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A large volume of research has acknowledged the role of oil price shocks to gener-
ate a significant stagflationary impact on U.S. and other oil importing nations. Recent
research however shows a paradigm shift in this oil price-macroeconomy relationship
since the mid 1980s, during which the U.S. economy has been relatively resilient to
oil shocks. Both output contraction and inflationary expectations have been milder in
the post mid 1980s than before. But the 2007-08 oil shock episode has re-emphasized
the immense impact of the ebbs and flows of oil prices on the U.S. economys ups and
downs. Global oil price peaked at $148 a barrel in June 2008. With the mortgage crisis
and credit crunch, oil was another blow too many. The U.S. economy swamped into one
of the greatest recessions of all times. According to Hamilton (2009), the 2007-08 oil
shock had a significant contribution to the recent recession. While a lot of work have
been done on the effects of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy, relatively little work
has investigated what triggers oil price increase. My research illustrates why it is im-
portant to study the cause of an oil price rise. First, the effects of oil price rise on the
macro variables depend heavily on what causes the shock. Secondly, whereas the oil
price hikes of the 1970s and early 1980s can mostly be attributed to exogenous events
in OPEC (Arab Oil Embargo, Iran-Iraq War, Iranian Revolution), a significant source of
oil price spikes in the post mid 1980 era have been an increase in global oil demand con-
fronting stagnating oil production. From a policy perspective, of course, policies aimed
at dealing with higher oil prices must take careful account of what causes oil prices to
rise.
Empirical research that demonstrates the resilience of U.S. economy to oil price
shocks builds on the implicit assumption that as oil price varies, everything else in the
global economy is held constant. Thus all variations in oil prices are taken as alike
and exogenous. This overlooks the possibility that oil price rise sparked off by diverse
events can potentially lead to different repercussions. This thesis is an attempt to de-
velop framework to study the endogenous increase in oil price. The oil price increase
arises from increase in U.S. growth rate, increase in foreign growth rate and a purely
exogenous oil supply shock by OPEC. The most important result is that the source of oil
price rise has changed after the mid 1980s - whereas before the mid 1980s, bulk of the
variation in oil price was due to supply shocks by OPEC, post mid 1980s, most of the
variation in oil price is explained by increase in U.S. and foreign growth. Furthermore,
if the origin of the oil price rise is the same, then the responses of most U.S. macroeco-
nomic variables display remarkable similarity in the pre and post mid 1980s. This result
gives us a new way to look at the resilience of the U.S. economic activity to oil price
rise since the mid 1980s. The resilience can be explained to a significant extent by the
fact that the type of shocks resulting in oil price rise has changed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A large volume of research has acknowledged the role of oil price shocks in gen-
erating a significant stagflationary impact on the U.S. and other oil importing nations.
Recent research however shows a paradigm change in this oil price-macroeconomy re-
lationship since the mid-1980s, following which the U.S. economy has been relatively
resilient to oil shocks. Both output contraction and inflationary expectations have been
milder since the mid-1980s than before. But the 2007-08 oil shock episode has re-
emphasized the immense impact of ebbing and flowing of oil prices on the U.S. econ-
omys ups and downs. Global oil price peaked at $148 a barrel in June 2008. With
the mortgage crisis and credit crunch, oil was one blow too many. The U.S. economy
plunged into one of the greatest recessions of all times. According to Hamilton (2009),
the 2007-08 oil shock had a significant contribution to the recent recession. While a
great deal of work has considered the effects of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy,
the triggers of oil price rise remain less studied. My research illustrates the importance
of studying what causes an oil price rise. First, the effects of oil price rise on the macro
variables depend heavily on what causes the shock. Second, whereas the oil price hikes
of the 1970s and early 1980s can be mostly attributed to exogenous events in OPEC
(Arab Oil Embargo, Iran-Iraq War, Iranian Revolution), a significant source of oil price
spikes in the post-mid-1980s era have been an increase in global oil demand confronting
stagnating oil production. From a policy perspective, of course, policies aimed at deal-
ing with higher oil prices must take careful account of what causes oil prices to rise.
Following is a brief description of each of my papers.
1
1.1 Different Sources of Oil Price Rise and Their Effects on the U.S.
Economy: Results From An Estimated DSGE Model
This paper develops a three-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
endogenous oil price. The oil price rise can result from any of the following events:
increase in U.S. growth rate, increase in U.S. consumption and investment, increase in
foreign growth rate and a purely exogenous supply shock by oil-exporters. The struc-
tural parameters of the model are estimated using Bayesian techniques separately for
the pre- and post-mid-1980 sample. My results show that the source of oil price rise has
changed since the mid-1980s: the oil price variation due to supply disturbances by the
oil-exporters is significantly higher in pre-mid-1980 sample compared to the post-mid-
1980s, whereas the oil price variation due to global growth is significantly higher in
the post mid-1980 sample. Furthermore, when the oil price increase is conditioned on
the same source and such that oil price increases by the same magnitude, the impulse
responses from my model display remarkably similar patterns across the two samples
even after controlling for changes in the structural parameter estimates. This suggests
that the response of U.S. aggregate real variables to oil price increase of different types
has not declined over time. If the cause of oil price increase in not taken into account,
i.e. if oil price is assumed to be exogenous, [Blanchard and Gali (2007)] then the U.S.
economy shows a relatively muted response in the post-mid-1980 sample. Our study
shows that this phenomenon can be explained largely by the fact that the composition of
the causes of oil price rise has changed after the mid-1980s.
2
1.2 A Sectoral Analysis of Oil Price Shocks on the U.S. Economy
In this paper, I seek to explain the relatively muted response of U.S. macroeconomic
variables to exogenous oil price shocks in the post-mid-1980s era. I use a factor aug-
mented vector autoregression framework to analyze a large dataset of 103 macroeco-
nomic indicators and sectoral data on output and prices to document some of the changes
in the U.S. economic landscape which are instrumental for the muted response: (i) Com-
position effect the U.S. economy has evolved from a manufacturing to a service econ-
omy. The effect of the oil price shock on the aggregate PCE price and quantity indices
which takes into account the true weights of the manufacturing and service sectors is
significantly muted compared to the response of the PCE price and quantity indices as-
signing equal weight to both sectors. Further, the difference between the weighted and
un-weighted price and quantity indices is significantly higher in the post-1984 sample.
(ii) Faster price adjustments due to increased competition following import penetration
reflected in the estimated sectoral Calvo probabilities conditional on oil shock and (iii)
decoupling of the sectors with a low energy usage from highly energy-intensive sec-
tors. Variance decomposition of sectoral output show that much of the variability of
production in the highly energy intensive sectors can be explained by common factors,
including oil. On the other hand, the bulk of the variability in low-energy-intensive
sectors is explained by sector specific factors.
3
1.3 Effects of Oil Price Shocks on the U.S. Economy: Role of Oil
Intensity and Wage Price Adjustments
Using a DSGE model with staggered Nash wage bargaining and with oil as a consump-
tion good and productive input, I show that a decline in real wage rigidity (union bar-
gaining power) plays a significant role in the dampened response of U.S. economic
activity and inflation to exogenous oil price shock in the post-mid-1980s. In addition,
increased energy efficiency, decline in the degree of price stickiness and improvement in
monetary policy have also contributed to the observed muted response of U.S. macroe-
conomic aggregates to exogenous oil price shocks.
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CHAPTER 2
DIFFERENT SOURCES OF OIL PRICE RISE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY: RESULTS FROM AN ESTIMATED DSGE MODEL
2.1 Introduction
“Big increases in the price of oil that were associated with events such as the 1973-74
embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Iranian Rev-
olution in 1978, the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, and the First Persian Gulf War in 1990 were
each followed by global economic recessions. The price of oil doubled between June
2007 and June 2008, a bigger price increase than in any of those four earlier episodes.
In my mind, there is no question that this latest surge in oil prices was an important
factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the U.S. in 2007:Q4.”
- James Hamilton in the Testimony Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the
U.S. Congress May 20, 2009.
There exists a large literature on the macroeconomic effects of oil price fluctuations.
But the broad consensus at least until a few years back was that oil price hikes induce
a contraction in overall economic activity and inflationary pressures in U.S. and other
oil-importing economies [Hamilton (1983), Hamilton (2006) and Mork (1994)].
However a more recent wave of empirical and theoretical studies, carried out for the
U.S. economy, identified a paradigm change in the oil price-macroeconomy relation-
ship since the mid-1980s. This research documented that the impact on U.S. economic
growth and inflation is somewhat muted than two to three decades ago. A variety of
explanations have been offered, including good luck [Blanchard and Simon (2001)], re-
duced intensity of energy usage [Bohi (1989), Bohi (1991)], a more flexible economy
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and better monetary policy [Blanchard and Gali (2008)]. All these explanations point
to a weakening of the relationship between oil prices shocks and U.S. economic activity.
This vein of research builds on an implicit thought experiment - oil price varies,
holding all other things in the world economy as fixed. However this assumption is an
unrealistic one. It overlooks the wide spectrum of events that can trigger an oil price
rise, treating all oil price shocks as alike and exogenous.
In this paper, we address the challenge of incorporating the various origins of oil
price increases. We revisit the questions addressed in the literature on the macroeco-
nomic effects of oil price rise, focusing on the U.S. economy. We depart from the
conventional oil price literature in two ways. First, contrary to the bulk of oil price lit-
erature which regards oil price changes as exogenous, we study what mechanism leads
to an oil rise in the first place. In our model, oil price increase can result from one of
the following events: increase in U.S. growth rate, increase in U.S. consumption and
investment, increase in foreign growth rate and a purely exogenous supply shock by oil-
exporters. Second, as well as investigating the effects of oil price increases triggered by
different events, we consider the role of endogenous price markup changes in U.S. the
transmission of oil shocks to the U.S. macroeconomic variables. The allows us to see if
the changes in the markup of U.S. firms can act as an additional transmission channel in
propagating the contractionary effects of oil price increases to the real economy.
To shed light on the questions outlined above, we build a three-country dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model and estimate the structural parameters of the lin-
earized model using Bayesian techniques with quarterly data for the U.S. economy sepa-
rately for the pre- and post-mid-1980s period. We extend the traditional New Keynesian
models to (1) three-country framework with two oil importing countries U.S.A. and the
rest of the oil importing world and an oil exporting country, (2) oil is used as an input
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in the production of goods by the U.S. and the oil-importing rest of the world. Firms in
the oil importing countries are assumed to adjust prices infrequently and households are
assumed to set wages in a staggered fashion. The oil exporting country exports oil to
the U.S. and the rest of the world. The key structural parameters of the model are jointly
estimated following a Bayesian approach as in Smets and Wouters (2003), Schorfheide
(2000) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).
We show that the estimates of the structural parameters of the model change sig-
nificantly after the mid-1980s. As regards to the variability of oil price, we show that
the source of oil price rise has changed since the mid-1980s: the oil price variation
due to supply disturbances by the oil-exporting countries is significantly higher in pre-
mid-1980 sample compared to the post-mid-1980s, whereas the oil price variation due
to global growth is significantly higher in the post mid-1980 sample. Further, when
we condition the oil price increase on the same source such that oil price increases by
the same magnitude, the impulse responses from our model display remarkably similar
patterns across the two samples even after controlling for changes in the structural pa-
rameter estimates. This suggests that the response of U.S. aggregate real variables to oil
price increase has not declined over time.
The importance of understanding the source of oil price rise was first emphasized
by Kilian (2009). He pointed out that distinguishing between the sources of higher oil
prices is crucial in assessing the effect of higher oil prices on U.S. real GDP and CPI in-
flation. Even from a policy perspective, policies aimed at dealing with higher oil prices
must take careful account of what causes the increase. For example, Bernanke (2004)
notes that, as a professor and textbook author, he “was accustomed to discussing the
effects of ... rising oil prices with all other factors held equal. However, as policymakers
know, everything else is never held equal. The increases in oil prices this year did not
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take place in isolation.” Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) also observe that oil prices
are not completely exogenous to the U.S. macroeconomy. Indeed the stochastic process
of nominal oil prices is quite different in recent years than during earlier periods. Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1996) show that the period of exogenous nominal price changes
effectively ends around the third quarter of 1980, when the period of endogenous nomi-
nal price changes begins. Thus it is of crucial importance to study the underlying causes
of an oil price increase.
The novelty of our approach is the endogenous oil price. Our three-country frame-
work allows us to assess how U.S. economic activity responds to oil price shocks aris-
ing from a diverse array of sources such as supply shocks from oil exporting country,
demand shocks resulting from productivity gains in the U.S. or in the rest of the oil-
importing world and increase in U.S. consumption and increase in Federal government
spending.
This three-country framework is particularly important in the context of the most
recent oil price shock episode, which everyone agrees was driven by an increase in
global demand. We observed a doubling of world oil prices between June 2007 and June
2008. Whereas historical oil price shocks were primarily caused by physical disruptions
of supply1 (for example the 1973-74 embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries, the Yom Kippur War, the Iranian Revolution in 1978 and the Iran-
Iraq War in 1980), the price run-up of 2007-08 was caused by booming world demand.
Particularly noteworthy was oil consumption in China, which has been growing at a 7%
compound annual rate over the last two decades (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). Chinese
consumption was 870,000 barrels per day higher in 2007 than it had been in 2005. The
surge of China and several other developing nations into the global economic scene was
1See Figure ?? for a detailed analysis of oil shocks and the associated events.
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Figure 2.1: Oil Price - 1947-2009
no doubt a significant factor triggering the 2007-08 oil shock episode.2 This important
development cannot be captured in a model if we assume all oil prices to be alike and
exogenous.
Our three-country set-up allows us to study the consequences of such a trigger, par-
ticularly the increase in oil demand due to economic growth in the oil-importing rest of
the world. We provide a comprehensive characterization of the magnitude of the effects
on the U.S. economy of oil shocks from diverse sources and we examine whether these
effects have changed over time. The paper demonstrates how global oil price spikes trig-
gered by different economic factors can lead to substantially different macroeconomic
consequences for the U.S. economy. For example, impulse responses to oil shocks trig-
2China alone has averaged nearly 10% annual GDP growth for a decade, and India hasn’t been far
behind.
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Figure 2.2: China’s Oil Consumption: 1990-2010
Figure 2.3: World’s 10 Largest Oil Importers
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gered by growth in the rest of the oil-importing world leads to a steeper drop in U.S.
output during the post-1984 episode; an oil price supply shock leads to similar drop in
U.S. GDP in both the pre- and post-1984 samples. This is in stark contrast to Blanchard
and Gali (2008), who attribute a muted response of GDP to exogenous oil price shock
in the post-1984 sample.
With regards to endogenous markup, we do not assume a priori that markup behav-
ior plays an important role in the transmission of oil shock; our analysis allows us to
evaluate the relevance of this channel. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) have argued
that macroeconomic consequences of higher oil prices could be amplified if markups
were to rise following an oil shock. But to our knowledge, no study of oil price shock
on the U.S. economy have evaluated the relevance of the markup-channel in the trans-
mission of oil shock. We find that indeed there is an increase in the markup following
an oil shock that acts as a transmission mechanism intensifying the impact of oil price
increase. However the role of markup in transmission of oil shock have significantly
reduced in the post-1984 period.
To model endogenous markup we follow the approach of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996). According to Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996), the three main approaches to explaining markup behavior can be considered as
special cases of a general formulation in which markups are allowed to be a function of
the ratio of expected discounted profits to current output. These three approaches are:
(i) the standard case where markups are simply assumed to be exogenous;3 (ii) the case
where the markup varies inversely with the ratio of expected discounted profits to cur-
rent output (associated with the so called “customer market” model of ?),4 and (iii) the
3In our case, markup in this case will be random as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
4According to Phelps and Winter, a higher level of expected discounted profits relative to current
output would induce each competing firm to reduce its markup in an attempt to increase its share in future
sales to customers.
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case where the relation between markups and the ratio of expected discounted profits to
current real output is positive (as in the “implicit collusion” model of Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986)5). Given that the ratio of expected discounted profits to current output
is normally dominated by short-run developments in the latter, cases (ii) and (iii) are
often referred to as situations where markups are procyclical and countercyclical, re-
spectively. Our estimated model can assess which of the three types of markup behavior
is supported by the data. Our estimates show that price markups are countercyclical,
which corroborates the evidence of earlier studies on price markups, cf. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991), Banerjee and Russell (2004), Wilson and Reynolds (2005) and
Jaimovich (2006).
Another advance of our analysis is its extended dataset spanning from 1960Q1-
2008Q1. We truncate the dataset to 2008Q1 instead of extending it all the way up to
2010 since the monetary policy in our model cannot capture close-to-zero interest rate
observed in the U.S. economy post 2008Q1. However extending the dataset till 2008 is
very important, since this up-to-date dataset allows us to study the most recent run up
of oil price which created a enormous stir in the world economy, ultimately leading to a
global recession. According to Hamilton, this latest surge in oil prices was a significant
contributing factor to the ongoing recession: “if there had there been no oil shock, we
would have described the U.S. economy in 2007:Q4-2008:Q3 as growing slowly, but
not in a recession.”
5In Rotemberg and Saloner’s view, a rise in the ratio of expected discounted profits to current output
allows for higher markups. In this context, implicit collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium given that
a firm’s deviation to a lower markup would not make it better off as such action would lead to sufficiently
large losses from punishment.
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2.2 Related Literature
Our work connects to four distinct strands of the literature. First, it connects to the
empirical research on the relationship between oil price shocks and the U.S. economy
starting with Hamilton (1983). Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, (1997) challenged
Hamilton’s finding, documenting that all U.S. recessions were preceded by both oil
price increases as well as a simultaneous tightening of monetary policy. Using a vector
autoregression methodology, they found that the systematic monetary policy response
to inflation following an oil price increase accounted for the bulk of the contractionary
effects of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy. Barsky and Killian (2002) and Kilian
(2005) also argued that the root cause of the abysmal macroeconomic performance from
1973 to 1983 in the U.S. was poor monetary policy, not the oil shocks.
Second, our work is connects to the vein of literature that deals with theoretical
models of oil price-macroeconomy relationship. Some important contributions in this
area include Kim and Loungani (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Finn (2000),
Leduc and Sill (2004), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005). Although these studies differ
in the way oil is employed in the economy (as a consumption good, as a productive input,
or as a factor linked to capital utilization), and hence in the implications of oil shocks,
they all make the assumption that oil price shocks are exogenous, and hence unrelated to
economic fundamentals. This is not only an oversimplification from a theoretical point
of view as Kilian (2009) pointed out, it is also inconsistent with what is observed in
reality. Nakov and Pescatori (2007) take into account the various sources of oil price
increase, but their model cannot study the effects of oil price increase triggered by an
increase in growth in the rest of world. This aspect can be studied from our model,
the presence of the second oil importing country in our framework adds an additional
source of oil price trigger. Economists by and large seem to agree that oil shocks after
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the mid-1980s were driven by events outside the domain of oil exporting countries e.g.
OPEC, specially demand-driven disturbances in the developing world e.g. China and
India and the Eurozone. In our paper, instead of taking oil prices as exogenous, we
study the underlying causes of an oil price rise, thereby endogenizing the oil price.
Third, our theoretical model draws from the real business cycle model of Backus and
Crucini (2000). We extend the model to a New Keynesian framework by introducing
nominal wage and price stickiness a` la Calvo (1983), in a multicountry setting similar
to that of Gali and Monacelli (2005). Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005), the model also incorporates a variable capacity utilization rate which tends to
smooth the adjustment of the rental rate of capital in response to changes in output.
We also follow Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) by modeling the cost of
adjusting the capital stock as a function of the change in investment. Our assumption
of wage stickiness relates to the issue that with an exogenous oil sector, and absent any
real rigidities (e.g. real wage rigidities as in Blanchard and Gali (2008)), there is no
obvious trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization, implying that full price
stability is optimal even in the face of oil sector shocks.
In contrast to existing models, ours features an oil exporter that charges an endoge-
nously varying oil price markup and exports oil to U.S. and the rest of the oil-importing
world. The main advantage of our approach lies in explicitly modeling the oil sector
from micro-founded first principles instead of assuming an exogenous process for the
oil supply. Also we assume a time-varying endogenous price markup for the U.S. to
study how markups react in the face of an oil shock.
Fourth, our theoretical open economy model is estimated with Bayesian methods
as in Smets and Wouters (2003), Schorfheide (2000) and Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez (2004). This allows us to disentangle the contribution of the Fed’s
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monetary policy from the effects of oil shocks. We estimate most of the models param-
eters separately for two separate samples (1960Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1) with
Bayesian techniques. This allows us to fit the volatility reduction in macroeconomic
variables better compared to other works which calibrate their model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 contains a description of the three-
country model with nominal wage and price stickiness and endogenous markup. Section
2.4 discusses our estimation of the model. Section 3.5 describes our results. Section 3.6
presents the conclusions of our analysis.
2.3 Model
In this section we set up the open-economy model that is the basis of our econometric
analysis. There are three economies: oil-importing country U.S.A. which we denote by
H, an oil-importing foreign sector (ROW) which we denote by F and an oil-exporting
foreign country. The oil-importing country U.S.A. is a canonical sticky price economy
with monopolistic competition and staggered price and wage adjustments. We impose
minimum structure on the oil-importing rest of the world and OPEC.
2.3.1 Oil-Importing Country - U.S.A
There are two types of firms in the U.S.A. : a representative final-goods (finished-
goods) producing firm and a continuum of intermediate-goods producing firms indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1]. The final-goods sector is perfectly competitive. The final goods are used
for consumption and investment by the households in the domestic economy as well as
in the rest of the oil-importing world and the oil-exporting country. There is monop-
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olistic competition in the markets for intermediate goods - each intermediate good is
produced by a single monopolistically competitive firm using differentiated labor, capi-
tal and imported oil. The details of production and consumption of U.S.A. are discussed
below.
Final-Goods Firms
At time t, a final good Qt is produced by a perfectly competitive, representative firm by
combining a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] using the following
technology:
Qt =
( ∫ 1
0
Qt(i)(Θpt−1)/Θptdi
) Θpt
Θpt−1 (2.1)
The above function is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator with a time-varying elas-
ticity of substitution measured by Θpt of a firm’s output to its relative price PH,t(i)/PH,t.
The aggregator is a special case of the Kimball (1995) aggregator. While the Kim-
ball formulation works with a general aggregator
∫ 1
0
G( Qt(i)Qt ,Θpt)di = 1, we work with
the Dixit-Stiglitz functional form with time-varying elasticity of substitution Θpt. The
choice of the specific functional form is only for computational simplicity. All our re-
sults hold true for the generalized Kimball aggregator.
Related to the time-varying elasticity of substitution Θpt, we have a time-varying
price markup µpt. Shocks to µpt can be interpreted as the “cost push” shock or markup
shock to the inflation equation as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). In light of costly
price adjustments, the firm’s actual markup hovers around its desired level over time.
The desired level of markup comprises an endogenous component, which is a func-
tion of the ratio of expected discounted profits Xt to current output, and an exogenous
component which is assumed to follow an autoregressive process. We assume the pro-
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cess for price markup shock to be modeled as follows:
µpt = f
( Xt
Qt
)
µ˜pt
ln µ˜pt = ρµp ln µ˜pt−1 + µpt (2.2)
with the restrictions f (X¯/Q¯) = µ¯p, where µp is the steady-state markup, and f ′(X¯/Q¯) =
µ1.
The parameters ρµp ∈ [0, 1) and µpt are mean-zero, serially uncorrelated innovations
which are normally distributed with standard deviation σµp .
Note that following the models of endogenous markup determination of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), we can write the expected
discounted profits of the firm as
Xt = Et
∞∑
k=1
αkΛt,t+k
[
(PH,t+k − ψt+k∆t+k)
]
Qt+k (2.3)
The parameter α has two different interpretations: in the “implicit collusion” model,
it measures the rate at which new products are created as well as the probability that
any collusive agreement will survive until the next period. In the “customer market”
model of ?, α represents the probability that a firm, for random reasons, be assigned a
market share in the next period that is independent of its past pricing behavior.6 Λt is
the stochastic discount factor defined in the next subsection. Qt(i) denotes the time t
input of the intermediate good i. The final-goods firm takes its output price PH,t and the
intermediate input price PH,t(i) as given and is unable to change them.
Profit maximization of the final-goods firm implies the following demand equation
for intermediate inputs:
Qt(i) =
(PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−Θpt
Qt (2.4)
6For more details refer to Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996).
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Integrating (2.1) and using (2.4), we obtain the following equation for the price index,
which gives a relationship between the price of the final good and the price of the inter-
mediate good:
PH,t =
[ ∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)1−Θptdi
] 1
1−Θpt (2.5)
Intermediate-Goods Firms
The differentiated intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1] with labor Nt, capital Kt and imported oil Ot according to
the Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Qt(i) = ZtNt(i)αN Kt(i)αK Ot(i)αO (2.6)
where αN , αK and αO denote respectively the share of labor, capital and imported oil in
the production function, with αN + αK + αO ≤ 1. The aggregate technology parameter
Zt is common to all firms and follows an autoregressive process
ln Zt = (1 − ρz) ln Z + ρz ln Zt−1 + zt (2.7)
with Z > 1 and ρz ∈ [0, 1), where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation zt is
normally distributed with standard deviation σz.
Oil Ot(i) is imported from the oil-exporting country OPEC by firm i at the world oil
price Pot , and Kt(i) denotes the employment of capital services by firm i in a competitive
rental market at the rate rt. Labor employment Nt(i) is an index of different types of
labor inputs used by firm i and is defined as follows:
Nt(i) =
[ ∫ 1
0
Nt(i, j)1−
1
Θwt d j
] Θwt
Θwt−1 (2.8)
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where Nt(i, j) denotes the quantity of labor j (supplied by the jth household) employed
by firm i in period t. The parameter Θwt represents the elasticity of substitution among
labor varieties. Note that here we assume a continuum of labor varieties corresponding
to each household j ∈ [0, 1].
We assume the process for the wage markup shock to follow an autoregressive pro-
cess:
ln Θwt = (1 − ρθw) ln Θw + ρθw ln Θwt−1 + θwt (2.9)
where Θw > 0 and ρθw ∈ [0, 1) and θwt are mean-zero, serially uncorrelated innovations
which are normally distributed with standard deviation σθw .
Let us denote by Wt( j) the nominal wage for the labor type j in period t, for all
j ∈ [0, 1]. As discussed in detail in the next section, wages are set by workers or labor
unions on behalf of each type of worker, and are taken as given by the intermediate-
goods producing firms. Thus at any point in time t, the firm’s cost minimization yields
a set of labor demand schedules for each firm i and for each labor type j, given firm’s
total employment Nt(i)
Nt(i, j) =
(Wt( j)
Wt
)−Θwt
Nt(i) (2.10)
for all i, j ∈ [0, 1], where
Wt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Wt( j)1−Θwtd j
] 1
1−Θwt (2.11)
denotes the aggregate wage index. Manipulating with (2.10) and (2.11), we get the
convenient aggregation ∫ 1
0
Wt( j)Nt(i, j)d j = WtNt(i) (2.12)
Now we can define the profit of the firm i as Pt(i)Qt(i) −WtNt(i) − rtKt(i) − Pot Ot(i),
where Pot is the relative price of oil in terms of Pt. Independently of how prices are set
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and assuming that the firms take the input prices of labor, capital and oil as given, the
first-order conditions for the ith firm are given by:
ψt(i) =
WtNt(i)
αN Qt(i)
=
rtKt(i)
αKQt(i)
=
Pot Ot(i)
αOQt(i)
(2.13)
where ψt(i) denotes the nominal marginal cost of the ith firm. With a Cobb Douglas
production function, the marginal cost of the firm is given by the following expression:
ψt(i) =
(Wt)αN (rt)αK (Pot )
αO
Ztα
αN
N α
αK
K α
αO
O
(2.14)
Following Calvo’s (1983) formalism, we assume that each intermediate-goods produc-
ing firm can reset its price only with probability 1− λp in any given period, independent
of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Also the ability of a firm to readjust
its price is independent of other firms. Thus, each period a mass 1 − λp of intermediate-
goods producers reset their prices, while the remaining fraction λp keep their prices
unchanged. As a result, the average duration of a price is given by (1 − λp)−1, making
λp a natural index of price stickiness.
Let P˜H,t denote the price set in period t by firms reoptimizing their prices in that
period. All firms will choose the same price, because they all face an identical problem.
Thus a firm reoptimizing in period t will choose the price P˜H,t that maximizes the current
market value of profits generated while that price remains effective. Therefore it solves
the problem
max
P˜H,t
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λt,t+k
(
P˜H,tQt+k|t − Ψt+k(Qt+k|t)
)}
(2.15)
subject to the sequence of demand functions
Qt+k|t =
( P˜H,t
PH,t+k
)−Θpt
Qt+k (2.16)
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for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } . Here PH,t =
[
(1 − λp)P˜1−ΘptH,t + λpP1−ΘptH,t−1
]1/1−Θpt
, P˜H,t is the newly set
price, Λt,t+k ≡ βk(Uc,t+k/Uc,t)/pit+k is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and
t + k, piH,t+k =
PH,t+k
PH,t
is the gross GDP deflator inflation rate between periods t and t + k,
Ψt(.) is the cost function, Qt+k|t denotes output in period t + k for a firm that last reset its
price in period t. The relative price dispersion at time t is given by
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−Θpt
di (2.17)
The first-order condition associated with the problem above takes the following form:
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λt,t+kQt+k|t
(
P˜H,t(Θpt+k − 1) − Θpt+kψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (2.18)
In the absence of price rigidities or costly price adjustments (λp = 0), we get the firm’s
optimal price setting condition under flexible prices; i.e., the firm sets its markup at the
frictionless level of Θpt/(Θpt − 1) :
P˜H,t(i) =
Θpt
Θpt − 1ψt|t (2.19)
As before ψt+k|t denotes the firm’s nominal marginal cost. In the presence of nominal
rigidities and costly price adjustments, the firm’s actual markup gravitates toward its
desired frictionless level over time.
Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] in the oil-importing country.
A representative household j maximizes the expected present discounted value of utility
streams:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUH
(
Ct( j),Nt( j)
)
= max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
At log Ct( j) − ζt Nt( j)
1+γ
1 + γ
]
(2.20)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor and γ is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Here At and ζt are preference shocks to the marginal
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utility of consumption and supply of labor, respectively. The household preference
shock At follows the autoregressive process
ln At = (1 − ρa)A + ρa ln At−1 + at (2.21)
where ρa ∈ [0, 1) is the persistence of the preference shock and at is a zero-mean,
serially uncorrelated innovation which is distributed normally with standard deviation
σa. The labor supply shock ζt also follows an autoregressive process
ln ζt = (1 − ρζ)ζ + ρζ ln ζt−1 + ζt (2.22)
where ρζ ∈ [0, 1) is the persistence of the preference shock and ζt is zero-mean, serially
uncorrelated innovation which is distributed normally with standard deviation σζ .
The aggregate consumption bundle Ct( j) consists of domestically produced goods
CH,t and an imported foreign good CF,t, and is given by:
Ct( j) =
[
b
1
η (CH,t( j))
η−1
η + (1 − b) 1η (CF,t( j))
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (2.23)
where b represents a measure of home bias in consumption and the parameter η ∈ [0, 1]
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The optimal allo-
cation of expenditure between domestic and foreign goods is given by
CH,t( j) = b
(PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct( j) and CF,t( j) = (1 − b)
(PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct( j)
The domestic consumption good CH,t is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of a continuum of
differentiated goods CH,t(i), given by
CH,t =
[ ∫ 1
0
CH,t(i)
Θpt−1
Θpt di
] Θpt
Θpt−1 (2.24)
with the associated domestic price index
P1−ΘptH,t =
∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)1−Θptdi, (2.25)
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where PH,t(i) is the price of the ith variety or good. As before, Θpt represents the time-
varying elasticity of substitution between the different domestic goods. The CPI price
index Pt is given by:
Pt =
[
b(PH,t)1−η + (1 − b)(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.26)
We assume that households in the U.S.A. have access to three different types of assets:
deposit dt( j), which pays gross expected real rate of return Rt, one-period non-contingent
foreign bonds BF,t( j), one period oil exporting country bonds Bo,t and one-period domes-
tic contingent bonds BH,t( j), which pay out one unit of domestic currency in a particular
state. There are no adjustments costs in the portfolio composition.
However following Turnovsky (1985), we assume each time a domestic household
borrows from abroad it must pay a premium over the international price of external
bonds. This premium or intermediation cost denoted by φF,t for rest of the world and
φo,t for OPEC ensures that net foreign assets are stationary and to ensure a well defined
steady state of the model.7 This premium depends on the ratio of economy wide hold-
ings of net foreign assets to nominal output and is given by φF,t = %texp
(
− φ
(
et BF,t
PH,tQt
))
and φo,t = %texp
(
− φ
(
et Bo,t
PH,tQt
))
where BF,t =
∫ 1
0
BF,t( j)d j is the aggregate net foreign asset
position of U.S.A.
If the U.S.A. has an overall net lender position internationally, then a household will
earn a lower return on any holdings of foreign bonds. By contrast, if the economy has a
net debtor position, a household will pay a higher return on any foreign debt.
Since the premium depends on the aggregate net foreign asset position of the econ-
omy, U.S. households take φ(.) as given when deciding their portfolios. In other words,
households do not internalize the effect on the premium of changes in their own foreign
7See Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for further details.
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asset position. The shock %t represents the exogenous component of the external inter-
mediation premium and will be referred to as external risk premium shock. The shock
process is given as
ln %t = ρ% ln %t−1 + %t (2.27)
where ρ% ∈ [0, 1) is the persistence of the premium shock and %t is a zero-mean, serially
uncorrelated innovation which is distributed normally with standard deviation σ%. The
intertemporal budget constraint of the household is given by:
Ct( j) + It( j) + τt +
dt( j)
RtPt
+
eF,tBF,t( j)
PtR∗t φF,t
+
eo,tBo,t( j)
PtRot φo,t
=
Wt( j)Nt( j)
Pt
+ S t( j) (2.28)
+
[rtut( j)K pt ( j)
Pt
− a(ut( j))K pt ( j)
]
+
dt−1( j)
Pt
+
eF,tBF,t−1( j)
Pt
+
eo,tBo,t−1( j)
Pt
+
Πt( j)
Pt
The household income consists of four components: the nominal income from labor plus
income from participation in domestic state contingent securities, Wt( j)Nt( j) + S t( j);
income from capital services minus the cost associated with variations in the degree
of capital utilization, (rtut( j)K
p
t ( j) − a(ut( j))Kt( j)); income from depositing an amount
dt( j) with a financial intermediary, which earns an interest of Rt; income from one-
period nominally riskless foreign bonds BF,t−1( j); and dividends from the final-goods
firms owned by the households, Πt( j).
The variable et is the exchange rate expressed in units of home currency per unit of
foreign currency. The household income is used in consumption of Ct( j) units of fin-
ished goods and It( j) units of investment goods, as well as in paying τt units of lump-sum
tax to the government, depositing dt( j) units to the domestic financial intermediary and
purchasing BF,t( j)(R∗t )
−1 units of foreign bonds purchase. We assume following Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) the existence of a complete set of securities that
insure the households against variation in the household-specific labor income. Hence
the first component of aggregate labor income and the marginal utility of wealth will be
identical across different types of households.
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The income from renting out capital depends not only on the level of installed capi-
tal, but also on the rate of capital utilization ut( j). The stock of capital is owned by the
households. The household j′s stock of physical capital, K pt , evolves according to the
equation:
K pt+1( j) = (1 − δ)K pt ( j) + F(It( j), It−1( j)) (2.29)
Here δ denotes the physical rate of depreciation, and It( j) denotes investment at time t.
Gross investment It consists of domestic and foreign final goods, and we assume that it
is in the same proportion as in the consumption basket:
It( j) =
[
b
1
η (IH,t( j))
η−1
η + (1 − b) 1η (IF,t( j))
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (2.30)
The price of investment Pt is the same as given by equation (2.26). The function F in
equation (2.29) denotes the technology that transforms current and past investment into
installed capital for use in the following period. Capital services Kt( j) are related to
the physical stock of capital by Kt( j) = ut( j)K
p
t ( j). Here ut( j) denotes the utilization of
capital, which we assume is decided by the household. Like in Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), we assume that the investment adjustment costs F(It( j), It−1( j)) are
given by:
F(It( j), It−1( j)) =
[
1 − S
( It( j)
It−1( j)
)]
It( j) (2.31)
The investment adjustment cost function S takes the following form:
S
( It
It−1
)
=
γI
2
( It
It−1
− 1
)2
(2.32)
Note that the function S satisfies the following properties: S(1) = S′(1) = 0, and
γI ≡ S′′(1) > 0. As regards the provision of effective capital services, varying the
intensity of utilizing the physical capital stock ut is subject to a proportional cost a(ut),
which is assumed to take the following quadratic form:
a(ut) = a1(ut − 1) + a22 (ut − 1)
2 (2.33)
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There are two restrictions on the capital utilization function a(ut). First, we require that
ut = 1 in the steady state. Second, note that a(1) = 0.8 Substituting (2.31) into (2.29),
we obtain the final version of the capital accumulation equation:
K pt+1( j) = (1 − δ)K pt ( j) + sIt
[
1 − S
( It( j)
It−1( j)
)]
It( j) (2.34)
where It is the investment-specific technology shock with mean unity affecting the ef-
ficiency of the newly installed investment good. We assume It follows the exogenous
stochastic process
log sIt = ρs log sIt−1 + It (2.35)
where ρs ∈ [0, 1) is the persistence of the preference shock and It is a zero-mean,
serially uncorrelated innovation which is distributed normally with standard deviation
σI .
Households face two forms of uncertainty. There is aggregate uncertainty that stems
from aggregate shocks, and in addition, the households encounter idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty. Being a monopoly supplier of its own labor, a household sets its wage rate, as will
be discussed in the next subsection. However, it can only adjust its wage at exogenously
and randomly determined points in time. In modeling this, we follow Calvo (1983).
We further restrict the analysis by making assumptions which guarantee that frictions
do not cause households to become heterogeneous. Namely, we allow households to
enter into insurance markets against the outcomes of these frictions. The assumption
is of complete domestic financial markets in this economy - i.e., that each household
can insure against any type of idiosyncratic risk through the purchase of the appropriate
portfolio of securities. This preserves the representative agent framework implying that
we do not need to keep track of the entire distribution of the household’s wealth, which
would otherwise become a state variable. Since households are identical ex ante they
8The parameter a1 will be pinned down by the model’s steady state, and we will estimate the parameter
a2.
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are willing to enter such insurance contracts. As a result, all households face the same
budget constraint in each period which (in nominal terms) is given by (2.28).
For notational simplicity, we ignore the j for now. The representative
household maximizes (2.20) subject to (2.28) and (2.34) by optimally choosing
{Ct,K pt+1, dt, BF,t, ut}.9 Let λ1t denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (2.28)
and λ2t Lagrangian multiplier associated with (2.34). The first-order necessary condi-
tions yield the following set of equations:
At
Ct
− λ1t = 0 (2.36)
λ1t = βRtEt
(
λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
)
(2.37)
λ1t = βφF,tR∗t Et
(
λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
eF,t
eF,t+1
)
(2.38)
λ1t = βφo,tRot Et
(
λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
eo,t
eo,t+1
)
(2.39)
rt
Pt
= a′(ut) (2.40)
qkt = βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t
[
rt+1ut+1 − a(ut+1) + (1 − δ)qkt+1
]
(2.41)
sItqkt
[
1 − S
(
It
It−1
)]
= sItqktS′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
)
− βEtsIt+1qkt+1 λ1t+1λ1t S′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2
+ 1 (2.42)
where qkt =
λ1t
λ2t
is the price of installed capital in consumption units, also known as
Tobin’s q and equaling 1 in the absence of adjustment costs. The ratio pit = Pt+1Pt is
the one-period gross CPI inflation rate. Combining the two first-order conditions with
respect to home contingent claims BH,t and foreign bond holdings BF,t, we obtain an
expression for (modified) uncovered interest parity (UIP) given by:
Et
(eF,t+1
eF,t
)
=
φF,tR∗t
Rt
and
Et
(eo,t+1
eo,t
)
=
φo,tRot
Rt
9Note that the Nt( j) is not a choice variable of the households. The households post the wage at which
they are willing to supply labor. Given the wage, the firms make the employment decision. The optimal
wage setting rule is discussed in the next section.
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Labor Supply and Optimal Wage Setting
We assume that labor cannot move across countries. Each household specializes in the
supply of a different type of labor indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, each household
has some monopoly power in the labor market, and posts the nominal wage at which it
is willing to supply specialized labor services to firms that demand them. Alternatively,
as noted in Gali (2008), we can “think of many households specializing in the same
type of labor (with their joint mass remaining infinitesimal), and delegating their wage
decision to trade unions that act in their interest.”
In a way analogous to firms’ price setting, we assume that during each period only
a fraction (1 − λw) of households drawn randomly from the population reoptimize their
posted nominal wage. Under the assumption of full consumption risk sharing, all house-
holds reoptimizing their wage in any given period choose the same wage and will thus
face an identical problem which we formalize and solve below.
First, let us see how the households choose the wage for their labor type when al-
lowed to reset their wage. Consider a household resetting its wage in period t, and let
W∗t denote the newly reoptimized wage. The choice of W
∗
t must maximize:
∞∑
k=0
(βλw)kEt
[
At+k ln Ct+k|t − ζt+k
N1+γt+k|t
1 + γ
]
(2.43)
where Ct+k|t and Nt+k|t respectively denote the consumption and labor supply in period
t + k of a household that last reset its wage in period t. Thus the expression (2.43) repre-
sents the expected discounted sum of utilities generated over the uncertain period during
which the wage remains unchanged at the level W∗t set in the current period. Households
maximize (2.43) subject to the flow budget constraints (2.28) and a sequence of labor
demand schedules given by
Nt+k|t =
( W∗t
Wt+k
)−Θwt
Nt+k (2.44)
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for k = 0, 1, 2.... and where Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di is the index of aggregate employment,
Wt =
[
(1 − λw)W∗1−Θwtt + λwW1−Θwtt−1
] 1
1−Θwt is the index of aggregate wages in period t, and
Θwt (as defined before) measures the time-varying elasticity of labor to its relative wage.
Instead of Wt, we will work with Πwt =
Wt
Wt−1 , the one-period gross rate of change in the
nominal wage, as the endogenous variable. The first-order condition associated with the
problem above is given by:
∞∑
k=0
(βλw)kEt
{
Nt+k|tUc
(
Ct+k|t,Nt+k|t
)[ W∗t
Ptpit+k
(Θwt+k − 1) − Θwt+kMRS t+k|t
]}
= 0 (2.45)
where pit+k = Pt+kPt is the gross CPI inflation rate between periods t and t + k, and
MRS t+k|t ≡ ζt+k(Nt+k|t)γ Ct+k|tAt+k is the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and con-
sumption.
Government and Monetary Policy
The fiscal authority is assumed to purchase an exogenous stream Gt of the final good,
financed by the collection of lump-sum taxes.10 For simplicity, we do not assume that the
fiscal authority has access to domestic or international capital markets. The government
budget constraint is:
Gt = τt (2.46)
We define gt = Gt/Yt, where the shock process for gt follows an AR(1) process given
by:
ln gt = (1 − ρg)g + ρg ln gt−1 + gt (2.47)
with ρg ∈ [0, 1) the persistence of the government spending shock and gt a zero-mean,
serially uncorrelated innovation which is distributed normally with standard deviation
σg.
10We assume for simplicity that government only consumes domestic goods.
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The central bank in the U.S.A. is assumed to follow a forward-looking monetary
policy rule given by:
Rt
R¯
=
(Rt−1
R¯
)φR[(pit
p¯i
)φpi( Yt
Ynt
)φy](1−φR)
R˜t (2.48)
where Yt is the output of GDP in the oil-importing country (defined in the next section)
and R˜t is the interest rate shock which evolves according to
log R˜t = ρr log R˜t−1 + R˜t (2.49)
with ρr ∈ [0, 1) and R˜t mean-zero, serially uncorrelated disturbances which are normally
distributed with standard deviation σR˜. As for the remaining quantities, R¯ = p¯i/β and p¯i
is the target rate of inflation, φR is the interest-rate smoothing parameter and φpi and φy
are the policy reaction coefficients.
Aggregation
We now aggregate the input and output demands of the oil-importing country U.S.A.
The aggregate labor demand in the U.S.A. is given by:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di (2.50)
while the aggregate demand for capital services and the aggregate demand for imported
oil are given respectively by:
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di (2.51)
and
Ot =
∫ 1
0
Ot(i)di (2.52)
The aggregate demand for final goods is given by:
Qt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
Θpt−1
Θpt
] Θpt
Θpt−1 di (2.53)
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which includes goods demanded by both the oil-importing country U.S.A. and the oil-
exporting country. The oil exporting country’s problem is discussed in the next section.
The aggregate demand for labor, capital and oil in terms of marginal costs and price
dispersion can be written as:
Pot Ot = αOψtQt∆t (2.54)
WtNt = αNψtQt∆t (2.55)
rtKt = αKψtQt∆t (2.56)
where ψt denotes the marginal costs and ∆t is the price dispersion as defined in (2.17).
Aggregate output satisfies the following condition:
Qt =
Zt
∆t
NαNt K
αK
t O
αO
t (2.57)
2.3.2 Oil-Importing Foreign Sector
We assume that the oil-importing ROW produces output Q∗t by using oil O
∗
t and labor
N∗t . We assume labor is supplied inelastically in the oil-importing foreign sector, so that
N∗t = 1. Similar to in the U.S.A., there are two types of non oil-producing firms in
the ROW: a representative final-goods producing firm and a continuum of intermediate-
goods producing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The final good is used for consumption in
the ROW and is also imported to the U.S.A. and to the oil-exporting country discussed
in the next section.
Production
At time t, the final good Q∗t is produced by a perfectly competitive, representative firm
using the continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The technology of the
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final-goods firm is given as follows:
Q∗t =
( ∫ 1
0
Q∗t (i)
(Θp−1)/Θpdi
) Θp
Θp−1 (2.58)
We assume that there is a continuum of differentiated intermediate-goods producing
firms in the oil-importing ROW. The production function of the intermediate-good firm
i in the oil-importing ROW is given by a linear technology:
Q∗t (i) = Z
∗
t (O
∗
t (i))
α∗o (2.59)
The aggregate technology parameter Z∗t follows an autoregressive process
ln Z∗t = (1 − ρ∗z) ln Z∗ + ρ∗z ln Z∗t−1 + ∗zt (2.60)
with Z∗ > 1 and ρ∗z ∈ [0, 1), where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation ∗zt is
normally distributed with standard deviation σ∗z .
The profit of the representative final-goods firm in the oil-importing foreign sector
is given as P∗F,tQ
∗
t (i) − P
o
t
et
O∗t (i), where P
o
t /et is the price of oil in units of ROW currency.
Cost minimization by the firms implies that
α∗oψ
∗
t (i)Q
∗
t (i)et = P
o
t O
∗
t (i) (2.61)
We assume producer currency pricing (p.c.p.), so that the prices of the imported goods
are set in the same manner as the U.S. domestic prices, i.e. the prices of U.S. commodity
imports adjust sluggishly as given below. As before, let λp denote the fraction of pro-
ducers who keep prices unchanged in any given period. Let P˜∗F,t denote the price set in
period t by firms reoptimizing their prices in that period. All firms will choose the same
price, because they all face an identical problem. Thus a firm reoptimizing in period t
will choose the price P˜∗F,t that maximizes the current market value of profits generated
while that price remains effective solving the problem:
max
P˜∗F,t
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λt,t+k
(
P˜∗F,tQ
∗
t+k|t − Ψt+k(Q∗t+k|t)
)}
(2.62)
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subject to the sequence of demand functions
Q∗t+k|t =
( P˜∗F,t
P∗F,t+k
)−Θp
Q∗t+k (2.63)
for k = 0, 1, 2..., P∗F,t =
[
(1 − λp)(P˜∗F,t)1−Θp + λp(P∗F,t−1)1−Θp
]1/1−Θpt
. The newly set price
is given by P˜∗F,t, while Λ
∗
t,t+k ≡ βk(UFc,t+k/UFc,t)/pi∗F,t+k is the stochastic discount factor
between periods t and t+k, pi∗F,t+k =
P∗F,t+k
P∗F,t
is the gross GDP deflator inflation rate between
periods t and t + k, Ψ∗t (.) is the cost function, Q
∗
t+k|t denotes output in period t + k for a
firm that last reset its price in period t.
The relative price dispersion at time t is given by
∆∗t =
∫ 1
0
(P∗F,t(i)
P∗F,t
)−Θp
di (2.64)
The first-order condition associated with the problem above takes the following form:
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λ∗t,t+kQ
∗
t+k|t
(
P˜∗F,t(Θp − 1) − Θpψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (2.65)
In the absence of price rigidities or costly price adjustments (λp = 0), we get the firm’s
optimal price setting condition under flexible prices; i.e., the firm sets its markup at the
frictionless level of Θp/(Θp − 1):
P˜∗F,t(i) =
Θp
Θp − 1ψ
∗
t|t (2.66)
As before, ψ∗t+k|t denotes the firm’s nominal marginal cost. In the presence of nominal
rigidities and costly price adjustments, the firm’s actual markup gravitates toward its
desired frictionless level over time. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale,
marginal costs are independent of the level of production and therefore common across
firms; hence we have ψ∗t+k|t = ψ
∗
t+k.
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Consumption
There is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] in the oil-importing country
ROW. A representative household j maximizes the expected present discounted value
of utility streams given by:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUF(C∗t ) = max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(C∗t ) (2.67)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor.
The consumption basket is an aggregate of U.S.-produced goods and ROW-produced
goods, and is defined as:
C∗t =
[
(1 − b) 1η (C∗H,t)
η−1
η + b
1
η (C∗F,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (2.68)
where b represents the home bias and η is the elasticity of substitution between U.S. and
ROW baskets.
The budget constraint of the oil-importing foreign sector is given by the following
set of equations:
C∗t +
B∗F,t
R∗t P∗t
+
B∗o,t
φ∗o,tRot P∗t
eo,t
eF,t
=
B∗F,t−1
P∗t
+
B∗o,t−1
P∗t
eo,t−1
eF,t−1
+
Π∗t
P∗t
(2.69)
where P∗t satisfies
P∗t =
[
(1 − b)(P∗H,t)1−η + b(P∗F,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.70)
and the premium φ∗o,t = exp
(
− φ
( eo,t B∗o,t
eF,tP∗F,tQ
∗
t
))
again depends on the ratio of holdings of net
foreign assets to nominal output.
The representative household in the oil-importing foreign sector maximizes (2.67)
subject to (2.69) by optimally choosing {C∗t , B∗H,t, B∗F,t}. The first-order conditions for the
household gives an optimal allocation of expenditures between the U.S. and ROW goods
implies:
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C∗H,t = (1 − b)
(P∗H,t
P∗t
)−η
C∗t and C
∗
F,t = b
(P∗F,t
P∗t
)−η
C∗t ,
Et
[
βR∗t
P∗t
P∗t+1
C∗t
C∗t+1
]
= 1
and
Et
[
βRot
P∗t
P∗t+1
C∗t
C∗t+1
eo,t/eF,t
eo,t+1/eF,t+1
]
= 1
Here we assume that changes in the exchange rate are passed through immediately to
the import and export prices, so that we have11
PH,t = κtetP∗H,t and PF,t = κtetP∗F,t
where κt is the shock to the terms of trade in the economy and is given as
lnκt = ρκ lnκt−1 + κt (2.71)
The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of the foreign consumption basket,
RERt =
etP∗t
Pt
.
Aggregation
The aggregate production function is given by:
Q∗t =
Z∗t
∆∗t
(O∗t )
α∗o (2.72)
The aggregate demand for imported oil by ROW is given by:
O∗t =
∫ 1
0
O∗t (i)di (2.73)
where ∆∗t is as defined in equation (2.64). The aggregate demand for oil input by the
ROW is given by:
Pot O
∗
t = α
∗
oψ
∗
t Q
∗
t ∆
∗
t et (2.74)
11If law of one price holds, then PH,t = etP∗H,t and PF,t = etP
∗
F,t
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2.3.3 Oil-Exporting Foreign Sector
The oil-exporting country produces oil which is used as an input in the production of
intermediate goods in the oil-importing countries outlined above. Unlike most works,
which treat oil production as exogenous, we treat oil production and capital additions in
the oil-producing country as endogenous. Our framework of endogenous oil production
allows us to distinguish between the economic effects of oil supply shocks vis-a-vis the
oil demand shocks.
Production
The oil production function in the oil-exporting country (OPEC) is given by
Qo,t = Zo,tKo,t (2.75)
where Qo,t is the oil production at time t and Ko,t is the stock of capital at time t.
The capital stock of the oil exporting evolves according to the following equation:
Ko,t+1 = (1 − δ)Ko,t + Io,t (2.76)
where δ is the rate of depreciation for the OPEC capital stock. The investment good Io,t
imported from the U.S.A. and ROW, is an aggregate of a continuum of differentiated
goods from the two oil-importing countries, and is given by the following expression:
Iot =
[
(1/2)
1
η (IoH,t)
η−1
η + (1/2)
1
η (IoF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (2.77)
with the price given by:
Popect =
[
(1/2)(PH,t)1−η + (1/2)(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.78)
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The optimal allocation of expenditures between U.S. imports and ROW imports of in-
vestment goods implies
IoH,t =
1
2
( PH,t
Popect
)−η
Io,t and IoF,t =
1
2
( PF,t
Popect
)−η
Io,t
The productivity of OPEC evolves exogenously according to
ln Zo,t = ln Z¯o + ρzo ln Zo,t−1 + zot, zot ∼ iidN(0, σ2zo) (2.79)
Note that OPEC’s market power in oil production implies that OPEC enjoys a time-
varying markup over its marginal cost which is given by:
µot =
αOK
1
1−αO
t Zo,t
OtδP
opec
t
=
α∗O(K ∗t )
1
1−α∗O Zo,t
O∗t δP
opec
t
(2.80)
where the values of Kt and K ∗t are given as Kt = W
αN
t r
αK
t N
αN
t K
αK
t
α
αN
N α
αK
K
and K ∗t = 1, and total
oil supply Qo,t = Ot + O∗t . Thus the higher the share of oil in production, i.e., the higher
are αO and α∗O in the two oil-importing countries, the higher is oil markup. Conversely,
the higher the oil production, the lower the oil price and therefore the lower the markup.
The novelty of this analysis is modeling the oil-producing country with a time-varying
markup over marginal cost. This is different from the conventional oil-price literature
which treats all changes in oil price as exogenous.
Households
The oil-exporting country is populated by a representative household that maximizes an
expected present discounted value of consumption utility streams given by:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cot ) = max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(Cot ) (2.81)
The consumption good Cot is also imported from the oil-importing countries. Like the
investment good Io,t, it is an aggregate of the differentiated goods from the oil-importing
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countries, given in the following form:
Cot =
[
(1/2)
1
η (CoH,t)
η−1
η + (1/2)
1
η (CoF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (2.82)
with the same price index (2.78) as before. The budget equation for oil exporter is given
by:
Popect C
o
t + P
opec
t Io,t +
Bot
Ro,t
=
Pot
eo,t
Qo,t + Bot−1 (2.83)
The optimal allocation of expenditure between U.S. and ROW imports is given by
CoH,t =
1
2
( PH,t
Popect
)−η
Cot and C
o
F,t =
1
2
( PF,t
Popect
)−η
Cot
Also maximization of (2.81) subject to (2.83) implies
Cot = βEt
[ Cot+1
Pot+1
Popect+1
Zo,t+1 + (1 − δ)
]
(2.84)
and
Et
[
βRo,t
Popect
Popect+1
Co,t
Co,t+1
]
= 1.
2.3.4 Market Clearing Conditions
In equilibrium, total oil production must equal total oil consumption. Thus the oil market
equilibrium is given as:
Qo,t = Ot + O∗t (2.85)
The equilibrium in the home (U.S.) goods implies
Qt = CH,t + IH,t + b
(PH,t
Pt
)−η
a(ut)K
p
t + GH,t + C
∗
H,t + C
o
H,t + I
o
H,t (2.86)
Equilibrium in the goods market of the oil-importing foreign country implies
Q∗t = CF,t + IF,t + (1 − b)
(PF,t
Pt
)−η
a(ut)K
p
t + C
∗
F,t + C
o
F,t + I
o
F,t (2.87)
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U.S. GDP, which we denote by Yt, is given by total sum of domestic consumption,
domestic investment and government spending plus exports minus imports:
Yt =
(
CH,t + IH,t + GH,t
)
+
(
C∗H,t + C
o
H,t + I
o
H,t
)
− P
o
t
PH,t
Ot − PF,tPH,t
(
CF,t + IF,t + (1 − b)
( PF,t
PH,t
)−η
a(ut)K
p
t
)
. (2.88)
Balanced trade implies the following relations must hold:
etBF,t−1 + PH,tC∗H,t = PF,t
(
CF,t + IF,t + (1 − b)
(PF,t
Pt
)−η
a(ut)K
p
t
)
+
etBF,t
φF,tR∗t
(2.89)
eo,tBo,t−1 + Pot Ot = PH,t(C
o
H,t + I
o
H,t) +
eo,tBo,t
φo,tRo,t
(2.90)
eo,tB∗o,t−1 + P
o
t O
∗
t = PF,t(C
o
F,t + I
o
F,t) +
eo,tB∗o,t
φ∗o,tRo,t
(2.91)
Here PH,tPF,t denotes the terms of trade (TOT). Bonds market equilibrium conditions imply
the following:
BF,t + B∗F,t = 0 (2.92)
and
Bo,t + B∗o,t + B
o
t = 0. (2.93)
2.4 Model Estimation
2.4.1 Empirical Methodology
The equations listed in the previous section represent agents’ behavior and identities
that altogether form a non-linear system. This includes the first-order conditions of
households and firms in the three countries, agents’ budget constraints, the monetary
policy rule and equations describing the exogenous processes which drive the economy.
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In order to estimate the model, we start by focusing on the symmetric equilibrium for
prices and quantities. We derive all the log-linearized equations of the model by taking
log-linear approximations around the deterministic steady state. The derivations of the
steady-state equations and the complete log linearized model are given in the appendix.
We adopt the empirical approach outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007), Smets
and Wouters (2003) and estimate the model outlined above by employing Bayesian
inference methods. Increasingly popular in the field of macroeconomics, Bayesian es-
timation involves obtaining the joint posterior distribution of the model’s structural pa-
rameters based on its log-linear state-space representation. There are a multitude of
advantages of using Bayesian methods to estimate a model. First, unlike GMM es-
timation of monetary policy rules and first-order conditions, the Bayesian analysis is
system-based and fits the solved DSGE model to a vector of aggregate time series. Sec-
ond, the estimation is based on the likelihood function generated by the DSGE model
rather than, for instance, the discrepancy between DSGE model impulse response func-
tions and identified VAR impulse responses as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Third, prior distributions can be used to
incorporate additional information into the parameter estimation.
In the following, we briefly sketch our adopted approach and describe the data and
the prior distributions used in its implementation. In this context, we also provide infor-
mation on the structural shocks considered in the estimation, and describe the calibration
of those parameters that we keep fixed. We then present our estimation results.
Employing Bayesian inference methods allows formalizing the use of prior empiri-
cal or theoretical information from earlier studies at both the micro and macro level in es-
timating the parameters of a possibly complex DSGE model. Additionally, Bayesian in-
ference provides a natural framework for parameterizing and evaluating simple macroe-
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conomic models that are likely to be fundamentally misspecified. As pointed out by
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004) and Schorfheide (2000), the infer-
ence problem is not to determine whether the model is “true” or to find the “true” value
of a particular parameter, but rather to determine which set of parameter values maxi-
mize the model’s ability to summarize the regular features of the data. From a practical
perspective, Bayesian inference may also help to alleviate the inherent numerical diffi-
culties associated with solving highly non-linear estimation problems.
Given the data, Bayesian estimation requires the construction of the posterior density
of the parameters of interest. If we write θ for the set of parameters to be estimated
through observations on a set of variables Y , the posterior density can be defined as
p(θ|Y) the probability distribution of θ conditional on having observed the data Y . The
posterior density forms the basis for inference in the Bayesian framework. Following
Bayes’s rule, the posterior density is proportional to the product of the prior density p(θ)
with the distribution of the data given the parameter set, f (Y |θ):
p(θ|Y) = p(θ) f (Y |θ)
f (Y)
where f (Y) is the marginal distribution of the data. The conditional distribution function
of the data given the parameter set, f (Y |θ), is equivalent to the likelihood function of the
set of parameters given the data, L(θ|Y). The likelihood function can be calculated from
the state-space representation of the model using the Kalman Filter (see Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004) for details). Bayesian inference therefore requires (i) the choice of
prior densities for the parameters of interest, and (ii) construction of the posterior from
the prior densities and the likelihood function. The remainder of this section discusses
briefly how to construct the posterior distribution. The choice of prior distribution is
discussed later, together with the estimation results.
Given the likelihood function and a set of prior distributions, an approximation to
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the posterior mode of the parameters of interest can be calculated using a Laplace ap-
proximation. The posterior mode obtained in this way is used as the starting value for
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. This algorithm allows us to generate draws from
the posterior density p(θ|Y). At each iteration, a proposal density (a normal distribution
with mean equal to the previously accepted draw) is used to generate a new draw, which
is accepted as a draw from the posterior density p(θ|Y) with probability p.
As discussed in Geweke (1999), Bayesian inference also provides a framework for
comparing alternative, not necessarily nested, and potentially misspecified models on
the basis of their marginal likelihood. For a given model m, the marginal likelihood is
computed by integrating out the parameter vector θ from the likelihood function:
L(Y |m) =
∫
θ∈Θ
L(Y |θ,m)p(θ|m)dθ.
Thus, the marginal likelihood gives an indication of the overall likelihood of the ob-
served data conditional on a model.
2.4.2 Data and Shocks
In estimating the model, we use quarterly time series for 12 macroeconomic variables
for the U.S. economy and also data on nominal oil prices (West Texas Intermediate
Crude) for two different samples: 1960Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1. The chosen
break date corresponds roughly to the beginning of the Great Moderation in the United
States, as identified by several authors, e.g. McConnell and Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000).
We choose the following 12 observable variables: real GDP, real consumption, in-
vestment, government spending, total hours worked, real wages, CPI inflation, GDP
deflator inflation, Federal funds rate, nominal price of West Texas Intermediate Crude,
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nominal exchange rate, U.S. crude oil imports. Real GDP, real consumption, invest-
ment, government spending, total oil imports and total hours worked are converted to
per-capita quantities by dividing by the U.S. population over 16 years. The monthly data
for CPI inflation rate, Federal Funds rate and the crude oil imports are converted to their
quarterly values.
All series are seasonally adjusted. The details of the data and the corresponding
sources are given in Table A.1 in the Data Appendix. In order to work with stationary
series, we detrend all variables except hours worked and Federal Funds rate using log
differences. We also demean all variables.
2.4.3 Calibrated Parameters
We partition the set of parameters in our log-linearized DSGE model into two subsets,
namely those parameters or ratios that are calibrated and those that are estimated. The
calibrated parameters are those for which solid evidence indicates their selection through
calibration exercise.
We set our model period equal to one quarter, and fix the calibrated parameters as
follows: We assume that the household discount factor β = (1.03)−0.25, implying a steady
state annualized real interest rate of 3 percent. We set αN = 0.64, which corresponds to
a steady-state share of labor income roughly equal to 64 percent. We estimate the capital
share αK and oil share αo separately for the two different samples described before.
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), we set the value of the parameter α, which
is the expected rate of growth of market share, to 0.89.
The depreciation rate of capital we take to be δ = 0.025, consistent with an annual
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depreciation rate of 10 percent. Also we set the value of µ¯p, the steady state markup, to
1.15.
We set the steady-state government share of output to 20 percent as in the data and
the value of elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η = 1.5, a
standard value used in macro literature [Chari et. al. (2002)].
The value of the home-bias b is chosen to be equal to 0.8 to match the steady-state
U.S. export-to-GDP ratio of 18 percent and import-to-GDP ratio of 21 percent.
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we choose Θw, which is the steady-state value
of elasticity of substitution between different labor varieties, to be equal to 10.
Next we need to define a value for γ, inverse of the labor supply elasticity, which is
not universally fixed in the literature. Gali and Monacelli (2005) give a value of 3. Yun
(1996) gives a value of 4, whereas micro-evidence shows a value of 0.6. [Greenwood
et.al. (1998)]. We choose γ = 1, the value reported by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) and Barsky et.al (2003). Table 2.1 gives a detailed overview of the
calibrated parameters of the model.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Mechanism Value
β Discount Factor (1.03)−0.25
α Rate of growth of market share 0.89
γ Frisch Elasticity 1
αN Labor share in production 0.64
µ¯p Steady State Markup 1.15
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
b Home Bias 0.8
Θw Steady state elasticity of subs between labor 8
η Elasticity of subs between home and foreign
goods
1.5
2.4.4 Prior Distribution of Estimated Parameters
Bayesian inference starts from a prior distribution of the model’s non-calibrated pa-
rameters, describing the available information prior to observing the data used in the
estimation. The observed data is then used to update the priors, via Bayes’s theorem, to
the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters. This distribution may be summa-
rized in terms of the usual measures of location (e.g. mode and mean) and spread (e.g.
standard deviation and probability intervals).
Thus in order to implement the Bayesian strategy, we must first specify the prior
distribution of the parameters we want to estimate, as well as the values for parameters
describing the stochastic processes of the exogenous driving forces.
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The location of the prior distribution of the 35 parameters we estimate corresponds to
a large extent to those in Smets and Wouters (2007) and other studies on open economy
models for the U.S. (as in Backus and Crucini (2000)). For all parameters bounded
between 0 and 1, we use the beta distribution. This consequently applies to the nominal
wage and price stickiness parameters and also the persistence parameters of the shock
processes.
For parameters assumed to be positive, such as the standard deviations of the shocks,
substitution elasticities between goods and labor, and markup, we use inverse gamma
distribution.
Table 2.4 give an overview of our assumptions regarding the prior distributions of
the estimated parameters. All the variances of the shocks are assumed to be distributed
as an inverse Gamma distribution with a degree of freedom equal to 2.
The distribution of the autoregressive parameters is assumed to follow a Beta distri-
bution with mean 0.90 and standard error 0.05.
For the oil share parameter, αo, the prior follows beta and corresponds to the values
obtained from the estimates based on U.S. data. Estimates suggest a value of roughly
0.04 for the period 1960-1983 and then a reduced oil share of about 0.02 during 1984-
2008. These estimates are in line with other studies of oil price shocks on the U.S.
economy. (Blanchard and Gali (2008), Backus and Crucini (2000))
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the parameters describing the monetary policy
rule are based in a standard Taylor rule: the policy reaction coefficients of inflation and
output are described by a Normal distribution with mean 1.5 and 0.125 (0.5 divided
by 4) and standard errors 0.125 and 0.05 respectively. The persistence of the policy
rule is determined by the coefficient on the lagged interest rate, which is assumed to be
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Normally distributed around a mean of 0.75 with a standard error of 0.1.
The value of the risk premium on net foreign assets is assumed to be gamma with
mean 0.001 and standard deviation 0.001, based on values reported in Backus and
Crucini (2000).
The prior on the adjustment cost parameter for investment is set around 4 with a
standard error of 1.5 (based on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)), and the
capacity utilization elasticity is set at 0.5 with standard error of 0.15.
Finally we need to specify the parameters describing the wage and price setting. The
Calvo probabilities are assumed to be around 0.75 with standard errors equal to 0.10 for
both prices and wages, suggesting an average length of price and wage contracts of three
quarters. This is comparable with the findings in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for
prices.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Posterior Distributions
We estimate the model using the Bayesian estimation module in DYNARE [Julliard
(2001)]. Once priors have been specified, DYNARE estimates the model by first
computing the posterior mode, then constructing the posterior distribution with the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6,2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 present the coef-
ficient estimates of the model’s structural parameters, as well as the persistence and
standard deviations of the shock processes.
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In this section, we first describe the coefficient estimates of the model’s structural
parameters for the post-1984 sample, and then compare with the pre-1984 sample esti-
mates. Overall our model yields plausible estimates of the parameters, which are broadly
in line with results from previous studies.
The estimate of the parameter governing the share of oil (oil intensity) in production,
αO, equals 0.039 in the pre-1984 sample. For the post-1984 sample, the estimate of
this parameter decreases to 0.018. These values are very close to the ones reported in
Blanchard and Gali (2008).
Turning to the behavioral parameters, the estimate of the Calvo parameter govern-
ing the wage rigidity equals 0.849 in the pre-1984 sample. The Calvo wage parameter
for the post-1984 sample equals 0.819, suggesting an increase in the frequency of wage
adjustment in the U.S. economy. This result is in line with Blanchard and Gali (2007)
and Blanchard and Gali (2008), who claim that labor markets have become more flex-
ible in the U.S. economy. It is well known that the 1960s and 1970s were times of
strong unions, and high wage indexation. Currently, unions are much weaker, and wage
indexation has practically disappeared, particularly in the private sector.
As regards the mode of the Calvo parameter governing the frequency of price adjust-
ment, we also see that the post-1984 value of 0.881 is smaller than the pre-1984 value
of 0.814, suggesting an increased price flexibility. This could be the result of increased
import penetration that has made competition more intense and prices more flexible
in recent decades. It is true that our degree of price rigidity is somewhat higher than
for wage rigidity. Our estimate of the degree of price rigidity, although slightly on the
higher side, is close to the Smets and Wouters (2007) estimates. However our measure
of inflation is based on the GDP deflator, which consists of producer prices, which are
stickier than consumer prices. In this regard, our estimate of the degree of price rigidity,
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and suggests a median duration of price changes of roughly four quarters, which is not
too far above Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) estimates of three quarters for consumer
prices.
With respect to the monetary policy, we make three important observations: first,
the mode of the inflation policy coefficient is larger in the post-1984 sample (2.033
in post-1984 sample, as opposed to 1.259 in the pre-1984 sample). This reflects the
strong anti-inflationary monetary policy stance of the Federal Reserve in the post-1984
period (Volcker-Greenspan period), and agrees with studies by both Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999) and Orphanides (2001). Second, the coefficient of the output gap is
also higher (0.214 in post-1984 as compared to 0.140 in the pre-1984 period). This
result is consistent with Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and does not support the
Orphanides (2001) hypothesis of activist monetary policy in the pre-Volcker regime.
Third, the interest rate smoothing parameter is higher in the second sample (0.859 in the
post-1984 period) than in the first sample (0.844 in the pre-1984 period).
The estimate of the response of the markup to the ratio of expected discounted profits
to current output also declines in the post-1984 sample. Our estimates suggest that the
coefficient of the response of markup to the ratio of discounted profit is 0.054 in the
pre-1984 sample and 0.029 in the post-1984 sample. This reduction in the coefficient
coincides with the conjecture in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). The positive value of
the markup response coefficient suggests a countercyclical markup, in line with studies
based on the U.S. economy.
Regarding the estimated stochastic process of the other structural shocks, the auto-
correlation of the foreign technology shock is very high in both samples. The autocor-
relation of the domestic technology shock and the household preference shocks are also
high (of the order of 0.90). The volatility of the domestic technology shock is signifi-
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cantly reduced in the post-1984 period (0.121 during the pre-1984 period and 0.089 in
the post-1984 period).
The standard deviation of the labor supply shock is the highest in both samples
(1.601 in the pre-1984 sample and 2.109 in the post-1984 sample). The volatility wage
markup shock is 0.095 in pre-1984 sample and 1.131 in the post-1984 sample. The
standard deviation of the technology shock is estimated to be rather small 0.121 in the
pre-1984 sample and 0.089 in the post-1984 sample. This low value can be rationalized
by the introduction of variable capacity utilization, which is expected to lower the value
of this coefficient as argued in King and Rebelo (2000). Finally, the standard deviation
of the interest rate shock is lower in the second sample (0.018 in pre-1984 sample and
0.011 in the post-1984 sample), suggesting a more erratic monetary policy in the pre-
1984 period.
Table 2.3 shows that the estimated model does a fairly good job in matching the
second moments and the post-1984 volatility reduction of the variables of interest. The
model slightly overestimates the volatility of GDP growth in both periods, but effectively
matched the post-1984 reduction in volatility. The volatility and its reduction is very
well matched for both CPI inflation and also GDP deflator inflation in both the pre- and
post-1984 samples. In addition, the model clearly shows an increase in the volatility of
real wages. This supports our estimate of a more flexible wage given by a reduction in
the wage stickiness parameter (wage Calvo parameter) in the post-1984 sample.
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Table 2.2: Tests for equality of parameters in the two samples.
Test p-value degrees of freedom
Wald test for all parameters 7.84 × 10−4 34
Wald test for structural parameters 3.02 × 10−4 10
LR test for all parameters 7.15 × 10−4 34
Table 2.3: Second moments of observed variables in data and model.
1960Q1:1983Q4 1984Q1:2008Q1 Percentage Change
Variable Data Model Data Model Data Model
∆ ln Yt 1.092 1.112 0.631 0.662 -42.22 -40.47
piH,t 0.711 0.694 0.267 0.242 -66.10 -65.13
pit 0.913 0.860 0.503 0.498 -44.91 -42.09
∆ ln Ct 0.841 0.876 0.548 0.574 -34.84 -34.48
∆ ln It 5.473 6.002 3.742 4.238 -31.63 -29.39
∆ ln(Wt/Pt) 0.587 0.614 0.832 0.846 41.74 37.79
Lt 2.913 2.811 4.162 3.911 42.88 39.13
Rt 14.592 13.757 6.844 6.531 -53.10 -52.53
∆ ln Pot 14.743 14.115 14.309 13.822 -2.94 -2.08
∆ ln Ot 13.031 12.886 14.419 14.094 10.65 9.37
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Figure 2.4: Prior(gray) and posterior(black) distributions of the estimated structural pa-
rameters
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2.5.2 Impulse Responses
In this section we will present the results of the set of impulse responses corresponding
to the six shocks of our model: oil supply shock, U.S. growth shock, foreign growth
shock, U.S. government spending shock, U.S. investment shock and U.S. preference
shock. The black solid lines in the figures are the point estimates for the impulse re-
sponses, shown separately for the pre-1984 and post-1984 samples. The shaded areas
represent the corresponding 90% credible intervals or Bayesian confidence intervals.
The impulse responses shown in the figures depict the reaction of real GDP, interest
rate, CPI, real consumption, price markup, labor hours, nominal wage, real investment,
foreign bond holdings, oil price and oil import to each of the shocks described above.
In depicting the impulse responses, we distinguish between the two periods, 1960Q1-
1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1. All shocks are adjusted such that they lead to a 10% rise
in the nominal oil price on impact.
The qualitative features of the responses presented in the figures are very interesting
to note. We will first analyze the oil price shocks that originates from events outside
the United States. Let us consider a negative oil supply shock triggered by political
tensions, or supply manipulations by oil exporting countries, such that oil prices rise
10% on impact. If we condition the impulse responses in such a way that the surge in oil
price is triggered by the same source in both samples and that the price changes by the
same amount, we are interested in how the responses vary across samples. As expected,
the oil price shock generates inflationary and recessionary pressures. However the drop
in GDP is not significantly different between the samples. The drop in consumption and
the rise in labor hours is also similar in the two samples, as is the increase in nominal
wage. The impulse response functions for the GDP deflator and CPI are slightly lower
in the second sample, but are contained within the confidence band for the first sample.
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On impact, the drop in GDP in the pre-1984 sample is 1.5% while in the drop in
GDP in the post-1984 sample is about 1.3%. The values for drop in consumption in the
two samples are very similar at around 0.07%, and the values for GDP deflator and CPI
inflation also yield similar results. The difference in the samples is even less when we
consider real oil price shock. Our results stand in contrast with those of Blanchard and
Gali (2008), who observed empirically that the effects of a given change in the price of
oil have changed substantially over time. Their estimates point to much larger effects of
oil price shocks on inflation and economic activity in the pre-1984 sample. Our findings
show that the responses of some of the major macro variables are not markedly different
when an oil price spike is triggered by the same event in the two samples.
Another interesting thing to note here is that our specification of the endogenous
elasticity of substitution shows that the rise in markup following an oil price increase
is larger in the first sample as compared to the second (about 0.8% in the first sample
and 0.2% in the second sample). This result confirms the conjecture in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996) of countercyclical markup following an oil shock, but is in contrast
to the perspective of Blanchard and Gali (2008), according to them the endogenous
change in the markup following an oil price increase had no effect in the transmission
of oil shocks.
Next we consider an oil price shock induced by growth in the rest of the oil-
importing world. The respective drops in GDP in the two samples are very similar
at about 0.04% on impact. The GDP deflator increases by 0.06% in the first sample and
by about 0.05% on impact in the second sample. The rise in CPI in the first sample is
0.05% and in the second sample is 0.04%. The muted response of CPI in the second
sample can be attributed largely to the Greenspan-Bernanke inflation targeting policy
regime. Also notable is the rise in the price markup following a rise in oil price - in the
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first sample markup rises by 1.5% whereas the rise in markup in the second sample is
only about 0.9%. The results are very similar at around 10% when we consider real oil
price shock and one standard deviation oil supply shock.
Our next focus is the case when a 10% oil price increase occurs due to growth in
the U.S. economy caused by a technology shock. Because of the technology shock,
output increases in both samples; interestingly the increase in output in both is simi-
lar at 1.2%. The drop in the GDP deflator and the CPI inflation are also the same in
both samples, and both these quantities fall by 0.75% in the two samples. As U.S. pro-
duction increases, demand for oil increases, which leads to an increase in the price of
oil. Induced by the technology shock, oil import increases, but the increase during the
pre-1984 sample is twice as much as during the post-1984 sample. In the pre-1984 sam-
ple oil import increases by 0.02% and in the post-1984 sample oil import increases by
0.01%. This reduction in oil import can be attributed to the increased oil efficiency in
the U.S. economy in the post-mid-1980s. Note that in the second sample, the reduced
oil demand is sufficient to generate a 10% increase in oil price since the oil supply has
become more inelastic over time. Several explanations can be advanced in this regard,
“peak oil” being one of the major explanations.
The increase in oil import leads to an increase in oil price, and we have a canonical
oil supply shock. As oil price increases, GDP falls, and inflation rises. However the
strength of this oil shock is not enough to bring down U.S. GDP growth to below zero.
Also while real wage falls in the canonical oil supply shock, in an oil shock triggered
by U.S. growth, real wage actually increases. In canonical supply shock, as GDP falls,
price rises, therefore real wage falls.The notable difference between the samples is in
the drop in the price markup, which is significantly larger in the first sample than in the
second, again confirming the conjecture of the presence of countercyclical markup as
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in the U.S. economy. But the countercyclicality seems to have weakened substantially
between the samples. One possible reason for this is the increased price flexibility.
Finally, we consider the case of U.S. households’ preference shock, such that oil
price increases by 10% on impact. Due to the preference shock, GDP increases in the
two samples because of increased consumption demand, but the increase is very similar,
about 4.5% in both samples. Increase in demand similarly causes the CPI to increase in
both samples by about 2%. Oil import rises with production, but this rise is higher in the
pre-1984 sample (about 0.025% in the pre-1984 sample and 0.015% in the post-1984
sample). Again this decrease in oil import between the two samples can be attributed
to the increase in oil efficiency of the U.S. economy. As oil import increases, oil price
increases. Once oil price increases, GDP falls, but the strength of the oil shock induced
by preference shock is not sufficient to cause a negative growth of output.
2.5.3 Variance Decomposition and Historical Decomposition
Table 2.10 decomposes the forecast error variances in real GDP, CPI inflation, real wage,
price markup and oil price into each of the 12 shocks described before. In doing so, we
distinguish between the two periods considered, 1960Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1.
The purpose is to make a formal assessment of the contribution of each structural shock
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Figure 2.17: Difference between impulse responses in 1960Q1-1983Q4 and in 1984Q1-
2008Q1
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to fluctuations in the endogenous variables.
The variance decomposition shows that the domestic technology shock has driven
real GDP fluctuations both in the first and second samples and both in the short and long
run. In the short run, technology shocks explain about 13.2% of real GDP fluctuations,
whereas in the second sample they explain about 9%. In the long run, domestic tech-
nology shock accounts for almost one third of GDP variability in the first sample. This
result matches with Smets and Wouters (2007).
In the second sample, contribution of preference shock in explaining GDP variability
increased (9.2% in the first sample and 19.2% in the second sample after the first quarter)
while the contribution of price markup shock has declined (17.7% in first sample and
11.4% in the second sample after first quarter). The declining role of markup shocks
corroborates our result for the impulse responses.
As far as exogenous oil supply disturbances are concerned, their contribution de-
clines from around 10.1% to 7.7% in the short run and from 7.5% to 4.2% in the long
run. In fact after four quarters, the role of oil shocks roughly halves in both samples.
Finally, we note that the role of monetary policy disturbances in explaining real GDP
fluctuations diminishes significantly from 11.9% to about 6.2%.
Turning to inflation, the role of exogenous oil price disturbance seems to decline
in the post-1984 sample (12.8% as opposed to 17.2% in the pre-1984 period). The
domestic price markup shock explains bulk of the inflation variability in the long run
in the first sample (42% after 20 quarters). However the role of price markup shock
declines in the post-1984 sample both in the short and the long run. At the same time,
the role of wage markup shock in explaining the CPI variability increases in the second
sample (from 6.9% to 9.4%). Finally the role of preference shock appears to rise over
76
time mildly (18% in the first sample and 21% in the second sample) while the role of
monetary policy disturbances in explaining inflation variability diminish significantly
between the two samples (from 7.9% in the first sample to 4.8% in the second sample).
With regard to the real wage, the wage and price markup shocks together explain
about half of the variation in both the pre- and post-1984 samples. The role of wage
markup shock nearly doubles from 16.3% in the first sample to 30.3% in the second
sample, whereas the role of price markup shock decreases from 38.1% to 20.2% in the
second sample. Again as for real GDP and CPI inflation, the role of monetary policy
disturbances is nearly cut in half (from 9.4% in the first sample to 5.1% in the second
sample after the first quarter).
By far the most interesting result is the variance decomposition of oil price. While in
the first sample, as much as 74.8% of the short run variability is explained by the OPEC
supply disturbances, only 46.7% of disturbances in the second sample are explained by
supply disturbances from oil exporting countries. Moreover the role of U.S. and rest of
the world growth shocks explain as much as 14% and 15.2% of the oil price variability
in the second sample as compared to 6.2% and 5.2% respectively in the first sample.
This result echoes the outstanding growth in the U.S. and Eurozone over the last ten
years and the ongoing process of industrialization in two of the world’s fastest growing
economies - China and India - as well as the fact that geo-political tensions in the Middle
East seem to be more under control.
As for the price markup, the bulk of its variation is explained by the markup shock
itself. The role of exogenous oil disturbances declines from 10.6% to 8.1% whereas
the role of domestic technology and household preference shock increase in the second
sample.
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Figure 2.18: Historical Decomposition of Oil Price
The historical decompositions in figures 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 show the contribution
of each shock to the evolution of oil prices and U.S. GDP and inflation respectively.
These figures represent the history of the variables for the pre- and post-1984 sample.
For the evolution of oil prices, shocks to oil supply are important in the pre-1984 sample,
whereas shocks to U.S. and rest of the world GDP growth and U.S. consumption shock
gained importance in the post-1984 sample.
For the U.S. GDP, growth shock and investment shock both are very important. The
role of oil supply shock has declined in the post-1984 sample as compared to the previ-
ous sample, whereas the role of foreign growth shock has become more important with
the world economy has a whole getting more integrated and globalized. The U.S. in-
flation fluctuations on the other hand seem to be dominated by the domestic technology
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Figure 2.19: Historical Decomposition of U.S. GDP
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Figure 2.20: Historical Decomposition of CPI
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and consumption shock.
2.5.4 Counterfactual Experiments
Table 2.11 reports counterfactual exercises that show that changes in certain parameter
values have a dampening effect of oil price increase on the various U.S. macroeconomic
variables. But it is interesting to note that the dampening effect is not uniform across
different sources of oil price increases.
The first counterfactual experiment assumes that the U.S. economy enjoys a 20%
efficiency gain in oil use i.e. αo decreases by 20%. This is found to reduce the effect of a
sudden oil price hike on both inflation and real output. For an oil supply shock, a 20% oil
efficiency gain reduces the contractionary impact by 4.5%, while inflationary impact is
reduced by 18.5%. For an oil price increase induced by growth shock from the rest of the
world, the contractionary impact is reduced by only 1.5%, and the inflationary impact by
1.9%. Similarly, for oil price increase induced by domestic growth, the contractionary
impact is reduced by about 3%. Thus the dampening impact depends on the source of
oil price increase.
The second counterfactual exercise reported in Table 2.11 consists of a fall in λw,
which amounts to reducing the wage contract duration by one quarter. This exercise
indicates that more flexible wages on balance induce a milder contractionary impact
following the disturbance. For an oil supply shock, higher wage flexibility reduces
output contraction by about 5% after one year. However, the lower degree of labor
market rigidity is also found to induce somewhat larger inflationary pressures (by about
4.5% after one year). For a foreign growth shock, however, the increase is labor market
flexibility reduces the contractionary impact of oil price shocks by about 10% after one
90
year, whereas there is no substantial effect of inflation after one year. For a domestic
technology shock, there is no noticeable milder effect on GDP or inflation for an increase
in wage flexibility.
The third counterfactual experiment reported in Table 2.11 consists of a fall in λp,
such that price rigidity decreases by one quarter. This exercise shows that an increase
in price flexibility reduces the contractionary impact of an oil supply shock by 10.6%.
Similarly for an oil price increase induced by a foreign technology shock, a higher price
flexibility reduces the contractionary impact by about 90% after the first year. At the end
of two years, a higher price flexibility reduces the inflationary impact mildly by about
1.5%.
In the final counterfactual exercise, the price markup is assumed not to respond to
the oil shock over the initial three years following the disturbance i.e. µ1 = 0. We find
that this generates a noticeable relief to inflation and output. This result agrees with the
variance decomposition results reported earlier showing that the markup does appear
to be highly affected by oil price shocks. For an oil price increase induced by an oil
supply shock, an unresponsive markup reduces the contractionary impact by about 18%
and the inflationary impact by 23% after one year. This exercise suggests that markup
behavior does play an significant role in amplifying the macroeconomic consequences
of oil price disturbances, as argued by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) for the U.S.
economy. For a foreign technology shock the unresponsive markup also reduces the
contractionary impact, but the magnitude is much lower, only 1.5%, with no noticeable
impact on inflation.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the various sources of oil price shocks. Oil price shocks are
not exogenous to the U.S. economy, rather oil price shocks can be triggered by a broad
spectrum of events, U.S. productivity growth, U.S. demand increase, foreign country
productivity growth and also oil supply shocks induced by the oil exporting countries.
We assess the extent to which increased macroeconomic stability in the U.S. after
1984 can be accounted for by changes in the constitution of the oil price shock. We
build a three country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to assess the im-
pact of various types of oil price shocks. We take the model to the data with Bayesian
techniques and performing counterfactual simulations. Our model involves two oil-
importing economies and an oil-exporting economy. Oil price shocks in the model
are not exogenous, rather endogenously determined from the demand and supply. The
model incorporates staggered nominal contracts in both product and labour markets, as
well as an intertemporal mechanism operating via consumption and investment demand.
Moreover, the model is extended to incorporate oil usage in production and endogenous
price markups.
The estimation results reported in this paper appear reasonable, in light of the U.S.
economy’s structural characteristics as well as the existing empirical and theoretical
literature. The DSGE model estimated here has been found to exhibit fairly good fore-
casting properties. With regard to structural parameters, we estimate a somewhat high
degree of price and wage rigidity, with the average length of wage contracts slightly
exceeding 5 quarters, which is seen to decrease post-1984. The price markup is found to
react positively to the ratio of expected discounted profits to current output, in line with a
number of existing studies for the U.S. Additionally, the postulated Taylor rule displays
97
higher predictability in the post-1984 period. The present study uncover evidence of
significant structural change, manifested by parameter instability between the pre- and
post-1984 sample periods concerning behavioral parameters and exogenous processes
driving structural disturbances.
The finding that the price markup reacts positively to the ratio of expected discounted
profits to current output deserves further discussion. As stressed by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996), this finding can be rationalized in terms of the “implicit collusion”
model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), which predicts that implicit collusion can
be sustained in a context of higher markups under the condition that any given firm’s
deviation to a lower markup would induce punishment from its competitors. Given
that the ratio of expected discounted profits to current output is normally dominated by
short-run developments in the current output, our finding would normally be labelled as
a situation of “countercyclical” markups.
With respect to the propagation mechanisms captured by the empirical DSGE model,
the qualitative features of the responses reported here are broadly in line with those ob-
tained in the literature. In the case of oil price shocks, they are found to generate infla-
tionary and recessionary pressures as well as a reduction in real wages and an increase
in the price markup. Overall, there is evidence that impulse responses to shocks became
milder in the post-1984 sample period compared with the pre-1984 period. Variance
decomposition analysis allows us to detect the smaller importance of shocks affecting
monetary policy and oil prices in the post-1984 period, consistent with the higher pre-
dictability of policy and fall in the persistence as well as (to a lesser extent) variability
of oil disturbances. Among other shocks, technology disturbances play an important
role in explaining movements in real output and inflation, as well as real wages in the
medium to long term. Preference shocks increase their share in overall macroeconomic
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variability in the post-1984 period, becoming of special relevance in the cases of real
output, inflation and real wages. Markup disturbances lose some of their importance in
explaining inflation and real wages seen in the pre-1984 period, though still remain the
key force behind price markup developments themselves.
Counterfactual exercises show that oil efficiency gains would alleviate the infla-
tionary and contractionary consequences of an oil shock, while higher wage flexibil-
ity would help constrain the contractionary effects of the disturbance at the expense of
wider fluctuations in inflation. Finally, the rise in price markups induced by an oil dis-
turbance is found to considerably amplify the inflationary and contractionary effects of
the shock, a finding that corroborates the prediction of the Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996) model calibrated for the U.S. economy.
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CHAPTER 3
A SECTORAL ANALYSIS TO OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY
3.1 Introduction
“What is black, sticky, comes in large tubs and causes depressions? No, not Marmite.
Here is a string of numbers as a clue: 1974, 1979, 1991, 2000. The answer is oil - and,
more precisely, large rises in the price of oil.” - Andrew Oswald, “Oil Price Puts Skids
Under Growth,” - The Sunday Times, U.K., Sept. 2001.
Since World War II, rising oil prices have gone hand-in-hand with U.S. recessions.
In fact, nine of the ten post-WWII recessions have been preceded by episodes of sharply
rising oil prices (see Figure 3.1). The 1990 recession is the one exception. Economic
research has long documented a relationship between oil price shocks and slowing U.S.
economic activity, with the consequences being declining output growth and possible
recession, higher unemployment rates, and a higher price level. Some of the earlier
studies to document the oil price macroeconomy relationship include Pierce and Enzler
(1974), Hamilton (1983), Rasche and Tatom (1977), Mork and Hall (1980) and Gisser
and Goodwin (1986).
However the effect of oil price shocks on U.S. economic activity seems to have un-
dergone a paradigm shift since the mid-1980s. The U.S economy was relatively resilient
to these oil price shocks - the output growth has been stable, inflation expectations have
been well anchored. A variety of explanations have been offered for this resilience, in-
cluding better luck Blanchard and Simon (2001), reduced intensity of energy usage in
the U.S. economy Bohi (1989), Bohi (1991), a more flexible economy and better mon-
etary policy Blanchard and Gali (2007). All these explanations point to a weakening of
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Figure 3.1: Oil Price - 1947-2009
the relationship between oil prices shocks and economic activity.
The recent oil price hikes have rekindled memories of the sharp oil price rises in the
1970s when the real oil price tripled in 1973 and then again more than doubled in 1979
(see Figure 3.1).
This paper is an attempt to ascertain empirically what led to the large responses of the
economy to oil price shocks in the past, and what changes in the U.S. economy that have
aided in countering the adverse effects of oil shock in the recent years. Thus the goal of
this paper is to assess empirically why the U.S. economy has been able to combat the
adverse effects of oil price shocks post-mid-1980s, and under what circumstances such
detrimental consequences could manifest themselves again in the future.
We show three major changes in the U.S. economy that we observe very clearly
from data. These changes serve as possible explanations for the muted response of U.S.
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output and inflation to the oil price shocks that occurred post mid-1980s.
(i) Composition Effect - Most research seeking to identify reasons for the declining
effects of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy has focused on the aggregate U.S. data,
thereby ignoring the role of the “composition effect.” The U.S. economy has largely
evolved from a manufacturing economy to a service-driven economy. Has this trans-
formation played a role in the muted response to oil shocks? There exists a substantial
degree of heterogeneity in the levels of energy usage across sectors. While the cost
share of energy may be small in aggregate U.S. output post-mid-1980s, energy inputs
are of considerable importance to individual sectors of the economy. These sectors
could be responsible for leading the economy into recession. Thus it is of interest to see
if output during oil price shocks systematically declined more in sectors of the econ-
omy where energy is used more intensively in production, and how have their responses
changed during the post-mid-1980 era. A sectoral analysis allows us to identify how the
low-energy-intensity industries performed relative to the highly energy-intensive indus-
tries following an oil shock. Our results show that since the U.S. economy has become
more service-oriented over the years, energy intensity of the aggregate economy has de-
creased. Consequently, the transformation of the U.S. economy to a service-driven one
have led the economy to withstand oil shocks more efficiently.
(ii) Decoupling of the low-energy-intensive industries - We analyze the evolution
of the degree of interdependence among the the three digit sectors over the period
1972-2008. Using dynamic factor model, we decompose the fluctuations in the sectoral
growth rates into an economy-wide component and a sector-specific idiosyncratic com-
ponent. Our results show that post mid-1980s, there is a clear classification of sectoral
linkages - sectoral linkages among the low energy sectors and sectoral linkages among
the high energy sectors. Sectoral linkages between the low and high-energy-intensity
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sectors have become substantially weaker during the post mid-1980s. Consequently,
most of the effects of oil shocks are absorbed by the few energy-intensity sectors. This
is turn allows for more resilience of the U.S. economy to oil price shocks during the
post-mid-1980 period.
(iii) Change in the frequency of price adjustment - Finally, we analyze the impact of
a change in the degree of price stickiness after the mid-1980s. Recent research (Boivin,
Gionnani & Mihov (2009)) and policy discussions have noted that the potentially in-
creased competition among firms as well as increased openness of the U.S economy
since the 1990s may affect inflation and economic activity. In the light of these consid-
erations, it is interesting to see if the frequency of price adjustment has increased after
the mid-1980s. Data shows that the sectoral price indices adjust at a faster rate compared
to the pre-mid-1980 period.
In this paper, we first estimate a factor augmented structural vector autoregression
(FAVAR) to study the effects of oil price shock on aggregate and disaggregated U.S.
prices and output. To do so, we use a large dataset of 103 macroeconomic indica-
tors and sectoral data on prices and output. We establish that changes in the sectoral
composition of the U.S. economy have played a pivotal role in the muted response of
U.S. output and inflation to an oil shock. Next, we disentangle the fluctuations in U.S.
sectoral production from those accounted for by aggregate or common economy-wide
factors and idiosyncratic sectoral factors. This framework allows us to assess the rela-
tive importance of aggregate and sectoral factors in explaining the disaggregated output
fluctuations and their evolution over time. Finally, we estimate the effects of oil price
shock on both the aggregate and the disaggregated prices. We study the magnitude of the
price responses to oil price shocks and investigate whether sectoral and aggregate prices
adjust faster to an oil shock in the post-mid-1980 sample versus the earlier sample.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 motivates the factor
augmented vector autoregressive framework, Section 3.3 discusses the econometric
methodology, Section 3.4 discusses the various datasets used in our estimation, Section
3.5 presents the results of our estimation, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Overview: Factor Augmented Vector Autoregression
Factor models have a long tradition in applied economics, finance and other quantita-
tive sciences. Firstly, factor models enable a reduction in the number of explanatory
variables (factors) when the variation of a cross-section of variables can be decomposed
into a low-dimensional common component reflecting the shared sources of variation
and a variable-specific idiosyncratic component. Macroeconomic variables tend to co-
move over the business cycle, and therefore their common variation over time may be
explained by a few dynamic factors. Secondly, large cross-sections of time series are
nowadays available to researchers and policy-makers, including central bankers who
“follow literally hundreds of data series”, as expressed by Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz
(2005). The potential gains of using large information sets are increased precision in
forecasts and a better understanding of the economy’s dynamics. In the context of the
FAVAR, a much richer information set is utilized in the econometric model than in the
standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model. This addresses the omitted variable prob-
lem. Moreover, because macroeconomic data are prone to measurement errors, dynamic
factor analysis of large panels may help to filter out the observable variables like real
GDP or inflation which may not be well represented by a single observed time series.
Econometric theory of the determination of the (optimal) number of factors has re-
cently been developed, notably by Hallin and Liska (2008), Stock and Watson (2005)
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and Bai and Ng (2006), Forni etal (2002) and Bai and Ng (2002) for the class of
dynamic factor models in the static representation. Including more factors in the fac-
tor model increases the statistical fit of the panel but at the cost of parsimony, whereas
choosing too few factors means that the factor space is not sufficiently spanned by the
estimated factors. The papers cited above propose various information criteria to guide
selection of the number of factors, but these proposals do not provide information about
the number of lags in the VAR. Consequently, the lag selection problem in this paper is
solved using the information criteria, and for a given number of factors, also the standard
Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.
As pointed out by Stock and Watson (2006), the curse of dimensionality in the VAR
is turned into a “blessing” of dimensionality in factor models, making them particularly
useful for representing the data-rich environment in which central banks and profes-
sional forecasters actually operate. Hence in our study of the effects of oil price shocks,
we will use the factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) as opposed to a stan-
dard VAR analysis.
3.3 Econometric Framework
Two ingredients must be combined to set up the Factor Augmented Vector Autoregres-
sion (FAVAR). The first ingredient is the dynamic factor model, and the second is the
standard VAR with observed variables. In this section, we lay out a formal framework
for FAVAR. The FAVAR methodology we use in this paper is based on the the work of
Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz (2005) and Boivin, Gionnani & Mihov (2009). As explained
before, the key feature of the FAVAR framework is to provide consistent estimates of the
macroeconomic factors by extracting important and relevant information from a large
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set of economic indicators. We estimate the empirical model by using information from
a very large set of economic indicators as well as from disaggregated industry-level
data for the U.S. economy. A notable advantage of this framework is that it allows the
decomposition of the fluctuations in each series to a common component and a sector-
specific component. It also allows us to analyze the response of all the data series to a
macroeconomic disturbance, such as an oil price shock.
The FAVAR framework is in principle more flexible than the VAR framework for
at least two reasons. Firstly, the VAR framework only uses a meager information set;
most VARs are restricted to a set of six to eight variables. Hence the VAR analysis re-
quires taking a stance on specific observable measures, for example, the Gross Domestic
Product as a reflection of “economic activity.” However “economic activity” may not
be perfectly represented by the GDP or index of industrial production or for that matter
by any single observable measure. Moreover any observable measure is likely to be
tainted from measurement errors. A second limitation of the standard VAR analysis is
the fact that, impulse responses in a standard VAR can be estimated only for a small
set of included variables. FAVAR, on the other hand, allows one to obtain impulse re-
sponse functions for literally any variable included in the dataset. For the context of
our analysis, it allows us to document the effect of oil price shocks on disaggregated
prices. It is also important to note here that the FAVAR is superior to the standard panel
VAR approach. We have a large dataset of economy-wide variables as well as industry
(sector) variables. Like the panel VAR approach, we do not want to a priori impose
the restrictions about which variables are most important for our analysis. The FAVAR
endogenously determines the most important variables by extracting the principal com-
ponents from the large dataset.
We now provide a description of the implementation of the FAVAR in the context
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of oil price shocks on the U.S economy. Let us assume that the economy is affected by
a vector Et of common economy-wide components, these components being common
to all variables in our dataset. To analyze the effects of oil price shocks, we include
the nominal price of West Texas Intermediate Crude, denoted by OPt in the vector of
common components. The common dynamics are captured by a K × 1 vector of unob-
served factors Ft, where K is small. The unobserved factors reflect general economic
conditions such as the economic activity, prices, productivity, employment, etc which
are difficult to capture by means of a few time series, but rather by a range of economic
variables. The joint dynamics of Ft and OPt are given by
Et = Φ(L)Et−1 + νt (3.1)
where
Et =
 OPtFt

and Φ(L) is the lag polynomial of finite order. The error term νt is i.i.d with mean zero.
The system of equations above is a VAR in Et, the only difference being the fact that
the factors Ft are unobservable. The factors Ft, more or less exhaustively summarize
of the information contained the large dataset considered in the analysis. Let Yt denote
the N × 1 vector of information variables, where N is large, i.e., N >> K + 1. Also we
assume that the set of informational variables Yt is related to the common components
Et by the following relation
Yt = ΛEt + et (3.2)
where Λ is a N × (K + 1) matrix of factor loadings, and the N × 1 vector et contains
the sector-specific components that are uncorrelated with the economy-wide common
components Et. These sector-specific components are assumed to be serially correlated
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and also weakly correlated across sectors.
As in Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz (2005) and Boivin, Gionnani & Mihov (2009),
we estimate our empirical model using a variant of the two-step principal component
approach. In the first step, we extract the principal components from the large dataset
Yt, to obtain consistent estimates of the common factors. Let us call denote the set of
principal components by PCt, so that our structural model in the second stage is given
by
A(L)E′t = t (3.3)
where
E′t =
 OPtPCt

and A(L) is the lag polynomial of finite order, A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag
operator L, and t is an (K × 1) vector of structural innovations or disturbances. t is
serially uncorrelated and var(t) = Σ , where Σ is a diagonal matrix where the diagonal
elements are the variances of structural disturbances. Hence the structural disturbances
are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. Note that we only consider the stochastic part
of the data-generating process because it is the part of interest from the point of view of
structural modeling and impulse response analysis.
We estimate a reduced form FAVAR equation given by
E′t = a + bt +
p∑
i=1
BiE′t−i + ut, (3.4)
where B represents matrix of polynomial of lag operators and var(ut) = Σu. According
to Stock and Watson (2002), the principal components consistently recover the space
spanned by the factors when the number of informational variables N is large and the
number of principal components used is at least as large as the true number of factors.
108
Next we estimate the structural VAR given by (3.3). This part of the procedure is exactly
similar to the structural VAR analysis, the details of which are discussed later. Our
implementation of the FAVAR follows Boivin, Gionnani & Mihov (2009), since we
impose the constraint that the oil price is one of the factors in the first step of estimation.
3.4 Data
Our dataset Yt consists of a panel of 103 monthly macroeconomic time series. The se-
ries are transformed to induce stationarity. The details of the series in the dataset and
their corresponding transformations are provided in the data appendix. The data spans
from 1972:1-2008:12. The dataset contains 103 updated macroeconomic indicators, in-
cluding measures of industrial production, price indices, interest rates, employment and
other macroeconomic and financial variables. As found in Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz
(2005), these indicators collectively contain useful information about the state of the
economy. We extend the dataset of Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz (2005) in three major
ways: first, we extend the time span to 2008:12. Second, since we are interested in the
effects of oil price shocks, we append a set of macroeconomic indicators pertaining to
energy. The data for the energy indicators are obtained from the Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA). Third, we also append disaggregated industry-level data published
by the Federal Reserve Board and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In particular, we ex-
tend the dataset by adding data on index of industrial production for the 28 three-digit
(NAICS classification, corresponding to the two-digit SIC classification) U.S sectors. In
addition, we also annex the data on producer and consumer price indices for 31 sectors.
The price data are obtained from the BLS1. However it is important to note that there
is no one-to-one mapping from the production indices to the price indices; hence the
1Refer to the data appendix for the details of the data and sources
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mapping used is only approximate. Thus the entire dataset contains a total of 162 series,
103 variables on economic indicators, 28 series on sectoral industrial production indices
and 31 series on the sectoral price indices.
3.4.1 Lag Length Selection
The standard results about the properties of the VAR coefficients and VAR estimation
(Hamilton (1994), Chapter 11) depend on the lag length of the VAR. The same results
extend to the FAVAR analysis. There are two main approaches used for selecting or
testing lag length in VAR models. The first consists of rules of thumb based on the
periodicity of the data and past experience regarding cyclicality of economic data. The
second is based on formal hypothesis tests. We rely on formal hypothesis tests for lag
length selection.
Two classical test statistics can be used to evaluate the lag length of a VAR model.
The first is based on a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test compares the max-
imum value of the likelihood achieved for a model with p lags to a model with p − 1
lags. The likelihood ratio function for a VAR model can be written as
L(Σˆ, B, p) = −T K
2
log(2pi) +
T
2
log|Σˆ−1| − T K
2
, (3.5)
where Σˆ−1 is the matrix inverse of the estimated error covariance matrix and log|Σˆ−1| is
the logarithm of the determinant of Σˆ−1.
Also used to determine lag length in VAR models is the information criteria such as
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian (or Schwarz) information criterion
(BIC or SC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. Information criteria measures are an ef-
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fort to determine the trade-off between model fit and parsimony. They are based on the
likelihood function for a model, penalized by the number of parameters. For two mod-
els that fit the data equally well (i.e., the same likelihood value), the more parsimonious
model pays a smaller penalty and is thus considered superior based on an information
criteria measure. According to Ivanov and Killian (2001), for monthly VAR models the
AIC tends to produce the most accurate structural and semi-structural impulse response
estimates for realistic sample sizes. Thus with our monthly FAVAR, we use the AIC to
determine lag length, suggesting an optimal lag length of 7. We are aware of the po-
tential sensitivity of the point estimates to assumptions about lag length as in Hamilton
and Herrera (2001). While including too many lags and hence an excessive number
of parameters introduces sampling uncertainty in estimating the parameters, at the same
time we cannot afford to overlook the fact that fewer lags also introduce omitted variable
bias. So we have tried with different other lag lengths of 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and found that
this does not alter the results significantly.
3.4.2 Identification
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equation
(3.3) from the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation (3.4). Some methods
give restrictions only on contemporaneous structural parameters. Others impose restric-
tions on the lag structure as well. A popular and convenient method is to orthogonalize
reduced form disturbances by Cholesky decomposition of the white noise covariance
matrix, Σu = PP′ (as in Sims (1980) among others), where P is a lower triangular
matrix with positive elements on the main diagonal. We will use the recursive iden-
tification scheme and justify why this is a satisfactory identification approach in our
case. The identifying assumption that oil prices are predetermined with respect to the
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U.S. macroeconomy at monthly frequency has a long tradition in both empirical and
theoretical work (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1996); Leduc and Sill (2004);
Blanchard and Gali (2007)). Recent empirical work by Killian and Vega (2008) lends
support to this identifying assumption. The assumption of predeterminedness permits
consistent estimation of the expected response of U.S. macroeconomic aggregates to an
innovation in energy prices. In conjunction with the assumption that there are no other
exogenous events that correlated with the exogenous oil price innovation, these impulse
responses can be interpreted as the causal effect of the energy price innovation. More
generally, we can interpret these responses as the expected change in the variables of
interest associated with energy price shocks.
Following the papers cited above, we identify oil shocks by assuming that unex-
pected variations in the nominal spot price of oil are completely exogenous relative
to the contemporaneous values of the remaining macroeconomic variables included in
the VAR. The theoretical justification of this recursive structure is as follows: oil price
shock can instantaneously affect the block of U.S. macroeconomic variables, but the
U.S. macroeconomic block cannot affect the world oil price instantaneously or in the
same month.2 Thus in this specification, oil price is Wold-causally prior to the remain-
ing macroeconomic variables in the system i.e., we place nominal oil price as the first
variable in our ordering. Since we are interested only in oil price shock, the ordering of
the remaining variables is immaterial. Note that the ordering of the federal funds rate
after the oil price captures the idea that U.S Fed will tighten monetary policy in response
to inflationary oil price shocks. We do not impose any restrictions on the lag structure
of the variables.
Our identification assumption outlined above allows us to recover the structural in-
novations t directly from the forecast errors or the reduced form residuals, ut. We can
2See discussion in Blanchard and Gali (2007)
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write the reduced form equation (3.4) in such a way that the residuals of (3.4) are uncor-
related. Writing the forecast errors as linear functions of the structural innovations, we
have ut = Pt. Hence Σu = PΣP′. Normalizing the variances of the structural innova-
tions to 1, i.e., assuming t ∼ (0, IK), gives Σu = PP′. Hence choosing P by a Choleski
decomposition solves our identification problem. This is the FAVAR extension of the
standard recursive identification of oil price shocks in standard VARs.
3.5 Effect of Oil Price Shocks
The purpose of this section is to discuss the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks
on disaggregated prices and quantities, and to explore the reasons underlying changes
in the effects of oil price shocks on the US economy. We use the Factor Augmented
Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) approach discussed above to analyze how the effects of
oil price shocks on the aggregate U.S economy have evolved over time. As mentioned
before, a common problem with the small-sized VARs is that to maintain sufficient de-
grees of freedom, estimated VARs are typically low dimensional, involving no more
than 6-8 variables. Consequently, they do not allow us to understand the effects of oil
price shocks on a large number of variables of interest. The FAVAR described above al-
lows us to circumvent this shortcoming of traditional VARs. In this section we focus on
the effects of oil price shocks on our large panel of disaggregated prices and quantities.
3.5.1 Responses to Oil Price Shocks
We define an oil price shock, i.e., an unexpected 10% increase in the nominal price of
West Texas Intermediate Crude (in dollars per barrel). Figure 2 shows the estimated im-
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pulse response functions for aggregate Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price
and quantity indices to an oil price shock, where the oil price shock is identified as
a 10% innovation to the oil price equation. Estimates are reported for two different
sample periods: 1972:2-1984:12 and 1984:1-2008:12. The left-hand side panel shows
impulse responses for the sample 1972:2-1984:12 and the right-hand side shows im-
pulse responses for the sample 1984:1-2005:12. The break date chosen corresponds
roughly to the beginning of the Great Moderation in the United States, as identified by
several authors [e.g.McConnell and Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000)]. Note that each subperiod
contains two of the four large oil shock episodes identified in the previous section. The
solid (black) line shows the responses generated by our FAVAR and the dashed lines on
both sides of the impulse responses show the 90% residual-based bootstrap confidence
intervals.
Three important features of oil price shock dynamics emerge from the FAVAR anal-
ysis:
(i) The mean impulse response from the FAVAR for the aggregate PCE quantity index
is statistically significantly higher than the mean impulse response in the second
sample: The mean impulse response of the PCE quantity index for the pre-mid-
1980 sample is -0.2826, whereas the mean impulse response for the post mid-1980
sample is -0.1521. The null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected by a
pairwise t-test in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the absolute value of the
mean is higher in the first sample with p-value less than 10−4. The PCE quantity
index in the first sample reaches its trough after four quarters when it falls by -
0.6%, whereas the decline in the PCE quantity index in the second sample after
four quarters, is only 0.2%, about one-third of the decline in the first sample.
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Table 3.1: Paired t-test for Aggregate PCE Quantity Indices
Variable Mean Std-Err. Std.Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
PRE -0.2826 0.0131 0.0918 -0.3090 -0.2562
POST -0.1521 0.0059 0.0415 -0.1640 -0.1402
Diff -0.1304 0.0143 0.1006 -0.1594 -0.1015
H0: Mean(diff)=0, Ha: Mean(Diff)< 0, t: -9.0755, DF=49, P-value=0.0000.
(ii) The mean rise in the PCE price index is lower in the post 1984 sample: The initial
rise in the prices following the shock is higher in the second sample for the first
four quarters. However the mean price response in the first sample is significantly
greater than that of the second sample. The null hypothesis that the means are
equal is rejected by a pairwise t test in favor of the alternate that the mean in the
first sample is higher with p-value less than 10−4. The peak of the impulse is
reached much earlier in the second sample. However the peak is much lower in
the second sample as compared to the first sample (0.22 in the second sample and
0.39 in the first sample). Furthermore, price rises faster and reaches its peak at 6
months in the second sample, while in the first sample where the peak is reached
at 23 months. Thus the speed of price adjustment is much faster in the second
sample than in the first sample. This suggests that aggregate prices have become
more flexible and adjust faster in the second sample when compared to the first
sample. More details on disaggregated price adjustments are provided in the next
section.
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Table 3.2: Paired t-test for Aggregate PCE Price Indices
Variable Mean Std-Err. Std.Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
PRE 0.2957 0.0107 0.0754 0.2741 0.3174
POST 0.1533 0.0053 0.0372 0.1426 0.1640
Diff 0.1424 0.0105 0.0740 0.1211 0.1637
H0: Mean(diff)=0, Ha: Mean(Diff)< 0, t: 13.4702, DF=49, P-value=0.0000.
(iii) Persistence of inflation is higher in the first sample: The next two tables give the
autocorrelation conditional on shock of inflation for the aggregate PCE series as
well as the unweighted average PCE series. It is clear from the series that the
persistence of inflation for PCE aggregate, PCE unweighted and disaggregated
PCE series for manufacturing, services and energy goods and services display a
very high level of persistence in the pre-mid-1980 sample. This persistence seems
to have declined significantly in the second sample, implying that price adjustment
after the oil shock is much faster.
3.5.2 Composition Effect
It is well known that the U.S economy has evolved into a service-driven economy over
time. Often referred to as the process of “deindustrialization”, the share of employment
in manufacturing has fallen over the years. This appears to mirror the decline in the
share of manufacturing value added in the U.S. GDP. Measured in real terms, the share
of expenditure in manufacturing has also been declining in the U.S. According to the
CIA World Factbook, in 2007 services made up 78.5% of the U.S. GDP, manufactur-
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ing made up 20.5% and agriculture less than 1%. To see if this change in the sectoral
composition has played a role in the dampened response of oil price shocks post 1984,
let us first analyze the impulse responses of the PCE quantity and price indices in man-
ufacturing and service sectors. Although there exists a substantial heterogeneity in the
magnitude of price and quantity responses of manufacturing and services, the qualita-
tive responses of the differences across the two samples are same - impulse responses
for both sectors appear to be more muted in the second sample. The PCE quantity for
manufacturing drops by 0.75% after 4 quarters in the first sample before reaching the
trough, after which it shows signs of recovery. The service PCE quantity index for the
first sample, on the other hand drops about 0.28% before exhibiting signs of recovery.
As expected, the service sector as expected contracts by only a third of the manufactur-
ing sector after the oil price shock. This result is intuitive: the service sector is inherently
less energy-intensive and therefore less affected by energy price fluctuations. However
there is a short-run adverse spillover effect from the manufacturing to the service sector
that is reflected in the PCE services. As a result of the oil shock, commodity prices
in manufacturing sector rise faster, hence with a fixed amount of income, consumer
expenditure on services falls. This spillover effect accounts for at least a part of the
contraction in the service sector. On the whole, responses of PCE quantity for manufac-
turing and services both display a more muted response; although in both manufacturing
and services the PCE quantity index shows a persistent decline following the oil shock
in both pre- and post- mid-1980 samples, the decline is only about half that experienced
in the first sample. The PCE price indices for manufacturing and services in the second
sample, however, show a lower volatility and a faster adjustment (less persistence).
To further corroborate the role of change in sectoral composition, we now run a
counterfactual experiment. We plot the unweighted average of the impulse responses of
manufacturing and services and compare those to the aggregate PCE price and quantity
119
indices. The aggregate PCE price and quantity indices take into account the true weights
of the manufacturing and service sectors, whereas the average PCE assigns equal weight
to both sectors. It is interesting to note that the average price and quantity responses are
different - both the rise in price and the drop in quantity for the unweighted PCE are
more than the weighted (aggregate) PCE price and quantity indices shown in Figure 5.
Another interesting observation is to see how the difference between the impulse
responses of the weighted and unweighted PCE indices has evolved over time. To see
this, we first compute the difference between the impulse responses of the weighted
and unweighted PCE price indices separately for the pre- and post- mid-1980 samples.
Next we do a mean comparison test to determine if the difference between the pre and
post 1985 difference is statistically significant or not. Our t-test shows (Tables 5 and 6)
that the difference between the weighted and unweighted price and quantity indices are
significantly higher in the post 1985 sample with a p-value of less than 10−4. This implies
that sectoral weights play an important role in explaining the reduced impact of oil
price shocks on the U.S. output and inflation, and that the role of sectoral weights have
changed significantly between the samples due to the U.S. economy moving towards a
service-oriented economy.
Table 3.5: Paired t-test for Aggregate and Unweighted PCE Quantity Indices
Variable Mean Std-Err. Std.Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
PRE(Agg-Avg) 0.0086 0.0005 0.0035 0.0076 0.0097
POST(Agg-Avg) 0.0043 0.0007 0.0053 0.0028 0.0059
Diff 0.0043 0.0010 0.0073 0.0021 0.0064
H0: Mean(diff)=0, Ha: Mean(Diff)> 0, t: 4.0901, DF=49, P-value=0.0000.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses of Aggregate PCE Price and Quantity Indices
Table 3.6: Paired t-test for Aggregate and Unweighted PCE Price Indices
Variable Mean Std-Err. Std.Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
PRE(Agg-Avg) -0.0073 0.0002 0.0020 -0.0079 -0.0067
POST(Agg-Avg) 0.0382 0.0025 0.0181 -0.0434 -0.0330
Diff 0.0308 0.0025 0.0176 0.0258 0.0359
H0: Mean(diff)=0, Ha: Mean(Diff)> 0, t: 12.2499, DF=49, P-value=0.0000.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses of Manufacturing PCE Price and Quantity Indices
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses of Service PCE Price and Quantity Indices
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses of Aggregate PCE Price and Quantity Indices
3.5.3 Sectoral versus Aggregate Shocks
The U.S. economy’s production landscape has shifted dramatically since the mid-1980s.
A very high level of import penetration has lead to a rapid increase in U.S. trade linkages
with other countries. As a natural byproduct of this development, the U.S. sectors are
less integrated with each other. In this section, our objective is to provide an empirical
characterization of the reduced linkages among different sectors of the U.S. economy.
We seek to answer how the linkages between sectors have evolved over time. We again
employ the dynamic factor model to decompose the fluctuations in sectoral output into
two factors: (i) economy-wide common factors and (ii) sector-specific components as
follows: Let y jt denote the growth rate of production (industrial production) in sector j.
y jt = (β
j
E′)
T E′t + e
j
t (3.6)
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where as defined before
E′t =
 OPtPCt

We denote the transpose of a vector β by βT . This formulation allows us to disentangle
the fluctuations in sectoral output growth rates due to the economy-wide common factors
(Et) and the sector-specific components represented by eit. The β parameters denote the
factor loadings and capture the sensitivity of each variable to the latent factors. For each
y j, the estimated factor loadings quantify the extent to which the variable moves with
the economy-wide factors, including oil price.
We use variance decompositions to measure the relative contributions of the aggre-
gate economy-wide and sector-specific factors to output fluctuations in each sector. This
provides an empirical assessment of how much of a sector’s output fluctuations are as-
sociated with aggregate fluctuations and how much is attributable to the sectoral factors.
We estimate the share of the variance of each macroeconomic variable attributable to
each of the three factors and the idiosyncratic component. With orthogonal factors, the
variance of the growth rate of the observable quantity y jt can be written as follows:
var(y jt ) = (β
j
E′)
T var(E′t )β
j
E′ + var(e
j
t ) (3.7)
If the comovement in sectoral growth rates is driven by aggregate (common) fac-
tors, it would follow that these shocks represent the dominant source of variation in the
sectoral and aggregate output. However, this calculation is only approximate, since the
diagonal elements of the production covariance matrix would themselves partly reflect
the effects of aggregate shocks.
We now examine the evolutions of the economy-wide common factors and the
sector-specific factors, and how these factors match the actual output growth. Our results
show a clear division of the sectors in two groups: high-energy-intensity sectors and
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low-energy-intensity sectors. The low- energy-intensity sectors have decoupled from
the high-energy-intensity sectors. While much of the variability of production in the
high-energy-intensity sectors can be explained by the common factors which includes
oil, bulk of the variability in the low intensive sectors is explained by sector specific
factors. Tables 7 and 8 show the 5-factor model’s implied standard deviation of sectoral
production as well as the fraction of the variability of sectoral production explained by
the common factors E′t . For the relative high-energy-intensity sectors, e.g., electric and
gas utilities, petroleum and coal products, motor vehicles and parts, aerospace and trans-
portation, the R2 statistic which measures the fraction of variance of output explained
by common factors is much higher for the post-mid-1980 sample. These common fac-
tors represent not only aggregate shocks but also propagation of sectoral shocks through
input-output linkages between sectors. For these sectors, since the input-output linkages
are strong, the effects of oil price shocks are transmitted rapidly.
For the low-energy-intensity sectors, e.g., apparel and leather, wood products, food,
beverage and tobacco, more than 50% of the variation is attributable to the common
factors, and the contribution only increases between the two samples. Thus for the low-
energy-intensity sectors, the common factors are more important in explaining output
variation than the idiosyncratic sector-specific factors.
To summarize, there are three major results from our analysis of variance decompo-
sitions of sectoral production for the two samples 1972:2-1984:12 and 1985:1-2008:12.
First, the overall fluctuations in the sectoral growth rates have dampened over time. For
most of the series, the fluctuations in the growth rate of output reflected in the sector-
specific standard deviations exhibit lower values in the second sample. Second, the
common economy-wide factors account for a modest but significant share of macroeco-
nomic fluctuations across all sectors, although they are more important for explaining
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the fluctuations in the low-energy-intensity sector’s output. Third, there appear to be
distinct cycles specific to each group, high-energy-intensity sectors and low-energy-
intensity sectors. Low-energy-intensity sectors seem to be less affected by the common
aggregate shocks post-mid-1980s. Thus effects of oil price shock propagate less to the
low-energy-intensive sectors in the post-mid-1980 sample. This shows a convergence
of the low-energy-intensity sectors. Because of this evolution of sectoral linkages, the
effects of oil price shocks are absorbed by a few sectors of the economy. This might
provide a reasonable explanation as to why we see a muted and dampened response of
aggregate output post-mid-1980.
Table 3.7: Decomposition of Variance of Sectoral Output:
1972:2-1984:12
Industries R2 Sector Common Std Dev
Specific Factors
Agriculture 0.1939 0.5746 0.2818 0.6399
Manufacturing 0.9891 0.1188 1.1316 1.1378
Durable Manufacturing 0.9566 0.2938 1.3793 1.4102
Non Durable Manufacturing 0.8362 0.3889 0.8786 0.9609
Mining 0.8897 0.6551 1.8605 1.9725
Electric Power Generation, 0.7102 0.8864 1.3876 1.6465
Transmission and Distribution
Electric and Gas Utilities 0.8593 0.6584 1.6271 1.7552
Natural Gas Distribution 0.4523 2.871 2.609 3.8793
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.4979 0.7582 0.7550 1.070
Textiles and Products 0.5982 1.102 1.3446 1.7385
Apparel and Leather 0.6536 0.9014 1.2381 1.5315
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of Variance of Sectoral Output:
1972:2-1984:12
Industries R2 Sector Common Std Dev
Specific Factors
Wood Product 0.4929 2.227 2.1955 3.1273
Paper 0.4849 1.458 1.4146 2.0314
Printing and Support Activities 0.1671 1.26 0.5644 1.3806
Petroleum and Coal Products 0.2095 1.806 0.9297 2.0312
Chemical 0.6444 0.803 1.0809 1.3465
Plastics and Rubber Products 0.4371 2.007 1.7685 2.6750
Non Metallic Mineral 0.6185 1.066 1.3573 1.7258
Primary Metals 0.5955 2.188 2.6547 3.4402
Fabricated Metal Products 0.7839 0.5579 1.0625 1.2001
Machinery 0.6343 1.018 1.3407 1.6833
Computer and Electronic Products 0.5574 1.044 1.1715 1.5692
Electrical Equipments, Appliance, 0.6103 1.27 1.5894 2.0344
Components
Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.6593 2.752 3.8282 4.7147
Aerospace and Miscellaneous 0.1602 1.719 0.7507 1.8758
Transportation
Furniture and Related Products 0.6029 1.144 1.4096 1.8154
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.6467 0.6866 0.9289 1.1551
Other Manufacturing 0.3175 0.8644 0.5895 1.0463
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Table 3.8: Decomposition of Variance of Sectoral Output:
1985:1-2008:12
Industries R2 Sector Common Std Dev
Specific Factors
Agriculture 0.0494 0.3631 0.0827 0.3724
Manufacturing 0.9767 0.1064 0.6888 0.6970
Durable Manufacturing 0.9524 0.1992 0.8910 0.9130
Non Durable Manufacturing 0.8784 0.2496 0.6708 0.7157
Mining 0.8010 0.632 1.2679 1.4167
Electric Power Generation, 0.7279 0.977 1.5979 1.8729
Transmission and Distribution
Electric and Gas Utilities 0.8830 0.7034 1.9323 2.0564
Natural Gas Distribution 0.5856 3.187 3.7885 4.9507
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.5290 0.6354 0.6733 0.9258
Textiles and Products 0.4133 1.03 0.8644 1.3447
Apparel and Leather 0.2819 1.037 0.6497 1.2237
Wood Product 0.4168 1.357 1.1471 1.7769
Paper 0.2829 1.187 0.7455 1.4017
Printing and Support Activities 0.2732 0.8633 0.5292 1.0126
Petroleum and Coal Products 0.5122 1.347 1.3802 1.9286
Chemical 0.6261 0.7022 0.9086 1.1483
Plastics and Rubber Products 0.4816 0.6107 0.5886 0.8481
Non Metallic Mineral 0.4122 0.9575 0.8018 1.2488
Primary Metals 0.3671 2.121 1.6153 2.6660
Fabricated Metal Products 0.5558 0.4799 0.5368 0.7200
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Table 3.8: Decomposition of Variance of Sectoral Output:
1985:1-2008:12
Industries R2 Sector Common Std Dev
Specific Factors
Machinery 0.3928 1.13 0.9088 1.4501
Computer and Electronic Products 0.5109 0.8562 0.8750 1.2242
Electrical Equipments, Appliance, 0.2663 1.008 0.6072 1.1767
Components
Motor Vehicles and Parts 0.6826 2.343 3.4359 4.1588
Aerospace and Miscellaneous 0.3221 1.863 1.2841 2.2627
Transportation
Furniture and Related Products 0.4078 0.8417 0.6984 1.0937
Miscellaneous 0.3849 0.604 0.4777 0.7701
Other Manufacturing 0.2932 0.724 0.4663 0.8611
3.5.4 Price Adjustment Conditional on Oil Shock
We have seen in Section 3.5 that aggregate prices adjust much faster in recent years
than in the 1970s and early 1980s. In particular we noted a decline in both the inflation
volatility and persistence for the aggregate PCE price indices and also for the disag-
gregated price indices for manufacturing and services. One possible underlying cause
of increased price flexibility is the increased competition among firms following the
largescale liberalizations since the 1990s. Because of intense competition, even if firms
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increase their prices following an oil shock, they bring down the prices faster in the fear
of losing market share. If producers know that prices are sufficiently flexible and that
they can easily pass on the increase in marginal cost following a oil price increase to the
consumers, their markup will in general be lower. Therefore the inflation trigger from
the high markups will be dampened.
In order to better understand the resilience of the U.S. economy to large oil shocks
post-mid-1980s, it is crucial to see how prices adjust in recent years as compared to the
1970s. The nature of price setting has important implications for a range of issues in
macroeconomics, including the welfare consequences of business cycles, the behavior
of real exchange rates and optimal monetary policy. Also there is a tremendous amount
of sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price change. In this section we seek to
understand how the frequency of price adjustment varies across sectors and how the
frequency has changed since the 1980s. To this end, we estimate the Calvo (1983) style
price stickiness parameters for the aggregate producer price index and also the sectoral
price indices from the impulse responses of our FAVAR to an oil price shock separately
for the pre- and post- mid-1980 period. Our results show that for all sectors, prices
adjust much quickly and more frequently when compared to the pre-mid-1980 period.
Measures of price stickiness have been analyzed with micro data Bills and Klenow
(2004), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). However their estimates are not condi-
tional on any shock. In this section, we investigate the frequency of price adjustment
for the different sectors following an oil price shock. We first define a measure of price
stickiness [Calvo (1983)] for the aggregate price index as well as the price indices for
the 31 sectors. We then estimate the price stickiness for the different sectors by using
a maximum likelihood approach separately for the pre- and post-mid-1980 samples to
determine if the frequency of price adjustment has changed between the samples.
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Let us assume a model similar to the Calvo (1983) framework. We also suppose
that the firms know that the shock is permanent and want to set their prices at a new
optimal level which we denote by c. This is not a restrictive assumption since in both
the sample, pre- and post-mid-1980, the nominal oil price shows a near-random walk
response, i.e., it jumps on impact and then stabilizes around a new plateau. However
all firms are not able to change the price immediately because of market rigidity. Let
λ denote the fraction of firms in sector i ∈ {1, 2, .....31} who cannot reset their prices at
period 1. Therefore, a proportion (1 − λ) of firms are able to change the price to its new
level in the first period, and those who are successful in resetting their price set the price
at the new optimal level. These firms do not change their prices again in response to
this particular oil shock. In the second time period, (1 − λ) proportion of the remaining
firms are able to change the price, which is a proportion λ(1−λ) of the total. Continuing
this argument forward, we get that at time T , (λT−1(1 − λ)) change their price. So the
proportion of firms at time T who have changed their price is (1 − λT ). This implies
that the mean change in price from the level prior to the shock to after T periods later is
given by (c(1−λT )). We assume that the observed cumulative impulse response of price
in sector i, t time periods after the shock is of the form
Pi,t = c(1 − λt) + t, t ∼ iid N(0, σ2).
We estimate the parameters λ, c and standard deviation of t, denoted by σ using the
maximum likelihood estimation and the results are tabulated in Table 9.
Our results are in line with Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), who also find that the
frequency of price change is highest for the energy and gasoline sectors. This result
holds true for both the pre- and post-mid-1980 sample. It is also interesting to note
that the probability of price change for most of the high-energy-intensity sectors has in-
creased in the post-1980 sample, e.g., following an oil shock the gasoline prices change
with a probability of 0.81 in the second sample as compared to 0.15 in the first sample.
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The frequency of price change also increases for other energy intensive sectors coal,
electric power, motor vehicles and energy services. The increase in the probability of
price change for these sectors also leads to increase in flexibility of the aggregate pro-
ducer price index. We find that the frequency of price adjustment of aggregate producer
price index increases significantly in the post-mid-1980 sample. This substantial in-
crease in the frequency of price adjustment could also be instrumental in the dampened
response of inflation in the post-mid-1980 sample.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to identify the structural changes that have taken place in
the U.S. economy during and after the mid-1980s. It is widely accepted that the U.S.
economy responds very differently to the oil price shocks post-mid-1980s than in the
pre-mid-1980s. This paper is an effort to empirically evaluate what could lead to the
differential response. Using a factor augmented vector autoregression framework, we
find three major changes in the U.S. economy. U.S. is now mostly a service driven
economy where 80% of the GDP comes from services. As a second change, the link-
age between the high-energy-intensity industries and low-energy-intensity industries has
substantially weakened over time. This result is also in line with the declining oil us-
age and increase in energy efficiency of the U.S. economy. Finally, our estimation of
the probability of price adjustment conditional on an oil shock shows that the aggregate
and sectoral price indices adjust much faster in the post-mid-1980 period. This could
be due to increase in product competition and increased import penetration. Also be-
cause of increased competition and fear of losing market share, producers tend to bring
down prices faster after an oil shock. This also leads to a lower persistence of sectoral
inflation, as shown in our empirical analysis.
In our current work, we are extending to build a New Keynesian model input-output
linkages to analyze the evolution of sectoral interlinkages over time. Our model also
includes infrequent price adjustments, allowing us to study the evolution of sectoral
price stickiness conditional on an oil price shock both in the pre- and post-mid-1980
period.
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CHAPTER 4
EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY: ROLE OF OIL
INTENSITY AND WAGE PRICE ADJUSTMENTS
Macroeconomic consequences of large increases in the price of oil have been of great
concern among economists and policy makers, as well as the general public ever since
two major oil-price shocks hit the economy in the 1970s.
Not only that, after World War II, nine out of ten recessions in the U.S. economy
were preceded by large increases in the oil price. A general perception is that oil-price
increases are instrumental for persistent and deep recession. In fact, a number of studies
have tested the relation between economic activity and oil prices and have confirmed
that it is not merely a statistical coincidence.
Interestingly in the past five years the price of oil has tripled in nominal units, from
$36 per barrel in 2002 to $72 per barrel in 2006 and $140 in June 2008. This has
rekindled memories of the sharp oil price rises in the 1970s when the real oil price
tripled in 1973 and then again more than doubled in 1979. The oil price hikes of the
1970s coincided with dramatic declines in US GDP growth and led soaring inflation.
While post 2000s the oil price build-up has been accompanied with only a modest pick
up in inflation and more or less stable GDP growth, it has sparked discussions about the
possible causes of the large effects of oil price shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s but
the inexplicable and bewildering dampened effect during the post 2000s.
This paper explores possible explanations why we expect to observe the weaker re-
sponses of macroeconomic variables to the same size of the oil-price shock. Most of
existing studies have focused mainly on recessionary consequences of oil-price shocks
[e.g., Kim and Loungani (1991); Rotemberg and Woodford (1996); Finn (2000); Leduc
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and Sill (2004); Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005); Cavallo and Wu (2006)] but have not
addressed the issue of weaker effects of oil-price shocks during the 1990s and later. The
only exception is Blanchard and Gali (2007), who ask the same question as this paper
does. In order to answer the question, they investigate four different hypotheses; (a)
good luck (i.e., lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in produc-
tion, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. They
conclude that all four factors have played an important role in accounting for the mild
effects on inflation and economic activity. In this paper, we will take a similar stance.
We will offer four possible explanations of the muted effect of oil price shocks in the
post 1990s. The first factor investigated is the improvement in oil efficiency in of the
U.S. economy. After the two oil-price shocks in the 1970s, technological advances en-
abled the economy to utilize petroleum more efficiently. For example, vehicles’ miles
per gallon improved dramatically. According to the Energy Information Administration
(2006), from 1973 to 1991, miles per gallon (all motor vehicles) improved by 42%.
This more efficient use of oil is apparent in terms of the oil expenditure share in value
added. While average oil expenditure share relative to GDP was 3.65% in the pre-1984
periods, the average share declines in the post-1984 periods to 2.75%. This point is sim-
ilar to one of factors considered in Blanchard and Gali (2007). The second possibility
that we will examine is the decline in labor market rigidities. Adjustments in the labor
market take place both on the intensive (hours of work) and extensive margin (employ-
ment). Besides the high levels of union membership during the 1970s and early 1980s
lead to a generally rigid labor markets. Thus the assumption of a cleared labor market
neglecting unemployment might be a misleading assumption. In contrast, our model
incorporates matching frictions that generate equilibrium unemployment as in Gertler,
Sala and Trigari (2008). Moreover, workers and firms bargain over wages in a col-
lective wage bargaining manner. We employ a model with nominal price rigidities that
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incorporates both real wage rigidities and matching frictions in the labor market. This
model framework will allow us to analyze how labor market dynamics and particularly
the adjustment of wages translate into marginal cost and inflation dynamics.
Next we analyze the change in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. Or-
phanides (2001) argues that monetary policy by the Fed definitely improved after the
appointment to Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979. In his view,
policy was excessively activist during the 1970s and early 1980s, a result of policymaker
overconfidence in their ability to stabilize deviations of output from the economys out-
put gap. Therefore according to his view, the inflationary episodes of the 1970s and
80s were because of the extremely activist policies of the Fed targeting output gap. By
the beginning of the 1980s, the inflationary outcome of the activist policies was finally
recognized and policies moved to targeting inflation than output gap.
Finally, we analyze the impact of a change in the degree of price stickiness after
the mid 1980s. Recent research and policy discussions have noted that the potentially
increased competition among firms and also increased openness of the U.S. economy
since the 1990s may affect inflation and economic activity. In the light of these, it is
interesting to see increased price flexibility induced by increased competitiveness among
firms and increased openness of the economy can shed light on the dampened effects of
inflation and economic activity in U.S. mid-1980s onwards.
The goal of the paper is not just to investigate the role of these four factors but also
to see how much each factor accounts for the changes observed in the time series data
for inflation and GDP i.e. weaker responses of output and inflation. We will argue and
show that all four factors outlined are instrumental for the decrease in the response of
output, employment and inflation to an oil price shock in the after the mid-1980s.
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Figure 4.1: Nominal Oil Price of West Texas Intermediate Crude
The model is based on a standard New Keynesian model with price and nominal
wage adjustment costs. We extend the standard sticky-price model to include the role of
oil prices into the economy in two ways. As in Blanchard and Gali (2007), we introduce
oil as an input in the production process as also in household consumption basket. We
modify the labor market along the lines of Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008). We intro-
duce labor market frictions with a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search
and matching framework. This variant allows for staggered Nash wage bargaining, as
in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the structural
VAR, Section 4.2 presents the model. Model evaluations are presented in section 4.3,
Section 4.4 discusses the role of monetary policy, Section 4.5 is a brief on extensions.
Finally Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.1 Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is to provide a structural evidence of the macroeconomic
effects of oil price shocks and explore the nature and causes of the apparent changing
consequences of the oil price shocks on the US economy. To answer this question, we
use the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach to analyze how the oil price shocks on
the aggregate U.S. economy.
The VAR modeling introduced by Sims (1980) is now very standard in applied
macroeconomics literature. This approach conceives of fluctuations in economic activ-
ity as arising from impulses or shocks (oil price shock in our case) through a complex
dynamic propagation mechanism. Our objective in this section is to develop a statisti-
cal model in order to identify the major oil price shocks from 1970s through today and
to understand the dynamic response of the U.S. economy to these shocks. Using the
estimated VAR system, we trace out the dynamic responses of output, prices and other
macroeconomic variables to an oil price innovation. This gives quantitative estimates of
how an exogenous oil price shock affect the economy. Our data (except energy intensity)
runs monthly from January 1960 to December 2008. All data are seasonally adjusted.
The variables and the corresponding data sources are given below. All the data above
(except oil price and CPI) are at quarterly frequency. We interpolated these quarterly
data to monthly frequency by following the interpolation method outlined in Bernanke,
Gertler and Watson, (1997). The details of the interpolation method is given in this
section.
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, (1997), we designate quarterly series by
uppercase letters and monthly series by lower case letters. Quarters are indexed by
T = 1, 2, ...,N, and months by t = 1, 2, ..., n. Let YT be an observed quarterly variable
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Table 4.1: Variables, Definitions and Sources of Baseline VAR
Variable Definition Source
Oil Price Nominal Spot Oil Price of West Texas
Intermediate Crude obtained as dollars
per barrel
FRB St Louis
CPI Prices paid by urban consumers for a
representative basket of goods and ser-
vices
BLS
GDP Deflator GDP deflator (implicit price deflator
for GDP) is a measure of the level
of prices of all new, domestically pro-
duced, final goods and services in an
economy
FRB St Louis & BLS
Wages Non Farm Business Sector Compensa-
tion Per Hour
BLS
Employment Non Farm Business Hours of all Per-
sons
BLS
GDP Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct in Billions of Chained 2005 Dol-
lars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual
Rate (SAAR)
FRB
FFR Rate at which a depository institution
lends immediately available funds to
another depository institution
FRB St. Louis
145
which we want to interpolate. Consider for example GDP. Correspondingly let yt be the
unobserved monthly series, which for our example is the monthly GDP. Therefore YT
and yt are related by the identity
YT =
1
3
2∑
i=0
y3T−i (4.1)
Interpolation by done by the same state space method as in Bernanke, Gertler and
Watson, (1997). Suppose xt be a vector of observable interpolator variable at monthly
frequency, eg. industrial production. This monthly variable evidently provides infor-
mation about quarterly movements in real GDP. We assume [Bernanke, Gertler and
Watson, (1997)] that the unobserved monthly variable yt is related to its corresponding
interpolator variables xt according to the “causal” equation
yt = x′tβ + ut (4.2)
where ut ∼ N(0, σ2). Note that we include a constant and a trend term in all our
“causal” equations.
Let zt be a monthly variable that equals Yt/3 in the third month of each quarter and is
zero otherwise. Then the measurement equations are given by
zt =
1
3
2∑
i=0
yt−i, t = 3, 6, 9, 12, ...., n
zt = 0 × yt, o.w (4.3)
The parameters β and σ2 are estimated by maximum likelihood. Conditional on the
estimated parameters, we assume yt/T = ET yt, where E is the expectations operator.
Thus given the full information set, yt/n gives the set of interpolated values.
To estimate the accuracy of the interpolation, we used the R2 goodness of fit, which
in levels is given by
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Table 4.2: Interpolators and Goodness of Fit
Quarterly Series
Interpolated
Monthly Interpolators R2
GDP IPBUSEQ, IPCONGD 0.9997
GDPDEF PPIACO, PPICPE, PPIFCG, PPIITM 0.9997
WAGES AHECONS, AHEMAN 0.9931
EMP AWHMAN, AWHNONAG 0.9998
R2levels = var(y
2
t|n)/var(y
2
t ) (4.4)
Table 2 lists the quarterly series we interpolate, the corresponding monthly interpo-
lators, and the measures of fit. The variables are defined in more details below.
The monthly interpolator variables along with their data sources are defined below:
(a) IPBUSEQ - Seasonally adjusted data on Industrial Production Index for business
equipments (Index 2002=100). Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (G17 Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization).
(b) IPCONGD - Seasonally adjusted data on Industrial Production Index for Consumer
Goods (Index 2002=100). Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (G17 Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization).
(c) PPIACO - Seasonally adjusted data on Producer Price Index for all commodities
(Index 1982=100). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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(d) PPICPE - Seasonally adjusted data on Producer Price Index Finished Goods Capital
Equipment (Index 1982=100). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
(e) PPIFCG - Seasonally adjusted data on Producer Price Index for Finished Consumer
Goods (Index 1982=100). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
(f) PPIITM - Seasonally adjusted data on Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials:
Supplies and Components (Index 1982=100). Source: U.S. Department of Labor:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(g) AHECONS - Seasonally adjusted data on Average Hourly Earnings: Construction
(Dollars per Hour). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(h) AHEMAN - Seasonally adjusted data on Average Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing
(Dollars per Hour). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(i) AWHMAN - Seasonally adjusted data on Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing
(Units=Hours). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(j) AWHNONAG - Seasonally adjusted data on Average Weekly Hours: Total Private
Industries (Units = Hours). Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
4.1.1 Structural VAR Model for the US Economy
As noted earlier our aim is to provide a structural evidence on the macroeconomic effects
of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy and also analyze the nature and causes of the
changes in the effects of those shocks. The choice of variables is influenced by insights
from Blanchard and Gali (2007), Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, (1997). In our baseline
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VAR, we carry out the specification in Blanchard and Gali (2007), with the variables
described before.
Assuming that the economy is described by a structural system of linear stochastic
dynamic form
A(L)yt = a + bt + t, (4.5)
where yt is a (K × 1) vector of endogenous variables given by
yt =
[
OPt,GDPt, EMPt,DEFt,CPIt,Wt, FFRt
]
Precise denitions of the variables and data sources are given in Table 1.
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, and t is an (K × 1) vector of
structural innovations or disturbances. t is serially uncorrelated and var(t) = Σ and
Σ is a diagonal matrix where the diagonal elements are the variances of structural dis-
turbances. Hence the structural disturbances are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated.
Note that we just consider the stochastic part of the data generating process because it is
the part of interest from the point of view of structural modeling and impulse response
analysis.
We estimate a reduced form equation (VAR)
yt = a + bt +
p∑
i=1
Biyt−i + ut, (4.6)
where B represents matrix of polynomial and var(ut) = Σu.
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4.1.2 Lag Length Selection
The standard results about the properties of the VAR coefficients and VAR estimation
(Hamilton (1994), Chapter 11) depend on the lag length of the VAR. There are two main
approaches used for selecting or testing for lag length in VAR models. The first consists
of rules of thumb based on the periodicity of the data and past experience, regarding
cyclicality of economic data. The second is based on formal hypothesis tests.
Two classical test statistics can be used to evaluate the lag length of a VAR model.
The first is based on a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test compares the max-
imum value of the likelihood achieved for a model with p lags to a model with p − 1
lags. The likelihood ratio function for a VAR model can be written as
L(Σˆ, B, p) = −T K
2
log(2pi) +
T
2
log|Σˆ−1| − T K
2
, (4.7)
where Σˆ−1 is the matrix inverse of the estimated error covariance matrix and log|Σˆ−1|
is the logarithm of the determinant of Σˆ−1, the inverse of the error covariance matrix.
A second type of measure used to determine lag length in VAR models is the infor-
mation criteria such as Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian (or Schwarz)
information criterion (BIC or SC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. Information criteria
measures are an effort to determine the trade-off between model fit and parsimony. They
are based on the likelihood function for a model, penalized by the number of parameters.
For two models that fit the data equally well (i.e., they have the same likelihood value),
the more parsimonious model pays a smaller penalty and is thus superior based on an
information criteria measure. According to Ivanov and Killian (2001), for monthly
VAR models, the AIC tends to produce the most accurate structural and semi-structural
impulse response estimates for realistic sample sizes. Thus with our monthly VAR, we
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were tempted to use the AIC to determine lag length, which suggested the optimal lag
length of 5. However there is always the issue of the potential sensitivity of the point
estimates to assumptions about lag length as in Hamilton and Herrera (2001). While
including too many lags and hence an excessive number of parameters introduces sam-
pling uncertainty in estimating a 5-7 variable VAR as in our case, we cannot at the same
time afford to overlook the fact that fewer lags also introduce omitted variable bias. Car-
rying out the F - tests also confirms that the extra lags (at least the 8th and 9th) enter
significantly. Thus we decided to use the rule of thumb so that our VAR models include
enough lags to capture the full cycle of the data, this means for our seasonally adjusted
monthly data, we included 12 lags for all the endogenous variables.
4.1.3 Identification Issues
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equations
from the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. Some methods give restric-
tions on only contemporaneous structural parameters. Others impose restrictions on the
lag structure as well. A popular and convenient method is to orthogonalize reduced form
disturbances by Cholesky decomposition of the white noise covariance matrix, Σu = PP′
(as in Sims (1980) among others), where P is a lower triangular matrix with positive
elements on the main diagonal. Ofcourse, such a method makes most sense when there
is theoretical reason for a recursive structure or a Wold causal ordering. We will use
the recursive identification scheme and justify why this is a satisfactory identification
approach in our case.
Following Blanchard and Gali (2007), we identify oil shocks by assuming that un-
expected variations in the nominal spot price of oil are completely exogenous relative
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to the contemporaneous values of the remaining macroeconomic variables included in
the VAR. The theoretical justification of this recursive structure is as follows: oil price
shock can instantaneously affect the block of U.S. macroeconomic variables, but the
U.S. macroeconomic block cannot affect the world oil price instantaneously or in the
same month.1 Thus in this specification, oil price is Wold casually prior to the remain-
ing macroeconomic variables in the system i.e., we place nominal oil price as the first
variable in our ordering. Since we are interested only in oil price shock, the ordering
of the remaining variables does not matter. The ordering of the federal funds rate after
the oil price captures the idea that U.S. Fed will tighten monetary policy in response to
inflationary oil price shocks. We do not impose any restrictions on the lag structure of
the variables.
Our identification assumption outlined above allows us to recover the structural in-
novations t directly from the forecast errors or the reduced form residuals, ut. We can
write the reduced form equation (4.6) in such a way that the residuals of the different
equations are uncorrelated. Writing the forecast errors as linear functions of the struc-
tural innovations, we have ut = Pt. Hence Σu = PΣP′. Normalizing the variances of
the structural innovations to one, i.e., assuming t ∼ (0, IK), gives Σu = PP′. Hence
choosing P by a Choleski decomposition solves our identification problem.
4.1.4 Impulse Responses
This section reports the estimated impulse responses from our VAR model specified
above. We begin our analysis by seeking to replicate Banchard and Gali’s results for
USA and checking whether they are robust to the use of monthly data (rather than quar-
terly data).
1See discussion in Blanchard and Gali (2007)
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We estimate monthly VAR models with 12 lags for different time horizons. It is
interesting to note that different horizons give different qualitative results of impulse
responses. The choice of variables is also the same as in Blanchard and Gali (2007).
However instead of the nominal price of oil, we use the real price of oil which is the
nominal oil price deflated by the GDP deflator and then expressed in log differences,
CPI inflation, GDP deflator inflation, wage inflation (wage is the non farm business
compensation per hour) and log changes in real GDP and employment (non farm busi-
ness sector hours). Each equation in the VAR includes a constant term and a linear
trend (unlike the quadratic trend in BG). Figure 2 shows the estimated impulse response
functions for the variables to an oil price shock, where the oil price shock is identi-
fied as an innovation to the oil price equation. Estimates are reported for two different
sample periods: 1970:1-1983:12 and 1984:1-2005:12. The left hand side panel shows
impulse responses for the sample 1970:1-1983:12 and the right hand side shows impulse
responses for the sample 1984:1-2005:12. The break date chosen corresponds roughly
to the beginning of the Great Moderation in the United States, as identified by several
authors [e.g.McConnell and Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000)]. Note that each subperiod contains
two of the four large oil shock episodes identified in the previous section.
The results of the impulse responses are similar to Blanchard and Gali (2007) which
means the shift to a low frequency data does not affect BG’s basic findings.
The VAR predicts a tighter monetary policy reflected in an increase in the federal
funds rate in the second sample, possibly aimed at curbing inflation. In the 1970:1-
1983:12 sample, after two years, the cumulative change in output is -0.016%. In con-
trast, during the post 1984 period, the same percentage increase in oil prices results in
a smaller (-0.010%) and shorter-lived drop in output. In the first period, the contrac-
tionary effect of the oil price shock reaches a trough a year after the shock, whereas in
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the post-1984 period, we see a monotonic decline of output although at a much lower
magnitude.
An interesting result is the change in the response of prices across subsamples. Note
that in the pre-Volcker era the oil price shock generates an increase in the price level
and a slowdown in output growth. During the second period, the shock still generates
a slowdown in GDP growth but the increase in prices, particularly of the GDP deflator
is considerably smaller. The change in the magnitude suggests that the less accom-
modative monetary policy of the Volcker-Greenspan era may has been more effective in
controlling the expectations of higher inflation that follow an oil price shock. However
not much is reflected from the headline inflation in since the increase in oil and food
prices directly feeds in to that part of inflation.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses when the dataset is extended till 2008:M12.
It is interesting to note that the impulse responses change significantly when the dataset
is extended, which means when the sky rocketing of the oil price in June 2008 is in-
cluded, we no longer get the muted response of oil price shock in the post 1984 episode.
Hence it is fitting to put a disclaimer here about the paper - this paper is not an argument
for not studying the effects of oil price increases anymore. By extending the dataset
sufficiently, it is clear that there could still be situations in which the effects of oil shock
is large. This is an attempt to try and ascertain what led to the large responses in the
past, and what are the conditions under which the US economy could be subject to such
problematic responses in the future.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses to Real Oil Price Shock: 1970:1-2005:12
155
5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
20
−
0.
10
0.
00
R
G
DP
1960 M1 − 1983 M12
5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
20
−
0.
10
0.
00
R
G
DP
1984 M1 − 2008 M12
5 10 15 20 25
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
N
UM
UN
EM
P
5 10 15 20 25
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
N
UM
UN
EM
P
5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
D
EF
5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
D
EF
5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
6
CP
IA
LL
5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
6
CP
IA
LL
5 10 15 20 25
−
10
0
10
20
RW
AG
E
5 10 15 20 25
−
10
0
10
20
RW
AG
E
5 10 15 20 25
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
FF
R
5 10 15 20 25
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
FF
R
Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to Real Oil Price Shock: 1970:1-2008:12
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4.2 The Model
In this section we will develop a model to study the macroeconomic effects of oil price
shocks. The main focus is to see the significant difference in the response of major
macroeconomic variables after the mid 1980s.
We start with a standard monetary DSGE model and introduce two modifications.
First, following Blanchard and Gali (2008), we take oil both as an input in the produc-
tion as well as a good in the household consumption basket. We assume that the country
is an importer of oil. But we will abstract from the explicit modeling of the foreign
sector. Secondly, to study the role of real rigidities, we introduce search and matching
frictions and staggered wage bargaining as in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) in this
otherwise standard new-Keynesian model. The model has the key features useful for
capturing data. These include cost of adjusting the flow of investment, variable capacity
utilization, nominal price rigidities, both nominal and real wage rigidities.
The model has three types of agents: households, wholesale firms, and retail firms.
We use a representative family construct, similar to Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) in
order to introduce complete consumption insurance. Production takes place at whole-
sale competitive firms. They hire workers and negotiate wage contracts with them and
in the process enter into staggered wage bargaining with the workers. Monopolistically
competitors retail firms buy goods from wholesale firms, differentiate them into a con-
tinuum of varieties and then repackage them as final goods and sell them back to the
households. Retailers set prices on a staggered (Calvo) basis. The separation of retail
firms from wholesale firms is purely to keep the wage bargaining process simple.
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4.2.1 Households
There is a representative household with a continuum of members of measure unity.
The number of family members currently employed is Nt. Employment is determined
through a search and matching process to be described in the following section. The
family provides perfect consumption insurance for its members. Thus consumption is
the same for each person, regardless of whether he or she is currently employed or un-
employed. The treatment of labor supply is exactly similar to Gertler, Sala and Trigari
(2008). Households vary labor along the extensive margin instead of the intensive mar-
gin. The reason for this assumption being the fact that in USA, most of the variation
in hours is on the extensive margin and as Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) say “inten-
sive margin in unimportant for cyclical variation.” Households do not receive any utility
gains from leisure. Individuals not currently working are searching for jobs.
Conditional on Nt, the representative household chooses consumption Ct, one pe-
riod nominally riskless government bonds Bt, capacity utilization νt, investment It, and
physical capital KPt to maximize the present discounted value of the utility stream
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct), (4.8)
where Ct = ΘχcC
χc
O,tC
1−χc
Q,t and where CO,t denotes consumption of imported oil and
CQ,t ≡ (
∫ 1
0
CQ,t(i)
1− 1Q )
Q
Q−1 (4.9)
is the CES index of the domestically produced differentiated by retail goods and Θχc =
χ
−χc
c (1 − χc)−(1−χc), where χc is the share of oil in the consumption basket.
Let Πt be the lumpsum profits, PC,t be the price of the consumption basket, Rt be the
one period nominal interest rate (central bank policy instrument). Household’s budget
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constraint is then given by
PQ,tCQ,t + PO,tCO,t +
Bt
PC,tRt
= Yt + Bt−1PC,t (4.10)
where PQ,t ≡
( ∫ 1
0
PQ,t(i)1−Qdi
) 1
1−Q is the price index of domestic goods, PO,t is the price
of oil in domestic currency, Bt denotes the quantity of one period bonds purchased in
period t which is purchased at the price 1/Rt. For simplicity we also assume no access
to international financial markets.
The optimal allocation of expenditures between imported and domestically produced
goods implies
PQ,tCQ,t = (1 − χc)PC,tCt, (4.11)
PO,tCO,t = χcPC,tCt (4.12)
where PC,t ≡ PχcO,tP1−χcQ,t is the headline CPI index. Also note that PQ,t is the core CPI
index which does not include the price of oil. Further PC,t = PQ,tS
χc
O,t, where S O,t =
PO,t
PQ,t
denotes the real price of oil, expressed in terms of domestically produced goods.
Furthermore conditional on an optimal allocation between the two types of goods,
we have PQ,tCQ,t + PO,tCO,t = PC,tCt, which can be substituted in the budget constraint
(4.10).
Let Yt denote the income of the household defined below. Households own capital
and choose the capital utilization rate, νt, which transforms physical capital into effective
capital according to
Kt = νtKPt−1 (4.13)
Effective capital is rented to the firms at the rate rt. The cost of capital utilization
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per unit of physical capital is A(νt). We assume that νt = 1 in the steady state. Also
A(1) = 0 andA′(1)/A′′(1) = ην.
Therefore the income of the household is given by the following equation
Yt = WtNt + (1 − Nt)bt + [rtνt −A(νt)]KPt + Πt (4.14)
WtNt is the household’s labor income, (1 − Nt)bt is the unemployment benefits, [rtνt −
A(νt)]KPt is the income from capital and Πt denotes the profit income, where we assume
S(γz) = S ′(γz) = 0, and S′′(γz) = ηk > 0. γz = 1 is the economy’s steady state growth
rate.
The physical capital accumulation equation is
KPt = (1 − δ)KPt−1 + [1 − S(
It
It−1
)]It (4.15)
The first order necessary conditions for the households is given below:
βEt
[ Ct
Ct+1
.
PC,t
PC,t+1
]
=
1
Rt
(4.16)
rt = A′(νt) (4.17)
qkt [1 − S(
It
It−1
)] = qkt .S′(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
− βEtqkt+1
λt+1
λt
S ′(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2 + 1 (4.18)
qkt = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
(1 − δ)qkt+1 + rt+1νt+1 −A(νt+1)
]
(4.19)
Here λt = U′(Ct) and qkt is the real price of capital or value of installed capital in
terms of the consumption good.
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4.2.2 Search and Matching
In the following section we lay out the search and matching model of Mortensen-
Pissarides that is incorporated into a New Keynesian style business cycle model to
explicitly model labor market frictions in the form of equilibrium unemployment,
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides (2000).
At each time t, each firm posts vt(i) vacancies in order to attract new workers and em-
ploys Nt(i) workers. The total number of vacancies and unemployed workers are vt=∫ 1
0
vt(i) and Nt=
∫ 1
0
Nt(i). All unemployed workers at t look for jobs. The timing as-
sumptions are such that unemployed workers who find a match go to work immediately
within the same period. Hence the pool of unemployed workers searching for jobs at
time t is given by
ut = 1 − Nt−1 (4.20)
Trade in the labor market is an uncoordinated, time consuming and costly activity
that introduces frictions which lead to imperfect outcomes in the labor market. Jobs are
constantly created and destroyed and unemployed workers look for new jobs generating
unemployment in equilibrium. The process through which workers and firms find and
match each other is represented by a matching function accounting for the imperfections
and transaction cost in the labor market. This function summarizes the entire search and
matching process in a single relation where the number of matches is a function of
the number of unemployed persons, ut, and the number of vacant jobs, vt, in the labor
market. The number of new hires or “matches”, mt is a function of searching workers
and vacancies, as follows:
mt = σmuσt v
1−σ
t (4.21)
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The probability a firm fills a vacancy in period t, qt is given by
qt =
mt
vt
(4.22)
Similarly, the probability a searching worker finds a job, st is given by
st =
mt
ut
(4.23)
Both firms and workers take qt and st as given. At each period, firms exogenously detach
themselves from a fraction 1 − ρ of their existing workforce Nt−1(i). Workers who lose
jobs at time t cannot search until next period. Thus within this framework, fluctuations
in unemployment are due to cyclical variations in hiring as opposed to separations. Hall
(2005a) and ? present evidence in support of this phenomenon.
4.2.3 Wholesale Firms
At each period t, wholesale firms produce Qit using capital Kit, labor Nit and oil Oit
according to the Cobb-Douglas production function given below:
Qit = ZtN
αN
it K
αK
it O
αO
it (4.24)
where Qit is the output produced by firm i, where Zt is the exogenous common produc-
tivity shock, Nit is the labor employed, Kit is the capital employed, and Oit is the quantity
of imported oil used in production. αN , αK and αO denote the share of labor, capital and
oil respectively in the production process, where αN + αK + αO ≤ 1. For simplicity, we
assume that capital and oil are perfectly mobile across firms and that there is a competi-
tive rental market in capital and oil. These assumptions ensure constant returns to scale
at the firm level, which greatly simplifies the wage bargaining problem. The hiring rate
xit as defined as the ratio of new hires qtvit to the existing workforce Nt−1(i) :
xit =
qtvit
Nit−1
(4.25)
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It is interesting to note that due to the law of large numbers the firm knows xit with
certainty at time t since it knows the likelihood qt that each vacancy it posts will be
filled. The hiring rate is thus effectively the firm’s control variable. The total workforce,
in turn, is the sum of the number of surviving workers ρNit−1 and new hires xitNit−1 :
Nit = (ρ + xit)Nit−1 (4.26)
Equation (4.26) reflects the timing assumption that new hires go to work immediately.
Let PWt denote the relative price of the intermediate goods produced by the wholesale
firms, Wt denotes the nominal wage, rt denotes the rental rate of capital, and βEtΛt,t+1 be
the firm’s stochastic discount factor, β being the household’s subjective discount factor
and Λt,t+1 = λt+1/λt. The value of the firm i given by Ft(Wit,Nit−1) may be expressed as:
Ft(Wit,Nit−1) = PWt Qit − rtKit − PotOit −
Wit
Pt
Nit − κt2 x
2
itNit−1
+βEtΛt,t+1Ft+1(Wit+1,Nit) (4.27)
with κt = κZt. Because of the presence of wage dispersion, Gertler, Sala and Tri-
gari (2008) replace the standard assumption of fixed costs of posting a vacancy with
quadratic adjustment costs, given by κt2 x
2
itNit−1. As in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008),
we have quadratic costs of hiring as opposed to fixed costs of post a vacancy for purely
technical reasons. Because the contract structure leads to temporary wage dispersion
and because (to simplify the bargaining problem) we have constant returns at the firm
level, quadratic costs are required to keep capital and labor from shifting to the low
wage firms. Lastly as in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008), we allow adjustment costs
to drift proportionately with productivity in order to maintain a balanced steady state
growth path (otherwise adjustment costs become relatively less important as the econ-
omy grows.)
At each time t, a representative firm i maximizes its total value Ft(Wit,Nit−1) by
choosing the hiring rate xit and capital stock Kit, given its existing employment stock,
163
the probability of filling a vacancy, the rental rate on capital and the current and expected
path of wages. If it is a firm that is able to renegotiate the wage, it bargains with its
workforce over a new contract. If it is not renegotiating, it takes as given the wage at the
previous periods level, as well the likelihood it will be renegotiating in the future. We
next consider the firm’s hiring and capital rental decisions, and defer a bit the description
of the wage bargain. The first order condition for oil and capital are given below:
Po,t = αOPWt
Qit
Oit
= αOPWSt
Qt
Ot
(4.28)
rt = αKPWt
Qit
Kit
= αOPWSt
Qt
Kt
(4.29)
Given Cobb-Douglas technology and perfect capital mobility, all firms choose the same
capital-output ratio and also oil-output ratio. Firms choose Nit by setting xit or equiva-
lently vit. The firm’s hiring decision gives us the following condition:
κtxit = PWait − WitPC,t + βEtΛt,t+1∂Ft+1(Wit+1,Nit)/∂Nit (4.30)
where ait = αN
Qit
Nit
= αN
Qt
Nt
= at. By making use of the envelope theorem to obtain
∂Ft(Wit,Nit−1)/∂Nit−1 and combining equations, we obtain
κtxit = PWt at −
Wit
PC,t
+ βEtΛt,t+1
κt
2
x2it+1 + ρβEtΛt,t+1κt+1xit+1 (4.31)
The hiring rate thus depends on the discounted stream of earnings and savings on ad-
justment costs. Finally, for the purpose of the wage bargain it is useful to define Jt(Wit),
which is the marginal value to firm i or the value to the firm from hiring another worker
at time t after adjustment costs have been incurred. Differentiating Ft(Wit,Nit−1) with
respect to Nit, taking xit as given yields:
Jt(Wit) = PWait − WitPC,t + βEtΛt,t+1∂Ft+1(Wit+1,Nit)/∂Nit (4.32)
By making use of the hiring rate condition (4.25) and the relation for the evolution of
the workforce (4.26), Jt(Wit) may be expressed as expected average profits per worker
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net of the first period adjustment costs, with the discount factor accounting for future
changes in workforce size:
J(Wit) = PWt at −
Wit
Pt
− βEtΛt,t+1 κt+12 x
2
it+1 + Et[ρ + xit+1]βΛt,t+1Jt+1(Wit+1) (4.33)
4.2.4 Problem of the workers
In this section we develop an expression for a worker’s surplus from employment, which
is the most important determinant of the outcome of the wage bargain. Let Vt(Wit) be
the value to a worker of employment at firm i and let Ut be the value of unemployment.
These values are defined after hiring decisions have been made at time t and are in units
of consumption good Qit. The value from employment of a worker working in firm i at
time t is given by
Vt(Wit) =
Wit
Pt
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[
ρVt+1(Wit+1) + (1 − ρ)Ut+1
]
(4.34)
To define the value of unemployment, we will first define Vx,t as the average value of
employment conditional on being a new worker at time t as Vx,t =
∫ 1
0
Vt(Wit) xitNit−1xtNt−1 di,
where xitNit−1 is total new workers at firm i and xtNt−1 is total number of new workers
at time t. Next let bt be the flow value from unemployment, including unemployment
benefits, as well as other factors that can be measured in units of consumption goods.
As defined before, let st be the probability of finding a job for the subsequent period.
Then Ut may be expressed as
Ut = bt + βEtΛt,t+1
[
st+1Vx,t+1 + (1 − st+1)Ut+1
]
(4.35)
with bt = bKPt , K
P
t being the economy wide stock of physical capital. We also assume
like Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) that bt grows proportionately to KPt in order to
maintain a balanced growth. The value of unemployment thus depends on the current
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flow value bt and the likelihood of being employed versus unemployed next period. Note
that the value of finding a job next period for a worker that is currently unemployed is
Vx,t+1, the average value of working next period conditional on being a new worker.
Unemployed workers do not have a priori knowledge of which firms might be paying
higher wages next period. They instead just randomly flock to firms posting vacancies.
Correspondingly Ht(Wit) and Hx,t defined as surplus from employment are given by:
Ht(Wit) = Vt(Wit) − Ut (4.36)
Hx,t = Vx,t − Ut (4.37)
and
Ht(Wit) =
Wit
PC,t
− bt + βEtΛt,t+1[ρHt+1(Wit+1) − st+1Hx,t+1] (4.38)
4.2.5 Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining
In this section, we introduce staggered Nash wage bargaining as in Gertler, Sala and
Trigari (2008). We introduce nominal wage contracting and simultaneously allow for
the possibility of indexing to past inflation.
The staggered multi-period contracting on this model is introduced so as to sim-
plify aggregation. In each period a firm has a probability 1 − λw that it may renegotiate
the wage.2 This adjustment probability is independent of its history, which makes it
unnecessary to keep track of individual firms’ wage histories. While how long an in-
dividual wage contract lasts is uncertain, the average duration of the wage contract is
fixed at 1/(1 − λw). The coefficient λw is effectively the measure of the degree of wage
stickiness.
2λw is effectively the Calvo parameter for wage setting
166
Since we allow for the possibility of indexing to past CPI inflation, piC,t−1, the fraction
λw of firms that cannot renegotiate their contract set their nominal wages Wit according
to the indexation rule:
Wit = Wit−1(piC,t−1)γ (4.39)
where piC,t = PC,t/PC,t−1 and γ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the degree of indexing to past inflation.
Firms that enter into a new wage contract at time t negotiate the wage with the
existing laborforce and also with the newly hired workforce. Due to the assumption of
constant returns, all workers are the same at the margin. The wage bargaining rule is
such that the negotiating firm and the worker share the surplus from the marginal match.
After the wage bargain and renegotiation takes place, all workers, both existing and the
newly employed labor force receive the same renegotiated wage. When firms cannot
renegotiate the wage, all existing and newly hired workers employed at the firm receive
the existing contracting wage indexed by last period’s inflation.
Let W∗t denote the wage of a firm that is able to renegotiate at time t. Given constant
returns, all sets of firms and workers at time t fact the same problem, and therefore
set the same wage. Under the assumption of Nash bargaining the contract wage W∗t is
chosen to solve
W∗t = arg maxWt
Ht(Wit)ηJt(Wit)1−η (4.40)
s.t
Wit+ j =

Wit+ j−1pi
γ
C,t+ j−1 with prob λw
W∗t+ j with prob 1 − λw
∀ j ≥ 1, where η ∈ [0, 1] is the worker’s relative bargaining power, and Jt(Wit) and
Ht(Wit) are as defined by equations (4.32) and (4.38). As in the conventional search
and matching model, we assume that the bargaining power parameter η is constant. The
wage in this model is determined by the two “threat” points of employers and employ-
ees, i.e. the marginal product and the reservation wage, respectively. The stronger the
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bargaining power of the worker, the closer the wage is to the marginal product and vice
versa. The first order necessary condition for the Nash bargaining equation is given by
ηtJt(W∗t ) = (1 − η)µt(W∗t )Ht(W∗t ), (4.41)
where t = Pt∂Ht/∂Wit is the effect of a rise in the real wage on the worker’s surplus,
and µt(Wit) = −Pt∂Jt/∂Wit is the negative of the effect of a rise in the real wage on the
firms surplus, and where
t = 1 + EtΛt,t+1(ρλβ)
pt
pt+1
γ¯pi
γ
t t+1 (4.42)
µt(Wit) = 1 + EtΛt,t+1[ρ + xt+1(γ¯pit)γWit)](λβ)
pt
pt+1
γ¯pi
γ
t µt+1(γ¯pit)
γWit)) (4.43)
In effect t is the cumulative the cumulative discount factor the worker uses to value the
contract wage stream, while µt(Wit) is the same thing for the firm. Because of the non-
negativity of the hiring rate xit, it must be always true that µt(Wit) ≥ t. This implies that
a firm has a longer horizon than the worker, since the worker cares only about the effect
of the current wage contract only on itself. However the firm cares about the effect of
the current wage contracts on payments to both the existing workforce and also on the
workforce slated to come in the future.
The first order condition for wages, therefore can be rewritten as:
χt(W∗t )Jt(W
∗
t ) = [1 − χt(W∗t )]Ht(W∗t ), (4.44)
where
χt(W∗t ) =
η
η + (1 − η)µt(Wit)/t (4.45)
χt(W∗t ) is the effective bargaining power of the worker. χt(W
∗
t ) depends not only on
the bargaining power but also on the different horizon over which the worker and the
firm value the impact of the contract wage. In the limiting case of λw = 0, χt(W∗t ) = η
as in the conventional period-by-period bargaining case. When λw > 0, χt(W∗t ) < η,
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Intuitively, because it makes firms effectively more patient than workers, the “horizon
effect” works to raise the effective bargaining power of firms from 1 − η to 1 − χt(W∗t ).
4.2.6 Wage Dynamics
The key features of the model that differentiates it from the conventional new Keyne-
sian models is the wage and hiring dynamics. In this section, we will derive log linear
relationship for these variables. Let W0t (W
∗
t ) be the target nominal wage at time t, i.e.,
the wage the firm and its workers would agree to under period-by-period bargaining,
given that firms and workers elsewhere remain on staggered multi-period wage con-
tracts. Loglinearizing the first order condition for Nash bargaining (4.41), we obtain the
following loglinear difference equation for real contract wage W∗t :
W∗t =
[
(1 − τ)W0t (W∗t ) + τEt(pˆiC,t+1 − γpˆiC,t) + τEtWˆ∗t+1
]
(4.46)
Note: hat above a certain variable denotes the percent deviation of a variable from its
steady state value and ψ = χβλwµ + (1 − χ)ρβλw and τ = ψ/(1 + ψ). The contract wage
thus depends on the current and expected future path of the target wage W0t (W
∗
t ) and
terms that reflect adjustments for indexing. As shown in the appendix for GST (2008),
we have:
W0t (W
∗
t ) = ϕa(Pˆ
W
t + aˆt) + ϕxEt
[
xˆt+1(W∗t+1) + (1/2)Λˆt,t+1)
]
(4.47)
ϕsEt
[
sˆt+1 + ¯ˆHxt+1 + Λˆt,t+1
]
+ ϕbbˆt + ϕχ
[
χˆt(W∗t ) − (ρβ)Etχˆt+1(W∗t+1)
]
where the coefficients ϕa, ϕx, ϕs, ϕb and ϕχ depend on the primitive model parameters
and are defined as follows ϕa = χPW a¯W¯−1, ϕx = χβκx2W¯−1, ϕb = (1 − χ)b¯W¯−1, ϕs =
(1 − χ)sβH¯W¯−1, ϕχ = χ(1 − χ)−1κxW¯−1.
Let Wˆ0t be the wage that would arise if all firms and workers negotiate wages period
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by period3. The link between Wˆ0t (W
∗
t ) and Wˆ
0
t is given by:
Wˆ0t (W
∗
t ) = W
0
t +
τ1
1 − τEt(Wˆt+1 − Wˆ
∗
t+1) +
τ2
1 − τ (Wˆt − Wˆ
∗
t ), (4.48)
where τ1 and τ2 are given as: τ1 =
[
κwµϕx + ϕχ(1 − χ)(xβλw)(κwµ)µ(ρβ) + ϕsΓ
]
(1 − τ),
τ2 = −(κµ)ϕχ(1 − χ)(xβλw)µ(1 − τ) and Γ = (1 − ηxβλwµ)η−1µκw.
The expression for Wˆ0t is given by
Wˆ0t = ϕa(Pˆ
W
t + aˆt) + (ϕs + ϕx)Et xˆt+1 + ϕs sˆt+1
+ϕbbˆt + (ϕs + ϕx/2)EtΛˆt,t+1 + ϕχ[χˆt − (ρ − s)βEtχˆt+1] (4.49)
There is both a direct effect and also an indirect spillover effect on the target wage.
The direct effect, captured by the second term in equation (4.48), reflects the impact
of market wages on the worker’s outside option. If EtWˆt+1 > EtWˆ∗t+1, opportunities are
prospective for workers expecting to move into employment next period, and vice versa
if EtWˆt+1 < EtWˆ∗t+1, average market wage at t + 1 induces a direct spillover effect on
the wage bargain. By influencing the worker’s outside option in this way, the expected
average market wage at t + 1 induces a direct spillover effect on the wage bargain. The
indirect effect, captured by the third term, depends on several factors. Overall, it is much
smaller in absolute magnitude than the direct effect. The loglinearized4 real wage index
is in turn given by
Wˆt = (1 − λw)Wˆ∗t + λw(Wˆt−1 − pˆiC,t + γpˆiC,t−1) (4.50)
Combining the equations above yields the following second order difference equation
for wage inflation:
Wˆt = γb(Wˆt−1 − pˆiC,t + γpˆiC,t−1) + γ0Wˆ0t + γ f Et(Wˆt+1 + pˆiC,t+1 − γpˆit) (4.51)
3See Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) appendix for the details of the derivations
4Details of log linearization is provided in Appendix
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where γb = (1 + τ2)φ−1, γ0 = (1 − λw)(1 − τ)λ−1w φ−1, γ f = (τλ−1w − τ1)φ−1, φ = (1 + τ2 +
(1 − λw)(1 − τ)λ−1w + (τλ−1 − τ1) with γb + γ0 + γ f = 1.
Due to staggered wage contracting, Wˆt depends on the lagged wage Wˆt−1 as well as
the expected future wage EtWˆt+1. The spillover effects measured by τ1 and τ2 work to
reduce the relative importance of the expected future wage. Thus the spillovers effects
work in a similar (though not identical) way as to how real relative price rigidities en-
hance nominal price stickiness in monetary models with time-dependent pricing. Also
in the case when λw = 0 (the case of period by period wage bargaining), both γb and
γ f go to zero, implying that Wˆt converges to Wˆ0t , which is the wage in the flexible wage
case. The model thus nests the conventional period-by-period wage bargaining setup.
Finally, loglinearizing the equation for the hiring rate (4.31) yields
xˆt = κa(PˆWt + aˆt) − κwWˆt + κλw EtΛˆt,t+1 + βEt xˆt+1 (4.52)
where the expressions for the coefficients are given asκ = (κx)−1, κa = κPW a¯, κw = κw¯
and κλw = β(1 + ρ)/2. The hiring rate thus depends on current and expected movements
of the marginal product of labor relative to the wage. The stickiness in the wage due
to staggered contracting, everything else equal, implies that current and expected move-
ment in the marginal product of labor will have a greater impact on the hiring rate than
would have been the case otherwise.
4.2.7 Retail Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit
interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods from the wholesale firms described before at
the wholesale price PWt . They in turn differentiate them with a technology that trans-
forms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, then resell them to
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the households. In addition, they set prices on a staggered basis. All retail firms face
an identical isoelastic demand schedule given by CQ,t(i) =
(
PQ,t(i)
PQ,t
)−Q
CQ,t and take the
aggregate price level PQ,t and aggregate consumption index CQ,t as given.
Following Calvo (1983), each firm may reset its price with a constant probability
(1 − λp) in any given period, independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment.
Thus each period a measure (1 − λp) of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining
λp keep their prices unchanged at the last period’s price with some indexation. Thus the
average duration of the price is given by 1/(1 − λp). We assume the following partial
price indexation rule (assuming zero inflation steady state),
PQ,t+k = PQ,t+k−1(piQ,t+k−1)γ, (4.53)
where γ as defined before is the degree of indexation.
Now we describe the optimal price setting. A firm reoptimizing in period t will
choose the price P∗Q,t that maximizes the current market value of the profits generated
while that price remains effective. Formally a price resetting firm solves the following
problem
max
{P∗Q,t}
= Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
λkpΛt,t+kQt+k|t(P
∗
Q,t −MpΨt+k|t)
}
(4.54)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints Qt+k = (
PQ,t
PQ,t+k
)−QCQ,t+k for k = 0, 1, 2, .......
and Λt,t+k = βk( CtCt+k
PQ,t
PQ,t+k
) is the stochastic discount factor, Ψt(.) is the cost function and
Qt+k|k denotes output in period t + k for a firm that last reset its price in period t. The first
order condition associated with the problem above takes the form
∞∑
k=0
λkp{Λt,t+kQt+k|k(P∗Q,t −M.Ψt+k) = 0 (4.55)
where ψt+k|t ≡ Ψ′t+k(Qt+k|t) denotes the nominal marginal cost in period t + k for a firm
that last reset its price in period t andM = Q
Q−1 . The real marginal cost of a retail firm is
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obtained by inverting the hiring rate condition given by (4.31), so that the real marginal
cost is
PWt =
1
at
[ Wit
PC,t
+ κtxit − βEtΛt,t+1 κt+12 x
2
it+1 − ρβEtΛt,t+1κt+1xit+1
]
(4.56)
Real marginal costs thus depend on unit labor costs, plus terms that correct for the
adjustment costs of hiring workers. Observe that since we have normalized the relative
price of final output at unity, the retailer’s markup is given by µpt = 1/PWt . Since final
goods prices are sticky and wholesale prices are flexible, this markup will in general
exhibit cyclical behavior, with the direction depending on the nature of the disturbances
hitting the economy, as well as other features of the model. Finally as shown in the
appendix, by log linearizing expressions for the price index and the optimal reset price
equation (4.55), we obtain a relation for the consumer price inflation which is the core
inflation (that does not include oil price) as follows
pˆiQ,t = ιbpˆiQ,t−1 + ιoPˆWt + ι f EtpˆiQ,t+1 (4.57)
where ιb =
γ
1+βγ , ιo =
(1−βλp)(1−λp)
λp
, ι f =
β
1+βγ . Since real marginal cost P
W
t feed into the
determination of prices through the new Keynesian Phillips curve, this in turn establishes
a direct channel of real wage rigidities to translate to aggregate inflation. Also note
that because of the partial indexation rule in the optimal price resetting equation of the
retailers, there is a substantial backward looking component included in the Phillips
curve relation.
4.2.8 GDP and Deflator
Let us now define the Value added or GDP, Yt as follows:
PY,tYt = PQ,tQt − PO,tOt (4.58)
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Correspondingly the GDP deflator PY,t is implicitly defined as
PQ,t ≡ (Py,t)αN+αK (Po,t)αO (4.59)
4.2.9 Monetary Policy Rule
We assume that the monetary policy follows a simple forward looking rule given by the
equation below:
Rt
R¯
=
(Rt−1
R¯
)ρR[(EtpiQ,t+1
piQ
)φpi( Yt
Ynt
)φy]1−ρR
(4.60)
where piQ and R¯ denote the steady state values of inflation, and Ynt denotes the potential
level of output of the economy i.e, the value of output when there are no frictions and all
prices are flexible. Note that the monetary policy rule is such that the Federal Reserve
targets the core inflation defined before as piQ,t.
4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Effects of Oil Price Shocks
Having described the model and the equilibrium dynamics of prices and quantities, given
the exogenous process for technology and the real price of oil, and the description for the
monetary policy rule. We will now use these conditions to characterize the economy’s
response to an oil price shock.
We will assume that in the steady state Z = 0 i.e., we abstract from technology
shocks. Further we assume that the real price of oil follows an AR(1) process
so,t = ρsost−1 + t (4.61)
Next we will assess quantitatively the four hypothesis of the changing effects of oil price
shocks.
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4.3.1 Calibration
We divide our simulation exercise in two different parts. First, we will examine the
ability of the model described above to see how it can reproduce the impulse responses
of the effects of oil shock on the U.S. economy. In the second stage, we will vary our
important parameter values to see how the impulse responses of output and inflation
changed in the post 1984 period. Table 4.3 displays the value of the parameters that are
kept unchanged through the various model variants in the simulation exercise. In order
to properly assess the high rate of job finding that characterizes the US labor market,
we opt for a monthly calibration. The key parameters of the business cycle literature
are calibrated at conventional values: the chosen discount factor is chosen at 0.99 which
implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 4%, capital depreciates by 10% on
an annual basis, the labor share is equal to 0.7. The share of oil in the production
and consumption are set at their high value (pre 1984 value) such that αO = 0.05 and
χc = 0.023. Further, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties of retail products if set at 10, such that the steady state markup is close to 10%.
The parameter for the elasticity of the capital utilization rate to the rental rate of capital
ην is taken to be equal to 0.4285 from the estimates of Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008).
There are six parameters that are specific to the conventional search and matching
framework: the job survival rate ρ, the elasticity of matches to unemployment σ, the
matching function constant σm, the worker’s bargaining power parameter η, the labor
adjustment cost parameter κ, and the unemployment flow value b¯.We choose the average
monthly separation rate 1 − ρ based on the observation that jobs last about two years
and a half. Therefore we set ρ = 1 − 0.035. We choose the elasticity of matches to
unemployment σ = 0.5, the midpoint of the values typically used in the literature.5 The
5The values for σ used in the literature are: 0.24 in Hall (2005a), 0.4 in Blanchard and Diamond
(1989), Andolfatto (1994) and Merz (1995), 0.45 in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), 0.5 in Hagedorn and
175
parameter σm is chosen to be equal to 1. To maintain comparability with much of the
existing literature, we set the bargaining power parameter η to be equal to 0.5. One of
the few studies that provides direct estimates is Flinn (2006), who finds a point estimates
of 0.4, close to the value we use. We then use the adjustment cost parameter, κ, and the
flow unemployment value, b¯, to target the average job finding probability, s = 0.45 and
the value of b˜ defined as the ratio of the unemployment flow value b¯ to the steady state
contribution of the worker to the match, given by
b˜ =
b¯
PW a¯ + β(κ/2)x2
We follow much of the literature by assuming that the value of non work activities
is far below what workers produce on the job (see Hall, NBER Macroannual, 2005,
p. 121, for a brief discussion). In particular, we specifically follow Shimer (2005a)
and Hall (2005c) and choose b˜ = 0.4. This requires setting b¯ = 1.46 and κ = 148.2.
This parameterization implies a ratio of adjustment costs to output equal to 1%. In
addition, under the interpretation of b¯ as unemployment benefits, it implies a steady
state replacement ratio of 0.42 (since the steady state ratio of the wage to the workers
contribution to the job is 0.956.)
Next we have to calibrate the parameters of wage renegotiation frequency λw and
the price stickiness parameter λp. For the wage stickiness parameter λw, we take the
estimate in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) which is equal to 0.72 for quarterly data,
which implies the monthly wage stickiness parameter is equal to 0.889. Regarding the
price stickiness parameter, we take the estimated reported in Gertler, Sala and Trigari
(2008) which says that for quarterly data the price rigidity parameter is λp = 0.72,
which gives a monthly value of about 0.95. Finally for the monetary policy parameters,
we choose the parameters reported in Orphanides (2001) for the pre-Volcker period.
The details on this is provided on the section on monetary policy.
Manovskii (2006), 0.5 in Farmer (2004), 0.72 in Shimer (2005a).
176
4.3.2 Calibration Results and Model Evaluation
The benchmark impulse responses are done with the parameter values calibrated for the
first sample 1960:1-1983:12. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 shows the impulse response functions
to a negative oil shock of 10% in an economy described above with staggered wage
bargaining and nominal price rigidity. It is clear that the presence of real wage rigidity
introduces a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization: inflation goes up and
output decreases, the nominal interests rate increases more than proportionately with
respect to the inflation rate. Moreover, in this staggered price economy unemployment
increases and the output gap increases. Given that firms cannot adjust real wages they
are forced to reduce their demand for labor. Therefore unemployment increases. The
qualitative features of the responses presented in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 are broadly in line
with those obtained in the literature. The oil price shock generates inflationary and
recessionary pressures as well as a reduction in real wages and an increase in the markup.
The model is able to replicate most of the responses observed in the empirical im-
pulse responses provided in Section 3. GDP Yt falls and employment Nt falls. Both core
CPI inflation (piQ,t) and headline CPI inflation (piC,t) show a rise. While the headline CPI
(which includes both oil and food prices) rises immediately due to a permanent rise in
the price of oil. However it takes about two months for this oil price rise to feed into
core CPI. Both the price markup and the wage markup exhibit countercyclicality which
is in line with Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The tables below give the 3 and 6 months impulse responses for GDP Yt, employ-
ment Nt and core CPI piQ,t along with their two-standard deviation error bands. The
responses of employment Nt is closer to the data than the Blanchard and Gali (2007).
The elaborate labor market with search and matching frictions is better able to capture
the data. Also the impulse responses of core CPI inflation piQ,t better matches the data
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Figure 4.4: Model Impulse Responses
since we also have a forward looking monetary policy rule that incorporates the inflation
expectations and output gap.
4.3.3 Testing the Hypothesis
What are the factors that account for the rather small impulse responses of GDP, em-
ployment and inflation in the post 1984 period? In the previous sections, we have offered
four hypotheses of the declining effect of oil price fluctuations. The first is the decline in
oil intensity, second is the decline in real wage rigidity, third is the decline in aggregate
price stickiness and the fourth is the change in the monetary policy stance of the Federal
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Table 4.3: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Mechanism Value
Conventional Parameters
β Discount Factor (0.99)1/3
αN Labor share in production 0.7
αO Oil share in production 0.04
χc Oil share in consumption 0.023
δ Depreciation rate 0.025/3
Q elasticity of subs between varieties 10
Labor Market Parameters
s Job finding rate 0.45
1 − ρ Job Separation rate 0.035
σ elasticity of matches to unemployment 0.5
η worker’s bargaining power 0.5
λw wage stickiness 0.889
γ Indexation 0.5
Monetary Policy Parameters
R¯ Steady state interest rate 1.53
φpi Weight on expected future inflation 1.64
φy Weight on output gap 0.57
ρR Interest Rate Smoothing Parameter 0.68
Other Parameters
λp Price Stickiness 0.95
σo Standard deviation of oil shock 0.012
ρso Persistence of oil shock (0.97)1/3
ην Elasticity of capital utilization 0.4285
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Figure 4.5: Model Impulse Responses
Table 4.4: Benchmark Impulse Responses of GDP (Yt)
1960-1983 1984-2005
3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
Data -0.0095 -0.0631 -0.0023 -0.0120
(-0.016, -0.003) (-0.093, -0.034) (-0.005, 0.001) (-0.025, 0.003)
BG -0.0623 -0.1192 -0.0480 -0.0765
Model -0.0425 -0.0525 -0.0154 -0.0173
(-0.032, -0.053) (-0.039, -0.063) (-0.012, 0.019) (-0.013, -0.021)
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Table 4.5: Benchmark Impulse Responses of Employment (Nt)
1960-1983 1984-2005
3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
Data 0.0150 0.0079 0.0018 0.0108
(-0.006, 0.036) (-0.022, 0.038) (-0.011, 0.013) (-0.006, 0.025)
BG 0.0623 0.1192 0.0480 0.0765
Model 0.0029 0.0087 0.0010 0.0021
(0.002, 0.004) (0.007, 0.011) (0.001, 0.001) (0.002, 0.003)
Table 4.6: Benchmark Impulse Responses of Core Inflation (piQ,t)
1960-1983 1984-2005
3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
Data 0.6949 0.9144 1.6404 2.0568
(0.275, 1.115) (0.353, 1.476) (1.271, 2.087) (1.523, 2.703)
BG 0.0266 0.0509 0.0480 0.0765
Model 0.2986 0.9362 0.1790 0.6932
(0.227, 0.370) (0.712, 1.161) (0.136, 0.222) (0.527, 0.860)
Reserve. In this section, we will consider one factor at a time. First we calibrate the
parameters of oil share in production and consumption to their post 1984 values (as in
Blanchard and Gali (2008)). The table below shows the change in the values of the
impulse responses of GDP after we reduce the oil share in production αO = 0.025 and
the oil share in consumption to χc = 0.017 in the first line. In the second line, we reduce
both the nominal and the real wage rigidity, by reducing the nominal wage stickiness
parameter from its benchmark value of λw = 0.889 to λw = 0.833 and the value of the
worker’s bargaining power parameter from η = 0.5 to η = 0.4. In the third line, we alter
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the value of nominal price stickiness from λp = 0.95 to λp = 0.90. We can see that in
all the three cases, the response of output decline is reduced. It is seen that as much as
50% of the decline in output response in the 3, 6 and 12 months case is accounted for by
the increase in oil efficiency. The next most important cause of decline in the response
of output in both the 3 and 6 months cases is the decline in real rigidity in the form of
bargaining power of the union η., while for the 12 months case, the next most important
cause of the decline in output response in the decline in the aggregate price rigidity.
For the core inflation, for both the 3 and 12 months case, the largest decline in
the response of inflation is caused by the decrease in real wage rigidity. About 12%
of the decline in the inflation response in the 3 month case is accounted for by the
decline in real wage rigidity, whereas about 47% of the decline in the inflation response
is accounted for by the decline in real wage rigidity. The increase in oil efficiency is
the next most important factor that is instrumental for the muted response of inflation.
However increase in the aggregate price flexibility understandably leads to a greater
short run pass through of oil price increase to the core inflation. Thus the hypotheses
advanced in the paper seem to have good explanatory power in explaining the reduced
impact of oil price shocks.
4.4 Role of Monetary Policy
A number of alternative hypotheses for how a monetary policy change may have con-
tributed to the improvement in macroeconomic performance during the post 1990s have
been advanced. One widely known view is the result of recent influential studies on
monetary policy rules, notably Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Taylor (1999).
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Table 4.7: Experiments with GDP
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Benchmark -0.0425 -0.0525 -0.0546
Oil Efficiency
(αO = 0.025, χC = 0.017) -0.0205 -0.0252 -0.0261
Real Wage Rigidity
(λw = 0.833, η = 0.4) -0.0342 -0.0395 -0.0402
Price Rigidity
(λp = 0.9) -0.0340 -0.0385 -0.0386
Table 4.8: Experiments with Core Inflation
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Benchmark 0.2986 0.9362 1.4494
Oil Efficiency
(αO = 0.025, χC = 0.017) 0.2908 0.5855 0.8182
Real Wage Rigidity
(λw = 0.833, η = 0.4) 0.2629 0.6013 0.7753
Price Rigidity
(λp = 0.9) 0.3280 0.1.4576 2.1094
This view emphasizes the important insight that successful monetary policy requires a
strong response to expected inflation, such that an increase in expected inflation prompts
a more than proportional increase of short-term nominal interest rates. CGG and Tay-
lor argue that the difference in performance from the pre 1984 to the post 1984 can be
squarely traced to a shift in this response associated with Paul Volcker’s appointment as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979. In essence, these authors argue that during
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the Great Inflation the Federal Reserve pursued a policy that accommodated inflation
and induced instability in the economy by lowering real interest rates when expected
inflation increased and vice versa. This perverse practice, they suggest, ended with
Volcker’s appointment as Chairman, thus restoring monetary stability in the economy.
An alternative view on how policy may have improved since 1984 onwards identifies
changes in the response of policy to economic activity, as opposed to expected inflation.
In this view, policy was excessively activist during the Great Inflation, a result of policy-
maker overconfidence in their ability to stabilize deviations of output from the economys
potential supplythe output gap. As shown by Orphanides (1998), if policymakers mis-
takenly adopt policies that are optimal under the presumption that their understanding
of the state of the economy is accurate when, in fact, such accuracy is lacking, they
inadvertently induce instability in both inflation and economic activity. According to
this view, the instability associated with the pre 1984 period was the unintended out-
come of excessively activist policies chasing output targets that proved overambitious,
retrospectively. By the end of the 1970s, the instability and inflationary impetus of these
activist policies was finally recognized and policy subsequently improved by becoming
less activist.
The behavior of inflation since the 1960s offers indisputable evidence that monetary
policy was highly accommodative during the Great Inflation but much less so afterwards.
Figure 4.5 compares the behavior of inflation and the federal funds rate from 1966 to
1995. As is evident, the federal funds rate was consistently much higher than inflation
since the late 1970s than it was earlier. This change is suggestive of a dramatic reversal
in policy at that time. To identify more precisely whether and how monetary policy
differed before and after Volcker’s appointment, CGG estimate and compare forward-
looking monetary policy rules responding to the outlook of inflation and economic ac-
tivity for each era. Their estimation also suggests that, even after controlling for policy
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responses to economic activity, the Federal Reserve adjusted real interest rates in a per-
verse manner prior to Volcker’s appointment but not after. In their estimation, however,
CGG do not employ information that was available to the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) when monetary policy decisions were made but instead rely on ex post
constructed data as proxies. As they carefully acknowledge, this raises some questions
regarding the interpretation of the results. Indeed, CGG conclude that the fundamen-
tal problem they raise for the pre 1984 inflationary episode is that the Federal Reserve
maintained persistently low short-term real interest rates in the face of high inflation. Or-
phanides (2001) revisits the issue and examine the evolution of monetary policy from
the 1960s to the 1990s using exclusively information that was available to the FOMC
when policy decisions were made. Specifically he estimated a forward-looking mone-
tary policy reaction function such as proposed by CGG for the periods before and after
Paul Volckers appointment as Chairman in 1979 using this real-time information.
Estimation results suggest broad similarities in policy over the two periods. In partic-
ular, and in contradiction to findings based on the ex post constructed data, the evidence
points to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to infla-
tion forecasts both before and after Volckers appointment as Chairman. This suggests
that policymakers during the Great Inflation did not commit an error as egregious as the
perverse response to inflation would suggest. The evidence, however, does not absolve
monetary policy from the macroeconomic instability experienced during the pre 1984
era. As we discuss, the policy rule describing policy during the Great Inflation was
excessively activist in its response to the output gap, especially in light of the outsized
misperceptions regarding potential output that were only understood much later. By
contrast, the evidence suggests that policy after 1979 did not exhibit the same degree
of activism, resulting in a reduction of emphasis to the output gap relative to inflation
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Figure 4.6: FFR and Inflation Rate
in setting policy. Contemporaneous accounts provide additional support for the view
that an intentional reduction in policy activism along these lines followed Paul Volck-
ers appointment as Federal Reserve Chairman. The policy record suggests that rapidly
changing economic developments during 1979 forced a critical reconsideration of pol-
icy that year. This subtle policy improvement in the aftermath of the Great Inflation
contributed to the improved macroeconomic performance of the Long
Orphanides (2001) also estimates a forward-looking Taylor rule but uses real-time
data on forecasts of GDP deflator inflation and the output gap made by Federal Reserve
Board staff for FOMC meetings. His estimates suggest that the Fed had a strong reaction
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Table 4.9: Baseline Estimates from Orphanides (2001)
R¯ φpi φy ρR
Pre-Volcker 1.53 1.64 0.57 0.68
Volcker-Greenspan 1.31 1.80 0.27 0.79
to inflation forecasts both before and after 1979. The weight on the output gap in rules
estimated using pre-1979 data is higher because of real-time uncertainty about the level
of potential GDP. Federal Reserve Board staff forecasts did not correctly perceive that
potential output growth slowed in the early 1970s, and so the perceived output gap was
larger than the actual output gap.
Monetary policy rule postulated by Orphanides (2001) estimates the following for-
ward looking Taylor equation
Rt = ρRRt−1 + φpi(1 − ρR)(Etpit+1 − pi∗) + φy(1 − ρR)(yt − y∗t ) + ηt (4.62)
where Rt denote the nominal interest rate (Federal Funds Rate). In estimating a
policy reaction function such as (4.62), the objective is to describe how policy responded
over time to the outlook of inflation and economic activity as understood when policy
decisions were made. Ideally, to capture the intent of policy as closely as possible,
estimation of (4.62) is based on consistent forecasts of inflation and the output gap, as
formed by policymakers themselves (using real time data), and reflecting concepts of
these variables with uniform meanings over time.
The tables and below presents the estimation results for equation (4.62).
We will now see the model impulse responses for 3, 6 and 12 months for the es-
timated parameter values in the benchmark case (pre-Volcker period) and the impulse
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Table 4.10: Impulse Responses to Oil Price Shock on Yt
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Benchmark -0.0699 -0.0966 -0.0992
Monetary Policy (V-G) -0.0678 -0.0933 -0.0951
Table 4.11: Impulse Responses to Oil Price Shock on piQ,t
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Benchmark 0.2465 0.3558 0.7416
Monetary Policy (V-G) 0.2391 0.3325 0.7033
responses for the estimated parameters in the Volcker-Greenspan (V-G) period. It is
clear from the values of the impulse responses that under the estimated parameters [pro-
vided by Orphanides (2001)] of the V-G period, the impulses are significantly lower -
decline in output for 3, 6 and 12 months are close to 3% and the decline for core inflation
piQ,t for 3, 6 and 12 months are about 4-6% respectively. This decline in the responses
for both GDP and inflation suggests a clear role of the change in the stance of the Fed-
eral Reserve’s monetary policy. These impulse response estimates are in line with our
story of the role of the change in the monetary policy in reducing the impact of oil price
shock in the post 1984 episode.
4.5 Multisector Extension
Currently we are working on a multisector extension of the single sector model de-
scribed above. The idea is to see how the change in the sectoral composition of the
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U.S. economy (economy becoming more service oriented) leads to a much smaller re-
sponse of oil price shocks post 1984s. Not only that the sectors differ significantly in
terms of energy intensities. Various studies have shown that sectoral heterogeneity in
price stickiness, energy intensity, cost shares play important role in determining the ag-
gregate impulse responses. While the cost share of energy may be small in aggregate
economic activity, energy inputs are of considerable importance to individual sectors of
the economy and therefore identifying these sectors and studying whether these were
responsible for the recessions of the 1970s looks to be an important agenda in the study
of oil shocks.
4.5.1 Changes in the share of energy
An explanation that we have offered in this study is that there has been a change in
the economy’s underlying structure and that has induced a reduction in the importance
of energy in the US economy. There is sufficient evidence of this decline in energy
intensity, with the US Energy Information Administration reporting a drop in “energy
intensity” of GDP from an index value of 100 in 1980 to a value of about 62 in 2000.
However calibrating the importance of this factor is nontrivial. In this work, following
Blanchard and Gali (2008), we suppose that production function for domestic output
takes the Cobb-Douglas form given in (4.24). Here the technological parameter αO is
taken to be equal to the value of energy inputs to the value of domestic output, and
this ratio is always independent of the price of energy. However it is well known that
increase in the price of energy raise the ratio of energy inputs over the value of produced
output. This clearly suggests that the elasticity of demand for energy is less than one
and therefore constant shares model is not ideal. Hence we are trying the nested CES
production function of the following form used quite extensively in the energy literature:
189
Qt = ZtNαN [(α)
1
e (Kt)
e−1
e + (1 − α) 1e (Ot) e−1e ]( ee−1 )(1−αN )
where e denotes the elasticity of substitution between oil and capital.
4.6 Conclusion
We have shown in the paper that the effects of oil price shocks have changed over time,
with steadily smaller effects on prices and wages, as well as on output and employment.
We have seen that the stories offered at the start of the paper are each responsible for a
more muted response of oil shock on the US economy in the post 1984 period. The first
and most important factor seem to be the decline in the oil intensity in both consump-
tion and production side. The decline is large enough to have significant quantitative
implications. The second plausible cause for these changes is a decrease in real wage
rigidities. The development of a richer labor market model than the one in Blanchard
and Gali (2008) helps understanding of the real wage rigidities and its decline in the
post 1984 episode much better, and therefore its quantitative implications are also better.
Thirdly there is a huge literature on the increased competitiveness of the manufacturing
sector. Therefore prices are more flexible today than it was in the pre 1984 period. Al-
though there is no available estimates for the degree of price stickiness separately for the
pre and post 1984 period, we can see that increasing the price flexibility of the aggregate
price index leads to a substantial decline in the response of GDP and prices. This makes
us hopeful that an estimation of the price stickiness parameters for the two sample will
give us better quantitative results with respect to the model impulses. Finally with re-
gards to monetary policy, it is widely accepted that the Federal Reserve now targets core
CPI inflation, and thus inflation expectations are anchored much better today than it was
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in the pre 1984 period. Using estimates from Orphanides (2001), we see that the esti-
mated coefficients of the monetary policy rule in the post 1984 period makes inflation
much lower as compared to the pre 1984 period.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1: EQUATIONS AND THEIR DERIVATIONS
Derivation of U.S. Household’s first order conditions
At time t, households in the oil importing country U.S. maximize the present dis-
counted value of their utility given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct,Nt) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
At log Ct − ζt N
1+γ
t
1 + γ
]
(A1)
subject to
Ct( j) + It( j) + τt +
dt( j)
RtPt
+
eF,tBF,t( j)
PtR∗t φF,t
+
eo,tBo,t( j)
PtRot φo,t
=
Wt( j)Nt( j)
Pt
+ S t( j) (A2)
+
[rtut( j)K pt ( j)
Pt
− a(ut( j))K pt ( j)
]
+
dt−1( j)
Pt
+
eF,tBF,t−1( j)
Pt
+
eo,tBo,t−1( j)
Pt
+
Πt( j)
Pt
K pt+1 = (1 − δ)K pt + sIt
[
1 − S
( It
It−1
)]
It (A3)
Let λ1t denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (A2) and λ2t denote the La-
grangian multiplier associated with (A3). The household maximizes (A1) subject to
(A2) and (A3) with respect to (Ct, Bt, ut,K
p
t+1, It). The first order conditions are given by:
Ct :
At
Ct
− λ1t = 0 (A4)
BH,t : λ1t = βRtEt
(λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
)
(A5)
BF,t : λ1t = βφF,tR∗t Et
(λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
eF,t
eF,t+1
))
(A6)
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Bo,t : λ1t = βφo,tRot Et
(λ1t+1Pt
Pt+1
eo,t
eo,t+1
)
(A7)
ut :
rt
Pt
= a′(ut) (A8)
K pt+1 : q
k
t = βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t
[
rt+1ut+1 − a(ut+1) + (1 − δ)qkt+1
]
(A9)
It : sItqkt
[
1−S
( It
It−1
)]
= sItqktS′
( It
It−1
)( It
It−1
)
−βEtsIt+1qkt+1
λ1t+1
λ1t
S′
( It+1
It
)( It+1
It
)2
+1 (A10)
where qkt =
λ1t
λ2t
is the price of installed capital in consumption units.
U.S. Firms’ Price Setting Equations
A domestic firm reoptimizing in period t will choose the price P˜H,t that maximizes the
current market value of profits generated while that price remains effective. Therefore it
solves the problem
max
P˜H,t
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λt,t+k
(
P˜H,tQt+k|t − Ψt+k(Qt+k|t)
)}
(A11)
subject to the sequence of demand functions
Qt+k|t =
( P˜H,t
PH,t+k
)−Θpt
Qt+k (A12)
PH,t =
[
(1 − λp)P˜1−ΘptH,t + λpP1−ΘptH,t−1
]1/1−Θpt
(A13)
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−Θpt
di (A14)
∆t = λppi
Θpt
t ∆t−1 + (1 − λp)
( P˜H,t
PH,t
)−Θpt
(A15)
The first order condition associated with the problem above takes the following form:
∞∑
k=0
λkpEt
{
Λt,t+kQt+k|t
(
P˜H,t(Θpt+k − 1) − Θpt+kψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (A16)
Derivation of OPEC’s Markup
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Pot Ot = αOψtQt∆t and ψt =
(Wt)αN (rt)αK (Pot )
αO
Ztα
αN
N α
αK
K α
αO
O
imply
Pot =
αO(Kt)
1
1−αO
Ot
(A17)
where Kt = W
αN
t r
αK
t N
αN
t K
αK
t
α
αN
N α
αK
K
The definition of markup implies the following equation for OPEC’s markup
µot =
αOK
1
1−αO
t Zo,t
OtδP
opec
t
=
α∗O(K ∗t )
1
1−α∗O Zo,t
O∗t δP
opec
t
(A18)
Steady State Equations
1. U.S. Economy
1. Consumption Euler Equation: 1 = Rβ = R∗β
2. Consumption and Savings: 1 = β(1 − δ + r)
3. Investment: qk = 1; δK = I
4. Capital Utilization: u = 1, rP = a
′(1) = a1
5. GDP Deflator Inflation: piH = 1
6. CPI Inflation: pi = 1
7. Price Dispersion: ∆ = 1
8. Marginal Cost: ψ = (W)
αN (r)αK (Po)αo
(αN )αN (αK )αK (αO)αo
9. Price Setting: P˜H =
Θp
Θp−1ψ
10. Wage Setting: W
∗
P =
Θw
Θw−1 MRS
11. Oil Demand: Po = αOψQO
12. Labor Demand: W = αNψQN
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13. Capital Demand: r = αKψQK
14. Consumer Price: P =
[
b(PH)1−η + (1 − b)(PF)1−η
] 1
1−η
15. Government Budget Balance: G = τ
2. Rest of the World
16. Production: Q∗ = Z∗O∗
17. Marginal Cost: ψ∗ = P
o
Z∗
18. Price Setting: P˜F =
Θp
Θp−1ψ
∗
19. Foreign CPI: P∗ =
[
(1 − b)(P∗H)1−η + b(P∗F)1−η
] 1
1−η
20. Law of One Price: PH = eP∗H, PF = eP
∗
F
3. OPEC
21. Oil Production: Qo = ZoKo
22. OPEC Price: Popec =
[
1/2(PH)1−η + 1/2(PF)1−η
] 1
1−η
23. Consumption Euler Equation: 1 = β
[
Po
Popec Zo + (1 − δ)
]
4. Market Clearing
24. Oil Market: Qo = O + O∗
25. U.S. Goods Market Equilibrium: Q = CH + IH + GH + C∗H + C
o
H + I
o
H
26. Foreign Importing Country Goods Market Equilibrium: Q∗ = CF + IF +C∗F +C
o
F + I
o
F
27. U.S. GDP: Y = PH
(
CH + IH + GH
)
+ PH
(
C∗H + C
o
H + I
o
H
)
− PoO − PF
(
CF + IF
)
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28. Net Foreign Assets: eF BF + PHC∗H = PF
(
CF + IF
)
+ eF BFR∗
29. U.S. OPEC Trade Balance: eoBo + PoO = PH
(
CoH + I
o
H
)
+ eoBoRo
30. OPEC ROW Trade Balance: eoB∗o + P
oO∗ = PF
(
CoF + I
o
F
)
+
eoB∗o
Ro
31. Bonds Market Equilibrium: BF + B∗F = 0 and Bo + B
∗
o + B
o = 0
32. Interest Rate: R = R∗ = Ro
The Log Linearized Model
1. U.S. Firms
1. pˆiH,t = Et[PˆH,t+1] − PˆH,t
2. ˆ˜PH,t = (1 − βλp)(ψˆt − (Θp − 1)−1Θˆp,t) + βλpEt[ ˆ˜PH,t+1]
3. PˆH,t = λpPˆH,t−1 + (1 − λp) ˆ˜PH,t
4. ∆ˆt − ΘpPˆH,t = λp(∆ˆt−1 − ΘpPˆH,t−1) − (1 − λp)Θp ˆ˜PH,t
5. Pˆot = ψˆt + Qˆt + ∆ˆt − Oˆt
6. Wˆt = ψˆt + Qˆt + ∆ˆt − Lˆt
7. rˆt = ψˆt + Qˆt + ∆ˆt − Kˆt
8. Qˆt = Zˆt + αN Lˆt + αoOˆt + αK Kˆt − ∆ˆt
9. µˆp,t = PˆH,t − ψˆt − ∆ˆt
10. µ¯pµˆp,t = µ1 XQ (Xˆt − Qˆt)
11. α−1X(Xˆt − pˆit) = Et
[
(PH PˆH,t − ψ(ψˆt + ∆ˆt))Q − (PH − ψ)QQˆt + XXˆt+1
]
2. U.S. Households
12. K pKˆ pt = (1 − δ)K pKˆ pt−1 + I(Iˆt + sˆIt)
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13. Kˆt+1 = uˆt + Kˆ
p
t
14. Rˆt + Cˆt + Et[Aˆt+1 − Cˆt+1] − Aˆt − pˆit = 0
15. pˆit = Et[Pˆt+1] − Pˆt
16. P1−ηPˆt = bP
1−η
H PˆH,t + (1 − b)P1−ηF PˆF,t
17. CˆH,t = η(Pˆt − PˆH,t) + Cˆt
18. CˆF,t = η(Pˆt − PˆF,t) + Cˆt
19. IˆH,t = η(Pˆt − PˆH,t) + Iˆt
20. IˆF,t = η(Pˆt − PˆF,t) + Iˆt
21. rˆt = Pˆt +
a′′(1)
a′(1) uˆt
22. qkqˆkt = pˆit + Et
[
r(rˆt+1 + uˆt+1) − a′(1)uˆt+1 + (1 − δ)qkqˆkt+1
]
23. Iˆt = 11+β It−1 +
1/S′′(1)
1+β (qˆ
k
t + sˆIt) +
β
1+βEt(It+1)
24. qˆkt = β(1 − δ)Etqkt+1 + (1 − β(1 − δ))Etrˆkt+1 − (rˆt − Etpˆit+1)
25. ˆ˜Wt =
1−βλw
1+γΘw
(
− Θˆw,t
Θw−1 + Pˆt + Cˆt − Aˆt + ζˆt + γLˆt + γΘwWˆt
)
+ βλwEt[Wˆt+1]
26. Wˆt = λwWˆt−1 + (1 − λw) ˆ˜Wt
3. Rest of the World
27. Qˆ∗t = Zˆ
∗
t + α
∗
oOˆ
∗
t − ∆ˆ∗t
28. Pˆot = ψˆt + Qˆt + ∆ˆt − Oˆt + eˆt
29. pˆiF,t = Et[PˆF,t+1] − PˆF,t
30. (P∗)1−ηPˆt = (1 − b)(P∗H)1−ηPˆ∗H,t + b(P∗F)1−ηPˆ∗F,t
31. Rˆ∗t + Cˆ
∗
t − Et[Cˆ∗t+1] − pˆi∗t = 0
32. Cˆ∗H,t = η(Pˆ
∗
t − PˆH,t) + Cˆ∗t
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33. Cˆ∗F,t = η(Pˆ
∗
t − PˆF,t) + Cˆ∗t
34. ˆ˜P∗F,t = (1 − βλp)ψˆ∗t + βλpEt
[ ˆ˜P∗F,t+1]
35. Pˆ∗F,t = λpPˆ
∗
F,t−1 + (1 − λp) ˆ˜P∗F,t
36. ∆ˆ∗t − ΘpPˆ∗F,t = λp(∆ˆ∗t−1 − ΘpPˆ∗F,t−1) − (1 − λp)Θp ˆ˜P∗F,t
37. PˆH,t = eˆt + Pˆ∗H,t + κˆt
38. PˆF,t = eˆt + Pˆ∗F,t + κˆt
4. OPEC
39. Qˆo,t = Zˆo,t + Kˆo,t−1
40. KoKˆo,t = (1 − δ)KoKˆo,t−1 + Io Iˆo,t
41. (Popec)1−ηPˆopect =
1
2 P
1−η
H PˆH,t +
1
2 P
1−η
F PˆF,t
42. CˆoH,t = η(Pˆ
opec
t − PˆH,t) + Cˆot
43. CˆoF,t = η(Pˆ
opec
t − PˆF,t) + Cˆot
44. IˆoH,t = η(Pˆ
opec
t − PˆH,t) + Iˆot
45. IˆoF,t = η(Pˆ
opec
t − PˆF,t) + Iˆot
46. Popec(Et[Cˆot+1] − Cˆot + Pˆopect ) = β
(
PoZo(Et[Pˆot+1] + Zˆo,t) − (1 − δ)PopecPˆopect
)
47. Rˆo,t + Cˆot − Et[Cˆot+1] − pˆiot = 0
5. Market Clearing
48. QoQˆo,t = OOˆt + O∗Oˆ∗t
49. QQˆt = CHCˆH,t + IH IˆH,t + b
(
PH
P
)−η
a′(1)K puuˆt + GHGˆH,t + C∗HCˆ
∗
H,t + C
o
HCˆ
o
H,t + I
o
H Iˆ
o
H,t
50. Q∗Qˆ∗t = CFCˆF,t + IF IˆF,t + (1 − b)
(
PF
P
)−η
a′(1)K puuˆt + C∗FCˆ
∗
F,t + C
o
FCˆ
o
F,t + I
o
F Iˆ
o
F,t
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51. eoBo(eˆo,t + Bˆo,t−1) + PoO(Pˆot + Oˆt) = PHC
o
H(Pˆ
o
t + Cˆ
o
H,t) + PHI
o
H(Pˆ
o
t + Iˆ
o
H,t) +
eoBo
Ro
(eˆo,t +
Bˆo,t − φˆo,t − Rˆo,t)
52. eoB∗o(eˆo,t + Bˆ
∗
o,t−1) + P
oO∗(Pˆot + Oˆ
∗
t ) = PFC
o
F(Pˆ
o
t + Cˆ
o
F,t) + PF I
o
F(Pˆ
o
t + Iˆ
o
F,t) +
eoB∗o
Ro
(eˆo,t +
Bˆ∗o,t − φˆo,t − Rˆo,t)
53. 0 = −eF BF(eˆF,t + BˆF,t−1) − PHC∗H(PˆH,t + Cˆ∗H,t)PFCF(PˆF,t + CˆF,t) + PF IF(PˆF,t + IˆF,t)
+ (1 − b)PF
(
PF
P
)−η
a′(1)K puuˆt + eF BFR∗ (eˆF,t + BˆF,t − φˆF,t − Rˆ∗t )
54. YYˆt = CHCˆH,t + IH IˆH,t + GHGˆH,t + C∗HCˆ
∗
H,t + C
o
HCˆ
o
H,t + I
o
H Iˆ
o
H,t − P
o
PH
O(Pˆot − PˆH,t + Oˆt)
− PFPH (CF + IF)(PˆF,t − PˆH,t) − (1 − b) PFPH
(
PF
P
)−η
a′(1)K puuˆt
55. Et[eˆF,t+1] − eˆF,t = φˆF,t + Rˆ∗t − Rˆt
56. Et[eˆo,t+1] − eˆo,t = φˆo,t + Rˆo,t − Rˆt
57. φˆF,t = φ eFY BˆF,t
58. φˆo,t = φ eFY BˆF,t
6. Monetary policy and Phillips curve
59. Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1 − φR)(φpipˆit + φyYˆt)
60. piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 +
(1−βλp)(1−λp)
λp
mˆct
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2: DATASET DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE
The data are taken from various sources. The series names, data span, respective
sources and transformation codes along with a short description is given here. The
transformation codes are: 1 - no transformation; 2 - first difference; 4 - logarithm; 5 -
first difference of logarithm. Second differencing of logarithms was not used. The data
are monthly and the span for all series is 1972:2-2008:12.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3: EQUATIONS AND THEIR DERIVATIONS
Steady State Computations
Let y¯ denote the steady state value of a variable y. We assume that in steady state y¯ =
yt∀t.
1. Production Function
Q = NαN KαK OαO
2. Marginal Product of labor
a¯ = αN
Q
N
3. Rental rate of capital
r = PWαK
Q
K
4. Oil Price
PO = PWαO
Q
O
5. Consumption and Savings
1 = β(1 − δ + r)
6. Investment
qk = 1
7. Hiring rate
x = 1 − ρ
8. Flow
xN = su
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9. Unemployment
u = 1 − N
10. Matching
su = σmuσv1−σ
11. Hiring Condition
κx = PW a¯ − W¯ + βκ
2
x2 + βρκx
12. Wages
W¯ = χ(a¯ + β
κ
2
x2 + βκsx) + (1 − χ)b¯
χ =
η
η + (1 − η)µ/ , µ =
1
1 − λwβ,  =
1
1 − ρλwβ
13. Resource Constraints
PYY = PCC
PCC = PQQ − POO
14. Prices and Inflation
PC = P
χc
O P
1−χc
Q
15. Real Oil Price
S O =
PO
PQ
16. Markup
PQ
PW
=
Q
Q − 1
17. Consmption
C = [χ−χcc (1 − χc)−(1−χc)]CχcO C1−χcQ
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18. Consumption Share
PQCQ = (1 − χc)PcC
POCO = χcPCC
The Loglinearized Model
I Production, Consumption and Investment
(1) Production Function
Qˆt = αN Nˆt + αK Kˆt + αOOˆt
(2) Consumption-Savings
EtΛˆt,t+1 + (Rˆt − EtpˆiC,t+1) = 0
(3) Capital Utilization
νˆt = ηνrˆt
(4) Investment
Iˆt =
1
1 + β
Iˆt−1 +
1
ηk(1 + β)
qˆkt +
β
1 + β
Et(Iˆt+1)
ηk = S
′′
(γz) = S
′′
(1)
(5) Capital Renting
rˆt = PˆWt + Qˆt − Kˆt
(6) Oil Import
PˆO,t = PˆWt + Qˆt − Oˆt
(7) Tobin’s q
qˆkt = β(1 − δ)Etqˆkt+1 + [1 − β(1 − δ)]Etrˆt+1 − (Rˆt − EtpˆiC,t+1)
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II Search, Matching and Employment
(1) Matching
mˆt = σuˆt + (1 − σ)vˆt
(2) Employment Dynamics
Nˆt = Nˆt−1 + (1 − ρ)xˆt
sˆt = mˆt − uˆt
(3) Transition Probabilities
uˆ = −(N
u
)Nˆt−1
(4) Working capital
Kˆt = νˆt + KˆPt−1
(5) Physical capital
KˆPt = (1 − δ)KˆPt−1 + δIˆt
(6) Vacancies
xˆt = qˆt + vˆt − Nˆt−1
III Bargaining
(1) Hiring rate
xˆt = κa(PˆWt + aˆt) − κwWˆt + κλw EtΛˆt,t+1 + βEt xˆt+1
κ = (κx)−1,κa = κPW a¯,κw = κW¯,κλw = β(1 + ρ)/2
(2) Marginal Product of Labor
aˆt = Qˆt − Nˆt
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(3) Weight in Nash Bargaining
χˆt = −(1 − χ)(µˆt − ˆt)
ˆt = (ρλwβ)Et
[
Λˆt,t+1 − pˆiC,t+1 + γpˆiC,t + ˆt+1
]
µˆt = (xλwβ)Et xˆt+1 − (xλwβ)(κwµ)µEt(Wˆt + γpˆiC,t − pˆiC,t+1 − Wˆt+1)
+(λwβ)Et(µˆt+1Λˆt,t+1 + γpˆiC,t − pˆiC,t+1)
IV Wages
(1) Spillover free wage
Wˆ0t = ϕa(Pˆ
W
t + aˆt) + (ϕs + ϕx)Et xˆt+1 + ϕs sˆt+1
+ϕbbˆt + (ϕs + ϕx/2)EtΛˆt,t+1 + ϕχ[χˆt − (ρ − s)βEtχˆt+1]
ϕa = χPW a¯W¯−1, ϕx = χβκx2W¯−1
ϕb = (1 − χ)b¯W¯−1, ϕs = (1 − χ)sβH¯W¯−1, ϕχ = χ(1 − χ)−1κxW¯−1
(2) Wage
Wˆt = γb(Wˆt−1 − pˆiC,t + γpˆiC,t−1) + γ0Wˆ0t + γ f Et(Wˆt+1 + pˆiC,t+1 − γpˆit)
γb = (1 + τ2)φ−1
γ0 = (1 − λw)(1 − τ)λ−1w φ−1
γ f = (τλ−1w − τ1)φ−1
φ = (1 + τ2 + (1 − λw)(1 − τ)λ−1w + (τλ−1 − τ1)
γb + γ0 + γ f = 1
τ1 =
[
κwµϕx + ϕχ(1 − χ)(xβλw)(κwµ)µ(ρβ) + ϕsΓ
]
(1 − τ)
τ2 = −(κµ)ϕχ(1 − χ)(xβλw)µ(1 − τ)
Γ = (1 − ηxβλwµ)η−1µκw.
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V Inflation
(1) Phillips Curve
pˆiQ,t =
γ
(1 + β)γ
pˆiQ,t−1 +
(1 − βλp)(1 − λp)
λp
PˆWt +
β
1 + βγ
EtpˆiQ,t+1
(2) Taylor Rule
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + φpi(1 − ρR)(Etpit+1 − pi∗) + φy(1 − ρR)(yt − y∗nt)
VI Prices, GDP and GDP Deflator
(1) GDP
P¯Y Y¯(PˆY,t − Yˆt) = P¯QQ¯(PˆQ,t + Qˆt) − P¯OO¯(PˆO,t + Oˆt)
(2) GDP Deflator
PˆQ,t = (αN + αK)PˆY,t + αOPˆO,t
(3) Real Price of Oil
Sˆ o,t = PˆO,t − PˆQ,t
(4) Headline CPI
PˆC,t = χcPˆO,t + (1 − χc)PˆQ,t
pˆiC,t+1 = PˆC,t+1 − PˆC,t
pˆiQ,t+1 = PˆQ,t+1 − PˆQ,t
pˆiY,t+1 = PˆY,t+1 − PˆY,t
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